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ABSTRACT 
“The power to flourish: Unearthing the roots of Kenyan flower producers’ 
market access strategies.” 
Nungari Mwangi 
Powering Kenya’s agricultural economy, the Kenyan flower industry is prided as an 
example of successful African integration into global agricultural trade. Export markets 
are bifurcated due to a marked shift from the Dutch flower auctions and an increase 
in trade within ‘direct markets’ which includes supermarkets and florists. While flower 
production is dominated by a few vertically integrated, large scale flower farms (>100 
ha), mid-scale (20-80 hectares) and small-scale (>0.25 hectares) flower farms which 
are the focus of the thesis, face a unique set of challenges in terms of navigating 
access to the more stable direct markets.  
 
The overall narrative is that even in a buyer-driven market, Kenyan cut flower 
producers at the mid and small scale have agency, and they exercise their bargaining 
power for favourable export access by diversification and differentiation in strategies 
and networks. Two meta-narratives framing the sector coalesce around the 
development angle which showcases contestations around labour and environmental 
abuses and the political economy angle focusing on governance structures and power 
relations of production. This thesis goes deeper than these meta narratives by 
introducing micro-level, relational perspectives using the GPN framework, and asks 
what strategies Kenyan mid and small scale cut flower producers employ to navigate 
the shifts in export markets as producers diversify from the Dutch auctions towards 
supermarkets.   
 
My findings identify diversification as the common factor in mid and small scale 
producers’ strategies for securing a range of lucrative export markets. Producers’ 
enhance their bargaining power to access diverse markets through adaptable 
production, relationally through collective action, and in the regulatory sphere by 
circumvention, compliance or contestation for more favourable ‘rules of the game’. 
Going beyond labour and environmental analyses, the thesis uniquely analyses the 
knowledge economy originating from the cut flower sector as an undertheorized 









Consider the flowers: true only to the earth,  
Yet we lend them a fate, from the borders of fate 
And supervise their fadings, their little deaths.  
How right that we should author their regret 
- Don Paterson, The Flowers 
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1. Growing flowers in shifting sands: An introduction to 
the Kenyan cut flower industry 
 
1.1. Research questions and focus 
From the moment the Kenyan rose is planted, it begins its transformation into a 
commodity that is painstakingly designed to evoke spontaneity and romance in 
accordance with the demands of export markets. Kenyan cut flower producers have 
been actively shifting markets under pressure from a devalued euro1 and collapsed 
rouble2, stagnating demand in Europe and increasing global supply, looming tariffs 
due to uncertainties around negotiations on the Economic Partnership Agreement, 
increasingly narrow profit margins and producers’ desire for greater bargaining power. 
They strategically shift from the Dutch flower auction to supermarkets, from traditional 
markets in North and Western Europe to non-traditional markets in East Asia, 
Australia, and the UAE and from physical trading to e-commerce or remote sales.  
 
This thesis focusses on how small and mid-scale Kenyan producers navigate the shift 
in export markets bifurcated between the traditional trade stronghold of the Dutch 
auction system and powerfully emerging ‘direct markets’ which are typically 
supermarkets and large retailers. Production is also bifurcated between the dominant 
20-25 large scale, vertically integrated producers (< 80 ha) which produce 
approximately 75% of total cut flower exports (Hortiwise & FlowerWatch, 2012:21) on 
the one hand, and the mid-scale farms (20-80 hectares)3 and small-scale (0.125 to 3 
hectares)4 flower farms which are the focus of the thesis. The basic structure of the 
Kenyan flower industry is summarised in table 1.1. below5. Mid and small scale farms 
                                                 
1 This was mentioned in reference to the Euro crisis and the uncertainty about a Greek exit from the 
Eurozone  
2 The collapse of the rouble took effect in the second half of 2014 due to economic sanctions due to 
Russian’s annexation of Crimea and military intervention in the Ukraine, and the drop in crude oil 
prices. 
3 The Kenya Human Rights Commission report (2012) provides a slightly different scaling. Large 
farms are considered to be above 70 hectares, medium farms 22 – 69 hectares and small below 22 
hectares. The FAO does not provide a global standardized system for scaling. 
4 Dolan et al. (2002:16) categorise smallholders as those with 0.25 – 2 hectares of land. Bolo (2012: 
26) uses KARI’s (2003) categorization that small scale farmers produce on farms averaging between 
0.125 ha to 1ha in size. Based on field work, this thesis adopts the scale of 0.125 to 3 hectares to 
categorise smallholders.  
5 The large-scale producers category in table 1.1. is included and will remain a point of reference in 
characterising the Kenyan flower industry. However, the focus of this thesis is on mid and small scale 
flower farms.  
 2 
face specific challenges in terms of navigating access to the more stable direct 
markets, which elicits a diverse set of strategies to enhance their bargaining power 
and competitiveness in an industry that is dominated by giants.  
Basic structure of the Kenyan flower industry  
 
Table 1.1. 
Source: Dolan, Opondo, & Smith (2002:16).  
Updated with author’s analysis on farm scales, varieties and features 
 
With this scenario in mind, this thesis sets out by asking the question:  
“What strategies do Kenyan cut flower producer networks use in seeking greater 
bargaining power amidst shifts in export markets?” which seeks to shed light on the 
nature of the practices and relationships that make up producer strategies as they 
seek access in changing export markets in Europe and beyond. For mid-scale flower 
producers, it is a question of competitiveness and achieving stable relationships with 
buyers in export markets, which translates into becoming a preferred supplier to large 
retailers. From the perspective of small-scale cut flower producers, it is a question of 
access, survival and resilience in very choppy market waters. Further, for smallholder 
farmers it is a question of security of livelihoods as they typically grow summer flowers 
 3 
as part of a diversification strategy from traditional horticulture or export cash crops 
like tea. The thesis question probes into the agency of cut flower farmers in minimising 
coordination and transaction costs (particularly information costs) in a buyer-driven 
market where the Dutch auction and supermarkets greatly influence the governance 
of the value chain.  
 
My interest in the lives of mid and small-scale flower farms was spurred by a comment 
from a European industry official6 early on in my field work who said, “I doubt whether 
any farms smaller than sixty hectares will survive in this industry.” My ambition was to 
fill out the contours of the inner life of mid and small scale flower farms noting their 
embeddedness in the Kenyan economy and in the globalised European aesthetic 
commodity culture. Narratives of the politics, culture and economy of the flower 
industry have largely been the preserve of European scholars7 such as Gebhardt's 
(2014) ethnographic account of the making of Dutch flower culture. This thesis seeks 
to amplify the voice and power of producers situated in the Global South by narrating 
how they survive, thrive and position themselves in the global flower trade.  
 
The first sub-question evaluates the suitability of the Global Production Networks 
theory to analyse the landscape of actors in the cut flower industry, their relationships 
and development implications. This question guides the development of the thesis’ 
analytical framework in chapter three.  
Thesis sub-question 1: To what extent does the Global Production Networks 
framework explain how cut flower producers adapt to shifts in end markets? 
a) To what extent does GPN theory explain the interests and position of the 
variety of actors in the Kenyan cut flower production network in line with the 
shifts in end markets? 
b) To what extent does GPN theory help us to understand the strategies of 
actors as they bargain for market access? 
c) What are the strengths and limitations of GPN theory in explaining the 
development implications for the localities where the Kenyan cut flower 
network is embedded? 
                                                 
6 Anonymized. A receiver-manager of a large-scale flower farm in Naivasha.  
7 The body of literature on the political economy of the cut flower trade is explored in the literature 
review, chapter 2.  
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The second sub-question foregrounds practices and experiences of cut flower 
producer networks in adapting to the shifts in end markets discussed above, as well 
as to local production challenges.  
Thesis sub-question 2: What are the experiences of Kenyan cut flower producer 
networks in seeking greater bargaining power in European export markets? 
a. How do cut flower producer networks manoeuvre local production challenges 
to gain greater bargaining power in export markets? 
b. What is the role of intermediary firms in positioning cut flower producers in the 
changing export markets?  
c. What are the institutional pressures / constraints that cut flower producer 
networks face in seeking greater bargaining power in new export markets? 
 
The third sub-question discusses the development impact of the industry. It is 
premised on the critical but little recognised understanding that the flower industry is 
very knowledge intensive. Therefore, producers’ capabilities to adapt to changes in 
end markets are dependent on the generation, management and use of various forms 
of knowledge. This engages GPN 2.0’s relational concepts ‘value capture’ and 
‘strategic coupling’. 
Thesis sub-question 3: What is the nature of the interaction between cut flower 
producers’ activities and Kenya’s knowledge economy? 
a) To what extent do producer networks introduce new technologies and methods 
of production? 
b) How has the flower industry contributed to the systems of knowledge 
management in Kenya? e.g., development of Intellectual Property Protections 
c) To what extent are there linkages between producer networks and Kenyan 
systems of knowledge production/management? 
As will be explored in the literature review chapter, the development impact of the 
flower industry has been studied with regard to labour questions, environmental 
(mis)management as well as the significance of its contribution to foreign exchange. 
The research provides a unique knowledge-centred perspective that explores how the 
industry couples with the local economy.  
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1.2. Thesis structure 
This thesis analyses players, strategies and institutional interactions in the Kenyan 
flower industry, centred around three nodes – flower farms as relational sites of 
production, the link to export markets through wholesaler intermediaries (which this 
thesis refers to as consolidator-exporters for the purposes of clarity), and the web of 
governance that paves the way to European export markets. Despite the technical 
detail on production, this is neither a thesis on agronomy, nor on political ecology 
though it acknowledges both angles in the literature review8. Centred on the Global 
Production Networks theory, this thesis is situated at the intersection of the politics 
and economics of trade in high value horticulture from a producer perspective. True to 
the multi-disciplinary character of Development Studies, it is influenced by 
perspectives from International Development, Economic Geography, Agricultural 
economics, Agrarian studies, and Business, Trade and planning policy.  
 
Chapter two details the empirical and theoretical literature review. It identifies two main 
strands of empirical literature analysing the cut flower sector characterised as the 
development policy literature and critical political economy literature. The chapter goes 
on to engage the theoretical literature including a justification of the choice of the 
Global Production Network as the framework of analysis, institutional theories on the 
firm from a relational perspective, the literature on bargaining power and lastly on the 
knowledge economy. These chapters foreground my analytical framework which is 
explained in chapter three, and is constructed around the updated version of Global 
Production Networks theory (GPN 2.0). The framework builds out three key themes - 
strategies, networks and implications for development in the knowledge economy - 
which are evidenced in the two subsequent empirical chapters. Chapter four then 
discusses my field work methodology which entailed a mixed methods approach and 
has aspects of grounded theory. It also summarises the challenges of conducting field 
work in the flower industry, which is a relatively opaque and reticent industry, under a 
discussion on positionality and reciprocity with field work participants9. In chapter five, 
                                                 
8 It is not an agronomic thesis because I do not discuss in any depth plant physiology, plant genetics or 
soil science and the science and technology used to enhance production besides mentioning a basic 
mentioning of flower varieties and hydroponic systems. It differs from political ecology because I 
explicitly do not focus on politicizing the environmental issues and phenomena encountered in the cut 
flower sector, which much of the academic literature sampled in the literature review does. 
9 The field work methodology chapter borrows from Mwangi, N. (2018) in Johnstone, L. (ed.) ‘“Good 
that you are one of us”: Positionality and Reciprocity in conducting field work in Kenya’s flower industry’ 
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I provide a technical background of how to grow and sell a Kenyan flower exploring 
the roles and relationships of the key actors in the cut flower production network. 
Chapters six and seven discusses the empirical findings from mid-scale and small-
scale cut flower producers respectively. These chapters highlight two key aspects of 
the producers’ engagement in the production network – their intra-firm strategies and 
the complexity of their inter-firm relationships particularly with consolidator-exporters 
as the most critical intermediaries for market access. Chapter eight details the extra-
firm relationships within the Kenyan cut flower industry. It highlights contestations 
between the flower industry, the state and voluntary private initiatives as governance 
institutions for the virtually contract-free industry, and identifies modes of bargaining 
by producers. In conclusion, chapter nine synthesises the findings of the thesis and 
outlines my contributions to knowledge as well as some ideas for future research.  
 
1.3. Overview of the flower industry and development in Kenya 
Kenya has proven to be Europe’s cornucopia of flowers, providing approximately 38% 
of cut flower imports to the European Union and being the biggest exporter mainly to 
Holland and the UK (KFC statistics). The sub-sector is Kenya’s second highest earner 
of foreign exchange in Agriculture after tea (KFC). It is also the driver of growth in 
horticulture, a key agricultural sub-sector, contributing approximately 70% of the total 
value of horticultural exports, and it contributes approximately 1.45% to national GDP 
(Ifedapo & Esposito, 2018:335). In 2017, the industry posted a record Ksh 82.2 billion 
(approximately $815 million) in export earnings which was a 20 percent increase from 
2016 at Ksh 70.8 Billion (approximately $702 million). This revenue was attributed to 
159,961 metric tonnes of cut flower exports compared to 133,668 tonnes shipped to 
European markets in 2016 (Daily Nation)10. The industry has recorded steady growth 
in volume and value as shown the graphs below. The Kenya Flower Council expects 
even greater growth in the future with the opening of direct freight routes to the US in 
October 2018 (VOA11; ITC, 2016)12. China has also become a lucrative market for 
                                                 
in The Politics of Conducting Research in Africa: Ethical and Emotional Challenges in the Field. 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
10 Daily Nation newspaper, June 4, 2018. Accessed at https://www.nation.co.ke/business/Cut-flower-
exports-defy-poll-jitters-to-hit-Sh82bn/996-4595916-392u86z/index.html 
11 Voice of America, February 9, 2018. Accessed at https://www.voanews.com/a/kenya-flower-
producers-eye-us-market/4246221.html 
12 International Trade Centre website, February 23, 2016. Accessed at 
http://www.intracen.org/blog/USA-increases-direct-sourcing-of-flowers-from-Kenya/ 
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Kenyan producers willing and able to diversify from the auction. The development of 
direct flights to China also enhances these prospects for growth (ITC, 2015)13. 
 
Value of Kenyan cut flower exports, 2010-2016 
 
*Exchange rate: Ksh 101 to 1 dollar 
Figure 1.1 
Source: Ifedapo & Esposito 2018 :335; Data obtained from the Kenya Flower Council (2017) 
 
Volume of Kenyan cut flower exports (MT), 2010-2016 
 
Figure 1.2. 
Source: Ifedapo & Esposito (2018:335); Data obtained from the Kenya Flower Council (2017) 
 
The mid and large scale farms employ approximately 100,000 people directly in farms, 
500,000 indirectly and supports 2 million livelihoods in total (KFC website)14. Kenya 
produces approximately 110 varieties of cut flowers (Ifedapo & Esposito, 2018:335) 
on over 2,600 hectares (Kirigia et. al, 2016: 34). As it was over a decade ago, export 
production remains concentrated in two dozen large scale farms accounting for 75% 
                                                 
13 International Trade Centre website, February 26, 2015. Accessed at 
http://www.intracen.org/blog/China-is-an-attractive-market-for-Kenyan-flowers/ 
14 Kenya Flower Council webpage on Floriculture in Kenya. Accessed at 
http://kenyaflowercouncil.org/?page_id=92 
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of the industry (English, Jaffee, & Okello, 2004:25; Hortiwise & FlowerWatch, 
2012:21). 77% of the approximately 180 farms15 are owned by Kenyans of Indian or 
European descent and the remainder by the political elite16 (Mulangu, 2016). 
According to the Kenyan constitution promulgated in 2010, non- citizens (either 
individual or corporate) can only hold land under a leasehold tenure that does not 
exceed 99 years. Thus, land purchased by foreigners only confers to them 99-year 
leasehold interest (Kibugi & Makathimo 2012:26) 
 
While the statistics are compelling, the qualitative narrative of the development impact 
of the industry muddies the waters. A number of high profile large scale farms have in 
the last decade come under fire by the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) for tax evasion 
and transfer pricing practices17. The government has been losing hundreds of millions 
of dollars of tax revenue through these practices (Business Daily report, 2011)18.  In 
terms of the labour impact, the literature points out the precarity of employment, poor 
working conditions, forced overtime, gender discrimination and oppressive and 
paternalistic types of supervision (Dolan & Sutherland, 2003; Dolan & Opondo, 2005; 
Hughes, 2000a; Opondo, 2006; Gibbon & Riisgaard, 2014). It also points out the 
limitations of certifications and codes of conduct especially on improving the lot for 
majority of the workers who are women. The elite ownership of the industry combined 
with its near total export orientation contributes to its distancing from the popular 
imagination as an industry that is really ‘for the people’.  
 
Environmentally, the flower industry has been criticised for its high water footprint19,  
for polluting Lake Naivasha through run-offs into the lake20, for carbon intensity of 
                                                 
15 This figure is an approximation based on data from Riisgaard and Gibbon (2014:104) that stated 
177 commercial flower farms in Kenya in 2011. 
16 Asian-Kenyan 52.2%; White Kenyan 24.6%; Black-Kenyan 23.2% (Mulangu 2016). 
17 ITC Report, 2013. Sher Karuturi, then the world’s biggest commercial rose flower farm based in 
Kenya was found guilty of tax evasion in 2013. Karuturi used transfer pricing to avoid paying $11 
million in Corporate Tax to KRA. Accessed at: http://www.intracen.org/itc/blog/market-insider/Tax-
authorities-investigate-flower-farms-in-Kenya/. Transfer pricing is discussed further in chapter 8.  
18 Business Daily, April 6, 2011. Accessed at https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/corporate/Kenya-
loses-Sh42bn-annually-to-flower-sector-tax-evasion/539550-1139462-6b84x8z/index.html 
19 The water footprint of one  Kenyan rose flower is estimated to be 7-13 litres and the total volume of 
water exported from Lake Naivasha per year is estimated to be 16 Mm3/year (Mekonnen, et.al, 2012). 
20 The continued use of Methyl Bromide, a powerful soil fumigant and an ozone depleting substance 
raised significant environmental concerns in the 2000s but alternatives have been developed and this 
has been checked through international regulation, and stringent implementation of environmental 
codes and checks. 
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production21, and for dispossessing indigenous pastoralist communities’ from grazing 
land (Kirigia, Betsema et. al,  2016: 36). Further, Kenya’s national food reserves have 
significantly declined since the 1990s and there is increasing competition for 
agricultural land which launches a challenge to leasing land for luxury, non-food export 
crops such as flowers (Kirigia, Betsema et. al, 2016:39; Government of Kenya, 2011). 
The sector therefore presents a checkered narrative of its development impact. With 
all this in mind, one aspect that has been overlooked is the impact of the industry on 
Kenya’s knowledge economy, which will be addressed herein22.  
 
1.4. The global cut flower sector – a landscape view 
Cut flowers are part of the ornamental plant sector which also includes cut foliage, 
flower bulbs, potted flowers, and bedding plants. The global value of the cut flower 
production is currently estimated to be $55 billion (Rabobank, 2016)23. The sector has 
grown robustly from 1985 when production was valued at $11 billion, to $31 billion in 
1996 and $44 billion in 2000 (Uffelen & de Groot, 2005). Worldwide, there are three 
main consumption centres – USA, Europe and Japan (Wijnands, 2005). Within Europe 
the major importers of cut flowers are the UK, Germany, Russia and the Netherlands 
(Rabobank 2016) where roses are the most highly sought after variety. The total value 
of demand for cut flowers in the EU is estimated to be 20 billion euros. (CBI report)24. 
88 per cent of Kenya’s flowers were sold to Europe in 2017 which has consistently 
been Kenya’s main flower market (Ifedapo & Esposito, 2018:335). 
 
The strong growth in global trade witnessed in the 1990s and 2000s has now 
plateaued (Mamias 2015). In the last eight years, global trade in cut flowers has been 
weakening, which can be attributed to the slow-down in the global economy due to the 
2008 financial crisis. Unfortunately, only 2-4% growth is expected in the global flower 
markets in the medium to long term (Rikken, 2011:4) prompting Kenyan producers to 
                                                 
21 Williams (2007) did a comparative study of cut flowers produced for the British market and found 
that each rose grown in the Netherlands produces 2.91 kg of CO2 to the atmosphere while a Kenyan 
rose produces only 0.5 kg of the same.  
22 The knowledge economy in relation to the flower industry is explored in chapters three, six and 
seven in detail. 
23 Rabobank World Floriculture map, November 2016. Accessed at 
https://research.rabobank.com/far/en/sectors/regional-food-agri/world_floriculture_map_2016.html 




explore emerging, non-traditional markets such as Japan, Australia and the UAE. 
There are also ongoing concerns about the stability of financial markets in Europe 
which are linked to recent political developments.  
 
In particular, Brexit has generated uncertainty, as has the possibility of other countries 
leaving the European Union, as well as the instability in Russia which is a particularly 
important market for Kenyan roses. Potential weakening of the pound under Brexit 
would make the imports of cut flowers more expensive and it would lower demand 
(CBI report, 2017)25. The effects of Brexit remain unclear while the UK is still working 
on defining its position in trade with the EU. Until 2016, Britain imported flowers and 
plants from the EU for an approximate value of €925 million per year (Floriculture 
magazine, 2017)26. 80% of cut flowers in the UK are still imported via the 
Netherlands27. Despite initial nervousness when flower exports from the Netherlands 
to the UK went down by about 10% right after the referendum28, the value of sales in 
2017 equalised with the previous year because the purchasing behavior in the UK had 
not (yet) changed (Floriculture magazine, 2017). Due to the reliance on Dutch flower 
imports, British florists are especially concerned about the possible increase in 
customs duties and border delays (BFA website, 2018)29. In the meantime, the BFA 
launched a campaign for ‘provenance labelling’ of flowers to encourage British supply 
and purchase of British-grown flowers (The Guardian, 21 May 2017)30.  
 
The Netherlands is the largest importer and exporter by value and is also a big grower 
and redistributor of flowers to the rest of the world (CBI 2016). However, in 2015 for 
                                                 
25 CBI Report 2017. Accessed at https://www.cbi.eu/market-information/cut-flowers-foliage/trends/ 
26 Floriculture magazine online. Accessed at http://www.florinews.com/index.php/past-featured-
articles/40-past-featured-articles/258-market-description-of-the-flower-markets 
27 Britain imports about 80% of total cut flowers from the Netherlands. Floriculture magazine, 2017.  
28 Horticulture week magazine online. November 21, 2017. Accessed at 
https://www.hortweek.com/plants-flowers-imports-fall-10-brexit/ornamentals/article/1416191  
29 British Florists Association Post Brexit Position Paper, 2018. Accessed at 
http://www.bfaflorist.org/Websites/212/Images/upload/file/British%20Florist%20Association%20Brexit
%20statement%202018..pdf.  
While things are not looking rosy for florists, for British wholesalers, Brexit might work in their favour. 
Florists pay 6% VAT on Dutch flower imports and 20% VAT when they buy from British wholesalers. If 
VAT rates go up after Brexit, Dutch flowers will be less attractive as florists would be able to buy more 
and fresher flowers from British wholesalers. (ITC, 2016) Accessed at 
http://www.intracen.org/blog/Brexit-to-impact-negatively-on-Kenyan-and-Dutch-exporters/  
30  In 2017, the National Farmers’ Union backed by growers and florists launched a campaign for 




the first time four developing countries - Kenya, Colombia, Ethiopia and Ecuador 
surpassed the Netherlands to account for 44% of global cut flower exports as shown 
in figure 1.3. below (Rabobank, 2016). The decline in Dutch production and export 
capabilities has been attributed to a decline in land under production. The four 
countries’ flower export growth has been remarkable in the last ten years given that in 
2005, their combined share was just 25%. As of 2015, Kenya has recorded a global 
market share of about 11% (figure 1.3.).  
 
The world’s largest cut flower export countries 2005-2015  
 
Figure 1.3. Source: Rabobank World Floriculture Map (2016)31 
 
Latin America – Colombia and Ecuador 
Colombia 
The US is the world’s leading importer of cut flowers (Rabobank, 2016). Colombia is 
the biggest supplier to the American market providing approximately 62% of cut flower 
imports (Pizano 2015). Colombia also commands about 15% of the world market 
share (figure 1.3), making it the world’s second biggest exporter after the Netherlands. 
Contrary to flower production in the Netherlands which is dominated by smallholders, 
Colombia’s flower industry is dominated by a handful of large grower/exporters and 
the landed elite (Patel-Campillo 2011:2524), which is similar to production in Kenya. 
Colombian flower growers are organized under the cut flowers exporters’ association, 
                                                 
31 Accessed at https://research.rabobank.com/far/en/sectors/regional-food-
agri/world_floriculture_map_2016.html 
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Asocolflores, known for its ‘unrelenting national and international lobbying campaigns 
for preferential trade agreements32’ (Patel-Campillo 2010:283),  which bears some 
similarities to the Kenya Flower Council’s activities33.  
 
Ecuador 
Ecuador comes third after Kenya in global flower production and exports about 9% of 
the world market share (see figure 1.3.). It supplies approximately 23% of total imports 
to the US (Pizano 2015). Ecuador competes primarily with Kenya where wage rates 
are lower, targeting the Russian market in particular to increase its global market share 
(Ifedapo & Esposito, 2018: 338).   
 
The expansion of large scale flower farms in Ecuador has limited smallholder flower 
production. That was until 2015 when some 300 small (<2 ha) greenhouses were 
established by smallholders (Mena-Vásconez et al. 2016:231). The smallholders 
mimic the large scale capitalist farmers’ modes of production in a desire to “become 
like them” by producing for export through high tech modernization despite capital and 
capability limitations (Mena-Vásconez et al. 2016: 229). Intensified water use for 
export crops in already water scarce regions generates inter-communal conflict, a 
situation similar to the contestation between large scale flower farms in Kenya and 
pastoralist communities access to pasture land and water.  
 
Ethiopia 
Ethiopia has similar production conditions to Kenya and two advantages in particular 
-  higher altitude conditions which allow for production of bigger budded roses and 
comparatively lower labour34 costs (Taylor 2011:86). Systematic government support 
came about in 200435 when an EU report on the potential of the sector was launched. 
Ethiopia now has 130 flower farms which occupy 1,426 hectares of land and export 
predominantly roses (about 80%). (Embassy of Ethiopia, Belgium)36. The country has 
                                                 
32 Despite strong opposition from US flower growers, the Colombian government backed by 
Asocolflores instituted export-promotion policies and tax exemptions for commercial flower exporters 
to ensure competitive market entry to the US. (Patel-Campillo, 2010b) 
33 The lobbying for preferential trade agreements carried out by KFC is explored in chapter eight  
34 The sector generated employment for over 100,000 people between 2010-15 (ITC report, 2015). 
35 In 2004, there were only six flower growers that regularly exported to the Dutch auctions and by 
2005, the Ethiopian floriculture industry was the fastest growing in the world (Taylor, 2011:65). 
36 Embassy of Ethiopia in Belgium website, June 23, 2017. Accessed at 
https://ethiopianembassy.be/en/2017/06/23/the-blooming-horticulture-industry-of-ethiopia/ 
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become the second largest exporter in Africa after Kenya, exporting $225 million worth 
of cut flowers, which is 80% of the foreign exchange earnings from the horticulture 
sector (Embassy of Ethiopia, Belgium). The industry is also the fourth largest exporter 
of cut flowers in the world.  
 
The institutional environment has also favoured the growth of the sector. In terms of 
finance, loans from the Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) fund a considerable 
portion of the investment by  Ethiopian and foreign investors (Melese & Helmsing 
2010:62). The Dutch who are leading foreign investors, can obtain grants from their 
government if they are in joint ventures with Ethiopian firms. Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) complements these sources of capital. To stimulate FDI, the government 
introduced a five-year tax holiday, custom duty exemptions, loss carry forward, 
remittance of funds, allowing full profit repatriation and making land near the airport 
available at low cost (Melese & Helmsing, 2010:46, 63). Ethiopians who venture into 
flower farming37 tend to be seasoned and successful business people with expertise 
in other industries and who have been exposed to the sector in other ways. As of 2015, 
there were 61 foreign owned farms, nine joint venture firms with foreigners while 
domestic investors owned 46 firms (Admasu, 2015:6).  
 
The development impact of the sector in Ethiopia is still unfolding.  Evaluating the 
degree of endogenisation, which is the process of building local capabilities, and 
enclave formation38, Melese & Helmsing (2010:63-64) find that endogenisation is 
occurring but to a limited extent. The main limitation to that process is the weak 
capabilities of Ethiopian entrepreneurship in the sector. They find that the big role of 
Dutch FDI in the sector does not cause the formation of enclaves, but rather a win-win 
situation for both countries’ economies.  
 
                                                 
37 Melese and Helmsing (2010:52) find that local commercial flower farmers are of three extractions – 
wealthy Ethiopian business with export experience in other or related industries, entrepreneurs from 
the Ethiopian diaspora who set up farms with the help of foreign consultants or Ethiopians who have 
been exposed to the industry in Kenya or India and return to set up their own.   
38 Enclave formation concerns an extractive process by external firms which have very low 
reinvestment rates; and benefits and development of the economy are usually exclusive to FDI, with 
little room for linkages and knowledge spill-over and learning by local firms (Helmsing 2005)  
 14 
1.5. Review of historical underpinnings of the Kenyan cut flower sector 
The roots of Kenyan flowers 
The Kenyan commercial cut flower sector is about fifty years old, having developed in 
the immediate post-independence era under the auspices of enterprising European 
businessmen39 (English et al. 2004:23). Perhaps the best known is Hans Zwager, the 
Dutch businessman who set up Oserian flower farm in Naivasha in 196940. The 
viability of profitable flower exports depended on being able to grow at scale so as to 
justify the cost of chartering flights to Europe (English et al. 2004). The seventies saw 
development of jumbo jets that brought tourists to Kenya and had spare cargo capacity 
on the flight back and were therefore able to offer relatively low freight rates for 
horticultural exports (Hortiwise & FlowerWatch 2012:17). By the eighties, Oserian had 
become a leading flower export farm to the Dutch auction (Nairobi Business Monthly, 
2017)41.  
 
A second narrative details institutional origins of the sector. It also pegs the start of the 
industry in 1969, when Dansk Chrysanthemum and Kultur (DCK) a Danish 
chrysanthemum firm, invested in a 6,000-hectare farm42. Government support was 
key to this venture. DCK had the backing of the Danish government which put in the 
equivalent of a third of the investment costs, while the firm introduced advanced 
irrigation and post-harvest technologies. The company was also offered very attractive 
investment terms by the Government of Kenya which played an active role in the 
sector43. 
 
Though DCK did not thrive, DCK set up two other farms - one in Updown and the other 
in Naivasha, growing carnations. The Naivasha farm, renamed Sulmac after being 
                                                 
39 For example, it is said to have begun with a former member of the British army who planted flowers 
on a small scale in a farm near Limuru (Dolan, Thoen et. al, 2000). 
40 Hans Zwager came to Kenya to manage ABN Amro Bank in the sixties, and then ventured into 
selling agro-chemicals. He first set up a vegetable farm for export and in seeking greater profitability, 
moved into flowers.  
41 Nairobi Business Monthly, February 2, 2017. Accessed at 
http://www.nairobibusinessmonthly.com/a-flower-business-success-after-loss-of-founder/ 
42 This was in in Msongaleli in what was then Eastern Province to grow chrysanthemums and a filler 
known as Asparagus plumosus (Dolan, Thoen et.al 2000:7). 
43 This included a low-cost lease on the 6,000-hectare estate, a twenty-year status quo passus with 
regard to changes in the law about foreign direct investment, taxation and profit repatriation, and a carte 




purchased by Brooke Bond, evolved into one of the leading flower firms in the country. 
By 1979, it was exporting at least 90% of the 4000 tons of flowers exported from Kenya 
overall. FDI continued to play a major role in the flower sector’s development in the 
1980s, such as the investment by the Yoder Brothers (English et al., 2004:24). In the 
1980’s the government had control of air freight and forex rates, restricted repatriation 
of profits and was not yet party to international agreements on plant breeders’ rights 
(UPOV), factors which have been argued to have limited the growth of the industry in 
that decade (English et al., 2004: 24).   
 
The history of smallholders in the cut flower industry begins with a government 
outgrower scheme in the 1970s from the restructured Updown flower farm, which 
came under management by the government’s Agricultural Development Corporation 
(ADC). The Horticultural Crops Development Authority then received funding from the 
FAO to train smallholder farmers as outgrowers through the ADC or small export 
companies (Dolan, Thoen et. al 2000). This scheme involved at least 200 farmers by 
the late 1970s, each growing tiny areas that were about 50 square meters of 
carnations and/or statice. After the scheme collapsed, 300 smallholders formed a now 
defunct flower trading cooperative (English et. al 2004:23). 
 
In the 1990s, the Structural Adjustment Program reforms took shape in Agriculture, 
encouraging export diversification in response to pressure from declining revenues 
from principal export crops and crippling fiscal austerity measures Dolan (2005:418)44. 
The non-traditional, high value flower industry became a darling of these neoliberal 
prescriptions because “in contrast to the traditional agricultural commodities, which 
signified ‘the old statist policies of developmentalism, non-traditional exports were 
vaunted as progressive and entrepreneurial, replacing archaic parastatal-controlled 
agriculture with market-savvy actors” (Little and Dolan, 2000: 64).  The Kenyan flower 
industry is particularly remarkable since as Riisgaard (2009:329) noted, “cut flower 
exports from Sub Saharan Africa led by Kenya grew from $13 million in 1980 to almost 
$300 million in 2007 representing one of Africa’s most significant cases of non-
traditional export development during the past two decades”. 
                                                 
44 On the link between balance of payments and the push towards high value export horticulture see 
for example, Maharaj and Dorren 1995: 45-46; Papademetriou and Dadlani 1998; Van Liemt 1999  
 16 
The Kenyan government liberalised controls on foreign exchange, freight rates, and 
streamlined importation procedures which made it easier to import production inputs 
for the flower industry. Thereafter, the area under production doubled and Kenya 
increased threefold the value of its flower imports (English et al., 2004: 24). Kenyan 
producers capitalised on the growing demand for roses in Europe in the 1990s and 
the production area grew from only 27 hectares in 1990 to 550 hectares in 1997 Dolan, 
Thoen et. al (2000:11). Kenya’s flower industry had evolved to become a “testament 
to neoliberalism” (Dolan (2007:240). However, with the remarkable growth came a 
realisation of the immiserating effects of growth indubitably through exploitation of 
women’s labour in the industry45. The graphic below provides a summary of the 
historical development of commercial flower farming in Kenya.   
 
 Timeline of major developments in the Kenyan cut flower industry 
 
Figure: 1.4. 
Sources: Compiled from Dolan, Thoen et. al (2000); Rikken, M. (2011); Hortiwise & Flowerwatch 
(2012); English et al. (2004); Kenya Flower Council and author’s own analysis 
 
                                                 
45 The increasing precariousness and vulnerability of labour that is associated with new forms of 
integration into global production particularly in export horticulture globally have been observed and 
extensively analysed. See for example (Barrientos 2001; Kritzinger et al. 2004; Selwyn 2009). 
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Historicising shifts in export markets in the global cut flower industry 
The Netherlands has historically been the nerve centre of the global flower trade 
(Stewart 2007)46. 65% of all the flowers traded globally move through Schiphol airport 
and the Dutch flower auction system (Gebhardt, 2014). Cut flowers have historically 
been constructed as globalised commodities47 whose value is hinged on the cultural 
trends and demands of buyers in foreign nations. The globalisation of the flower trade 
can be seen in the geographical shift of flower production from Europe to various 
centres in the Global South – notably Kenya, Ethiopia, Colombia, Ecuador and Israel 
among others. Meanwhile, the Netherlands through constant innovation around its 
flower auction system has remained the centre of trade. Patel-Campillo (2011:87) 
argues that the centrality of the Dutch auctions to the global flower trade was 
established through its historical trajectory, the regulatory context and the strategies 
of growers.  The Dutch auction is the primary export market for Kenyan flower 
producers, and the consolidation of its power in global trade is explained in the section 
below.   
 
Centralisation of buying power in the Dutch flower auction system  
In 1912, flower growers in Aalsmeer set up the Centraal Aalsmeer Auction mart (CAV) 
which was the first modern cooperative for cut flowers, and which after a merger with 
another auction Bloemenlust, evolved into the first flower auction, Verenigde 
Bloemenveilingen Aalsmeer (VBA) (Gebhardt 2014). Today VBA is the umbrella 
organization for all the Dutch floricultural cooperatives. The second biggest auction 
was at Naaldwijk/Bleiswijk48. Though there were other auctions in the Netherlands 
such as at Rijnsburg, the auction at Aalsmeer was dominant because it was the largest 
auction in the industry, had a wide variety of flower varieties and plants, and its location 
eased export to Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Britain, Scandinavia, and 
Switzerland (Gebhardt 2014: 102). The locations of the Dutch auctions in 2008 after 
                                                 
46 The Netherlands made a name for itself in the global flower trade in the 17th century when ‘Tulip 
Mania’ gripped the Dutch republic and speculators traded tulip bulbs as [what we now call] ‘futures’ for 
exorbitant amounts of money, only for this bubble to burst shortly thereafter leading to the ruination of 
fortunes (Stewart, 2007) 
47 Tulips for example, which are now synonymous with Dutch floriculture originated in Central Asia 
and graced the gardens of opulent Ottoman rulers before being transported across trade routes to the 
gardens of wealthy Dutch connoisseurs. (Stewart, 2007) 
48 The auctions underwent reorganization in 2013/14. Bleiswijk auction was closed in 2014 and its 
operations moved to Naaldwijk. The facility is still maintained as a logistics center. Accessed at 
http://www.flowerweb.com/en/article/169873/Massive-reorganization-at-FloraHolland-announced 
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the two largest flower auctions merged49  to form FloraHolland are shown in map 1.1. 
below. 
Locations of the FloraHolland auctions, Netherlands (2008) 
 
Map 1.1. 
Source: Levelt (2010:153)  
 
The auction was supplied by small-scale flower farmers who dominate cut flower 
production in the Netherlands and typically grow one variety of flowers on their land 
(Patel-Campillo 2011b), while bidding at the auction is carried out by wholesalers. 
Increasingly wholesalers are sourcing flowers directly from developing country 
producers (CBI report 2016:10). Cooperative structures50 backed by government 
support have a long and rich history in the development of Agriculture in the 
Netherlands and the uniqueness of the Dutch flower auction is its roots in this system. 
                                                 
49 The recent series of mergers is discussed in detail in the following section 
50 The cooperative strategy among small scale Dutch farmers enabled them to scale up their operations, 
consolidate volumes and diversify their supply. Patel-Campillo (2011:88) explains that rather than have 
individual growers deal with traders directly, sales were formalised through purchase agreements that 
ensured payment on the spot and so collective action protected growers from exploitative, opportunistic 
behaviour by traders. Cooperatives therefore strengthened the position of growers as a formalised 
network vis a vis that of traders. Further, Patel-Campillo (2011) elaborates that the auction system 
protected growers from the risks of trading in highly perishable commodities. The separation of 
production from sales gave farmers the freedom to focus on their core competencies of production 
without worrying about the transactional challenges of marketing their product (Gebhardt 2014: 114). 
Focussing on production also fosters cooperation among growers which enables them to share 
knowledge in associations, trade fairs and clubs. 
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The auction has persisted as a reference point in Dutch floriculture despite the 
unpredictability of prices at the auction and the slim margins. It offers transparency in 
pricing (Wijnands 2005) and because of its position within the value chain, that is its 
ability to differentiate the production function from sales, it reduces transaction costs 
(in particular the ‘Coaseian’ search and policing costs) between growers and buyers. 
The Dutch auctions give organised producers a platform to consolidate varieties, and 
buyers supply of a wide range of varieties. Further, the auction system also guarantees 
payment for every transaction that occurs in its system (CBI report, 2016). The flower 
auctions also persist because of the importance of availing a broad (variety choice) 
and deep (cut flower specifications) range of varieties51 and bouquet arrangements 
that meet the flower industry aesthetic (Wijnands 2005:33). Dutch floriculturalist Hans 
de Vries sums up the ‘genius’ of the Dutch auction system thus:  
“You don’t have to worry about sales, because the auction takes care of that. 
You don’t know the clients, who’s buying your product, so you don’t view other 
growers as competitors. You’re not fighting each other to win a contract with 
someone. This is the genius of the grower’s auction system, or at least as the 
system works in combination with the cooperative, and other cultural, financial, 
historical, infrastructural and policy-related factors in the Netherlands.” 
(Gebhardt, 2014: 114) 
The centralisation of growers’ power in the Dutch flower trade has important lessons 
through which to view flower production in Kenya. These include the importance of 
harnessing collective power among smallholders and the institutional power of 
government support in policy which enables a strong bargaining position in an 
otherwise buyer-driven industry.  
 
Consolidating the power of the auction and the growers’ interests 
The membership of the CAV grew from 25 in 1912 to 1200 members in 1948. This 
strong growth was because of the emergent benefits of the collective action of 
producers under the auction. Patel-Campillo (2011:87) explains that the power of 
Dutch flower growers was further consolidated by the introduction of favourable 
regulation and the introduction of a clock based on declining price. In this way, buyer 
                                                 
51 It is interesting to note that the Dutch also had vegetable auctions but their demise was caused by 
higher volumes of vegetables in supermarkets and the consumer responsiveness to this. (Gebhardt 
2014) 
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demand sets the price and so as the price drops, buyers who are really keen on 
purchasing the lot bid first and therefore pay the higher price. In this way, buyers are 
more likely to get a high price for their flowers. Government regulation in support of 
grower cooperatives came into effect as buyers tried to boycott these cooperatives to 
protest their diminishing power in setting prices with growers one-on-one. The 
government established the mandatory use of producer cooperatives as the sole 
suppliers of cut flowers thereby strengthening their position and ability to capture 
value. In effect, this move transferred the governance of the chain from the buyers to 
producers (Patel-Campillo, 2011:88). The first fifty years of the existence of the auction 
can therefore be seen as a period of consolidation of the power of the auction to protect 
the interests of Dutch flower growers.  
 
For the better part of a century, Dutch flower producers sold their roses at the most 
competitive price because of their superior technology and production capabilities, 
cooperative networks and marketing systems.  Cut flower production is however very 
energy intensive and these concerns rose to the fore with the energy crisis in the 
seventies52. It prompted a move away from production in Europe to alternative 
production sites in the Global South where agronomic conditions were naturally 
optimal and labour was relatively cheap. The need for a seasonal and flexible work 
force in the flower plantations was also central to this southward shift. Developing 
countries tend to have weaker labour comparatively lower wages and weaker labour 
regulations to protect workers from capitalist exploitation (Selwyn, 2009).   
 
At the same time, the CAV voted to allow international imports of cut flowers at the 
auction, which represented the beginning of international competition at the auction. 
Dutch growers later began to import East African flowers53 particularly Kenyan roses 
in the winter months to augment their own low production in winter. For a while, this 
provided consistency of supply and therefore stabilised prices at the auction. However, 
Kenyan growers began to import flowers to the auction year-round and because they 
could produce for much cheaper than Dutch farmers, their produce began 
                                                 
52 Despite the fact that a decade earlier, the Netherlands had discovered its gas reserves in the North 
Sea and that the flower trade was mostly regional (Germany and France) at that time, Dutch producers 
began to look for alternatives that would allow for more economical production (Gebhardt, 2014: 106).  
53 Initially, these imports mostly came from Israel and Spain and were only a small percentage of total 
sales (Gebhardt 2014: 106). 
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outcompeting Dutch roses. Even so foreign-grown export from the auctions remained 
below 30% of turnover and this was the case till the 2000s (Gebhardt 2014: 106).  All 
in all, the 1970s and eighties were characterised by the development of Dutch flower 
exports and its dominance in the world flower market trade (Kouzmine 2000: 21; 
Riisgaard 2009: 328).  
 
Flower market ‘shifts’ and Dutch Auction ‘turns’ 
In the mid-nineties there were discussions at the auction about the increasing foreign 
flower imports,  decoupling price information mechanisms from logistics at the auction, 
and the use of IT in the auction system (van Heck & Ribbers 1997:29). Out of these 
concerns emerged the innovations and changes that that took place as the auction 
modernized itself. I characterize these internal changes within the auction as “turns”, 
and the external changes of the wider global trade landscape in which the auction 
operates as “shifts”. 
 
Shifts in the global flower trade landscape 
The 1990s marked a monumental shift in the global flower trade first in terms of the 
geographies of production towards the Global South54 as explained above and which 
informs the formation of bifurcated markets. Second, market development led to the 
expansion of direct markets and later a shift to non-traditional markets.  
 
In regard to market development, in the late nineties and 2000s a market shift occurred 
that involved the expansion of direct markets (supermarkets, garden centres, florists 
and other retailers) in Europe in competition with the auction as buyers of first priority 
for cut flowers producers (Hughes 2000). While buying habits remain fairly 
conservative in most of Europe with most people buying from florists and garden 
centres, in the UK, majority of flowers are bought in supermarkets which brand their 
flowers or provide third party certification to ensure the quality and reliability of the 
production process. Retail concentration and the domination of governance in the 
flower industry by supermarkets through these private voluntary codes consolidated 
the buyer-driven nature of the value chain (Dolan 2005:422).  Regional traditional 
                                                 
54 As previously explained, production shifted to and was embraced by some countries along the 
equatorial belt in the Global South where environmental and agronomic conditions for flower production 
were optimal such Kenya, Zimbabwe, Colombia, Ecuador and Israel, while the hub of trade remained 
the Dutch flower auctions.  
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markets for Dutch-grown flowers such as Germany and France began to wane and 
non-traditional markets emerged such as Russia and Scandinavian countries, and in 
other world regions such as North America (Hanks 2015). These market 
developments involve the diversification of players in the global cut flower trade 
territorially and institutionally.  
 
Auction turns 
I identify three main internal changes within the Dutch auction which I characterise as 
‘turns’. These include (1) the contestation over the membership of international 
growers, (2) the introduction of electronic trading at the auction, and (3) a series of 
mergers and acquisitions. Agitations for change began as the auction became deeply 
institutionalised in the flower trade and bureaucratised, and Dutch growers perceived 
it as being more concerned with the protection of its interests as a firm55 rather than 
the interests of its growers. The demands of the auction bureaucracy were often at 
odds with those of the constituent growers. For example, Cunden and van Heck (2005) 
explain that the Dutch flower growers who own the Dutch flower auctions, were hostile 
to the incorporation of foreign competing growers and the rising imports of competitive 
foreign flowers on sale at the auction. Meanwhile, the East African Flower (EAF) 
Company which was comprised of a range of flower growers from Kenya, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe had been successfully marketing their flowers at the Dutch 
auctions all through the 1980s and early 90’s.  
 
In relation to Kenyan production, the first notable turn was in 1994 when the Dutch 
flower growers decided to prohibit EAF from the auction in order to cut down 
competition. These import restrictions meant that EAF could not sell up to 30% of their 
cut flowers at the auction and in the summer, they could not sell at all (Van Heck & 
Ribbers, 1997). In response, Oserian’s East African Flower Company set up the Tele 
Flower Auction (TFA) as a private company to cater to marketing their flowers and 
flowers from foreign growers (Cunden and van Heck, 2005: 579) in Amstelveen. TFA 
was set up as a fully electronic auction in contrast to the then FloraHolland and 
Aalsmeer auctions which were a combination of traditional and electronic. The 
restrictions existed till 2002 (Cunden and van Heck 2005). Prior to that, in order to 
                                                 
55 Gebhardt (2014: 116) explains that the Dutch flower grower membership has little to do with the 
day to day running of the auction and is not active in setting the agenda for the future.  
 23 
transact at TFA members had to be registered with the Dutch Chamber of Commerce 
which meant that many growers transacted via Dutch intermediaries. In 2006, full 
voting membership at the Dutch Auction was then extended to foreign international 
growers (Levelt 2010). Cooperative members were expected to sell 100% of their 
produce at the auction (Levelt 2010) but given recent developments with competition 
from direct markets and slow growth, this rule has been relaxed. This market 
diversification strategy by producers in developing countries contesting the dominance 
of the auction as an oligopoly remains essential to the shift in power relations between 
producers in the global South and markets in the North.  
 
The second auction turn first marked by the TFA was the introduction of electronic 
sales in 1996 through the ‘buying at a distance’ or remote sales platform ‘‘Kopen Op 
Afstand’’56(Heezen & Baets 1996). The TFA (designed for international growers57) had 
the effect of decoupling logistics from the price discovery mechanism58 of the auction 
clock sales.  For the system to work, there had to be trust in the quality59 of the product 
because buyers who were further away from the warehouse at Amstelveen and could 
not physically inspect the quality. Today, the digitization of markets continues to be a 
key trend shaping flower export markets. Notably, 50% of wholesale trade in flowers 
now takes place through online shops (CBI 2017).  
 
The third formative turn for the auction was the series of mergers that the Dutch 
auctions underwent since 1973 but formatively in the 2000s. Mergers and acquisitions 
have historically been the means by which Dutch auctions consolidate corporate and 
                                                 
56 Under the TFA, buyers could bid on their personal computers and each PC was connected to a fully 
computerized auction clock. Flowers were no longer physically visible to buyers (as they were paraded 
in the auction for sale) and buyers no longer needed to be physically present in the auction room to 
make their bids, thereby decoupling the price mechanism from logistics (van Heck & Ribbers 1997); 
Cunden & van Heck 2004). The KOA system is discussed in detail in chapter five.  
57 Growers who participated at the TFA came from many developing countries, sent their flowers to the 
EAF warehouse at Amstelveen and once they had been purchased, the flowers would be distributed to 
the buyers’ addresses, while transport costs were catered for by EAF 
58 Van Heck (1997) and Kambil & van Heck (1996) discuss the example of the Aalsmeer flower auction 
as a sample-based auction which decouples logistics from price discovery. In this concept growers sent 
a sample of their produce for sale to the auction and this represented the entire inventory. The system 
was discontinued in 1994 after it failed to deliver on storage efficiency or on increasing sales of potted 
plants.  
59 Van Heck (1997) notes that quality control was done at three stages: by TFA's quality inspectors at 
the grower's place, at the distribution point in Nairobi (Africa), and at TFA in Amstelveen. 
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institutional power60. In the seventies, there were approximately 20 Dutch flower 
auctions and by 1996 there were six (Heezen & Baets, 1996). In 2008, the two largest 
auctions FloraHolland61and Verenigde Bloemenveiling Aalsmeer (VBA) underwent a 
merger forming a new, more powerful integrated entity known simply as FloraHolland 
which became the biggest flower market in the world. The Economist62 reported that 
the merged entity FloraHolland controlled 98% of the Netherlands’ flower business 
and nearly a seventh of the global trade63. One effect of the merger was the growth of 
direct sales between retailers and growers through the auction’s ‘direct sales’ office 
(Levelt 2010: 167). Direct sales in this context refer to sales that go through the auction 
system in terms of linking buyer and grower, but bypass the auction clocks. Also in 
2008, the only independent auction Veiling Oost Nederland voted for a merger with 
Veiling Vleuten and became what is now known as Plantion (Hughes 2000; Gebhardt 
2014) 
 
These three ‘turns’ which have transformed the form and function of Dutch flower 
auction showcase collective power as wielded by Dutch growers to dominate the 
competitive landscape by excluding international growers. The auction turns also 
show the importance of accessing market knowledge through information technology, 
which was harnessed for example through the Tele Flower Auction to empower 
previously excluded growers from developing countries and enable their participation 
in global trade. The auction mergers exemplify corporate and institutional power which 
the auction system wields to maintain its position as the hub of global trade. These 
three concepts are emergent themes in the narrative of how mid and small scale 




                                                 
60 For example, CAV and Bloemenlust merged to form the powerful VBA as previously discussed. The 
monopoly control of the FloraHolland merger in 2008 was challenged in court as violating anti-
monopoly laws but eventually it went through (Gebhardt 2014: 101).  
61 The name Flora Holland came with the last merger in 2002. (Ingenbleek et al 2007:9) 
62 The Economist, May 10 2007. Accessed at https://www.economist.com/business/2007/05/10/petal-
power 
63 The monopoly control of the FloraHolland merger in 2008 was challenged in court as violating anti-
monopoly laws but eventually it went through (Gebhardt 2014:101). 
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1.6. Bypassing the auction clock 
The previous section has outlined the ways in which the Dutch auction maintained its 
dominance in the global flower trade. Even so, the market landscape is bifurcated 
between the auction and direct markets, and there is great heterogeneity therein as 
this section will explain. More and more growers are bypassing the auction clock and 
selling to direct markets (CBI report 2016). As of 2007, nearly half of Kenyan flower 
production was sold outside of the Dutch auctions (Levelt 2010: 158). Reuters (2016)64 
highlighted that direct sales from members of the cooperative bypassing the auction 
rose by 3.8 percent to 2.3 billion Euros in 2015. Further, in 2016, the CEO of 
FloraHolland, Lucas Vos was quoted as saying that sales of flowers by growers 
directly to buyers have indeed overtaken sales ‘on the clock’ Reuters (2016).  
 
Producers are bypassing the auction because of the high costs of transacting65, the 
decreasing profit margins and price fluctuations, all of which challenge the survival 
particularly of mid and small-scale growers. The quote below crystallises the adverse 
competitive terrain at the auction for producers from developing countries: 
 “Marketing costs of the auction range from 10-12 % of the auction selling price 
for large volumes or high-value products, and up to 20 % for small volumes or 
low-value crops. These costs include commission, promotion levies, bucket 
rent and handling fees. The marketing costs and the airfreight costs inhibit 
marketing of small volumes or low-value flowers from foreign growers.”  
(Wijnands 2005:39)66 
In addition, as part of a cost cutting initiative the auction did away with the quality 
assurance service of flowers that it provided to buyers and to producers who trusted 
and relied on it as a guarantee they could get nowhere else.  
 
Noting the increasing shift by producers to direct markets, the auction developed an 
innovation that would enable it to still capture value and maintain its financial 
dominance by managing transactions, as a financial intermediary67. Sales handled as 
such are not registered as auction sales because they do not happen ‘on the clock’, 
                                                 
64 Reuters, June 16, 2016. Accessed at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-netherlands-
flowers/african-growers-threaten-dutch-flower-power-idUSKCN0Z21RW 
65 The experiences of Kenyan producers with cost at the auctions are elaborated on in chapter seven. 
66 Cross referencing research done by Thoen et al (2000:34) 
67 The functioning of the auction as a financial intermediary is discussed in detail in chapter three 
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rather they are recorded as ‘direct sales’. The producer and buyer may then separately 
work out the logistics of delivering the bought flowers. This financial transaction system 
capitalised on use of electronic markets which enabled the decoupling of logistics from 
the price mechanism as previously described. Transacting parties value this 
innovation because as financial intermediary the auction is responsible for 
guaranteeing the integrity of the sale. This is a high priority since lack of security and 
timely payment68 is one of the main risks of shifting to direct markets (CBI 2016).  
Another innovation aimed at increasing the number of transactions passing through 
the auction and therefore protect the auction’s financial dominance is a new 24 hour 
online dealing platform (Reuters, 2016)69. For these and other reasons previously 
discussed, capable producers continue to transact at the auction, while also exploring 
opportunities in direct markets, detailed below.  
 
Trends and key features of direct markets 
Retail flower markets in Europe can be categorised into two – specialised and 
unspecialised channels which together constitute what is commonly referred to as 
‘direct markets’. Specialised retailed channels include florists, garden centres, market 
and street stalls where flowers are the only product (CBI report, 2016). These retail 
options are displayed in figure 1.5. below. Specialised channels offer a wide range of 
flowers and custom-make bouquets for their customers. Wholesalers, referred to as 
consolidator-exporters 70 in this thesis to clarify their double roles, who supply these 
outlets buy their flowers from the auction and this is the traditional sales route. “Florists 
and street vendors either buy flowers directly at the auction, or are supplied through 
cash-and-carry outlets, by “Flying Dutchmen” or specialised exporters.” In the 
Netherlands, Italy, Spain, France as well as Eastern Europe, 60-85% of flowers are 
sold through florists (CBI report 2016:2-3). Notably, in specialised channels 
                                                 
68 “Supplying via the Dutch flower auction means payment security. Payments are wired to your 
account soon after the auction. If you supply directly, you must wait longer (between 30 and 60 
days)”. Accessed at: https://www.cbi.eu/sites/default/files/market_information/researches/product-
factsheet-europe-fresh-cut-flowers-foliage-retail-market-2016.pdf 
69 Accessed at http://www.businessinsider.com/r-african-growers-threaten-dutch-flower-power-2016-
6?IR=T 
70 This thesis refers to wholesalers as consolidator-exporters for clarity in the double role they play as 
intermediaries in the flower trade. They are responsible for amalgamating flowers for economies of 
scale (consolidating) and handling the specifics of export from producers typically in developing 
countries to Europe. The term wholesalers though commonly used obfuscates the second critical role 
of export. The role of consolidator-exporters is elaborated on in chapter five.   
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environmental and social standards71 do not play a dominant role. Rather than focus 
on how the flowers are produced, these retailers are more concerned with quality, 
variety, price and arrangement.  
 
Unspecialised channels include supermarkets and petrol stations (CBI report, 2016). 
They offer flowers as a secondary commodity and offer a more limited range of flowers 
and pre-made bouquets.  This sector is highly concentrated and has a few very large, 
dominant players such as Tesco (UK), Sainsbury’s (UK), Aldi (Germany), Lidl 
(Germany), Carrefour (France) and Royal Ahold (Netherlands) (CBI 2016:3). The CBI 
report explains that most consolidator-exporters will supply either specialised 
channels or supermarkets exclusively, except very large consolidator-exporters who 
can afford to have specialised portfolios catering to each. The UK in contradistinction 
with other countries in the EU, has the largest proportion of supermarket sales for cut 
flowers at 56% and the smallest for florists at 14% (Hanks 2015:4). As seen in figure 
1.5. below, the Netherlands, Scandinavia and Germany are increasingly buying from 
supermarkets even though specialised channels remain dominant, while Russia and 














                                                 
71 However, in Sweden for example where the share of specialised florists is decreasing (Riisgaard & 
Hammer 2011), markets are becoming more specific and require labelling such as Fair Trade or FFP.  
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Source: Hanks (2015:6) 
The consolidation and expansion of supermarkets globally termed ‘the supermarket 
revolution’ (Reardon & Gulati 2008) led to the expansion of direct markets in the flower 
industry. Figure 1.6. below (Hortiwise & FlowerWatch 2012:27) summarises the 
bifurcation of the European flower export markets and from left to right shows how the 
market has been shifting. Supply chains 1, 2 and 3 centre the Dutch auction where 
florists are the main retail buyers, while 4 and 5 portray the shift to direct markets and 
supermarkets dominate this segment as buyers. Wholesalers dominate the auction, 
where they are known as ‘big buyers’ (see supply chains 1 and 2 below). The adoption 
of direct sourcing approaches by supermarkets for cut flowers from producers in 
developing countries undercuts the role of consolidator-exporters and the auction (CBI 
2007; Thoen et al. 2000, Riisgaard 2009: 180). This is shown below as supply chain 







Cut flower supply chains from Kenyan producers to European consumers 
 
Figure 1.6. 
Source: Hortiwise & Flowerwatch (2012:27) 
Wholesalers are referred to as consolidator-exporters in this thesis  
 
Direct sourcing by supermarkets is carried out in three main ways, which showcase 
efforts at vertical integration of the role of the consolidator-exporter. The first is via an 
importing company created as subsidiary of the supermarket72. Secondly, as part of a 
process of vertical integration, very large flower farms may enter into partnerships or 
joint ventures with importers in European markets to develop more established 
                                                 
72 Such as International Procurement and Logistics (IPL) is for ASDA, Walmart’s UK subsidiary. 
 30 
relationships with supermarkets73. Third, rather than opt for to internalise the role of 
the consolidator-exporter, supermarkets may outsource for the services of a global 
consolidator-exporter74. By the late nineties, cut flower producers and exporters saw 
sourcing agreements with UK supermarkets as “being the way forward, preferring to 
bypass the Dutch flower auctions75 where most flowers for EU countries are sent, and 
thus maximize efficiency and profit” (Barrett et. al 1999:167). 
 
Two significant effects of producers’ shift towards direct markets are a proliferation of 
private voluntary codes including supermarket certifications76 and greater 
consolidation among consolidator-exporters as described above. This is as a result of 
the ‘cascade effect’ (Nolan et al. 2008) where supermarkets prefer to work with larger 
more capable suppliers to minimise coordination costs (Reardon et al. 2012:176). To 
this effect, in the past decade the number of consolidator-exporters in Europe has 
been declining (CBI report 2016:4). The few major independent players left are giants 
of industry such as the Dutch Flower Group which are very large and diversified 
entities with secured markets.  
 
1.7. Conclusion 
This introductory chapter has undertaken the task of outlining the shifting bifurcated 
landscape akin to shifting sands, in which Kenyan cut flowers are traded.  It has also 
provided a rich historically grounded account of the shifts in European cut flower export 
markets, explaining the dominance of the Dutch auctions and the emergent power and 
appeal of direct markets.  
 
My overall research question is: “What strategies do Kenyan cut flower producer 
networks use in seeking greater bargaining power amidst shifts in end markets?” It is 
concerned with the experiences, relationships and contestations of mid and small 
scale flower producers seeking access in European markets split between the auction 
and supermarkets. Three thesis sub-questions guide the thrust of this thesis. The first 
                                                 
73 For example, MM flowers, a wholesaler of flowers and plants, is one third owned by one of the 
largest Kenyan flower farms, Veg Pro. Marks & Spencer supermarket is now moving towards having 
only one strategic partner, MM, to specially supply its cut flower demand.  
74 Such as the Dutch Flower Group, a global family company with 30 individual companies that 
specialises in international trade of cut flowers. This case study is analysed in chapter six.  
75 Hughes (2000:182) noted that by the late nineties the influence of the auctions was waning slightly 
as retailers sought to source directly from producers. 
76 Discussed in detail in chapter eight. 
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addresses the theoretical engagement of this thesis using the Global Production 
Networks lens, the second delves into the experiences, networks and strategies of mid 
and small-scale cut flower farms. The third sub-question is premised on the 
knowledge-intensive nature of the flower industry, an important but often overlooked 
aspect of the sector. It zeroes in on the development impact of Kenyan flowers industry 
by evaluating the nature of its interaction with Kenya’s knowledge economy.  
 
The remainder of the chapter lays out the setting of the argument by explaining the 
bifurcated nature of European flower export markets that are the north-star of Kenya’s 
flower producers. After describing the narratives of origin and the strong performance 
of the Kenyan flower industry led by large scale producers amidst global competitors 
such as Colombia, Ecuador and Ethiopia, the chapter goes on to discuss the auction 
as the first path in the bifurcated structure of the flower market. It provides a historical 
explanation of the dominance of the auction emphasising the collective power of Dutch 
small producers and regulatory support from the state which lead to the consolidation 
of producers’ interests therein. Contestation of the power of the auction is narrated in 
terms of ‘shifts’ within the global flower landscape and auction ‘turns’ which are 
changes in the workings and organisation of the auction. Shifts involved geographic 
reorientation of production towards the global south, and the development of direct 
markets (mostly supermarkets) and later a shift to non-traditional markets such as the 
UAE and Japan. The three auction turns entail negotiations in the auction over the 
membership of international growers, the introduction of electronic trading at the 
auction, and a series of mergers and acquisitions. These dynamics point to the 
evolution of the collective, corporate and institutional power of the auction, which are 
locations of power later outlined in the GPN framework.  
 
Direct markets are the second path in the flower market landscape, which include retail 
channels such as supermarkets and florists. The expense of doing business at the 
auction, the fluctuation in prices and the stripping away of quality assurance 
mechanisms, as well as stagnation in growth in traditional European markets pushed 
developing country producers to seek out direct markets. Two outstanding features of 
this development are the evolution of the role of the wholesaler intermediary firm, 
referred to in this thesis as the consolidator-exporter as summarised in figure 1.6. 
Secondly, the proliferation of private voluntary codes of conduct as supermarkets 
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establish ‘preferred suppliers’. Consolidator-exporters play a key role in the auction 
trading system supplying mostly florists and other specialised channels. However, in 
the move to direct markets the consolidator-exporter is increasingly consolidated or 
vertically integrated into the supermarket’s direct sourcing arrangement. This scenario 
is testament to what Nolan et al. (2008) describe as ‘the cascade effect’.  
 
These dynamics in the flower trading landscape are a heavily contested, competitive 
space. The chapter shows the great heterogeneity (for example in figure 1.6.) of 
actors, the complexity of their roles and geo-politics within flower export markets that 
necessitates a diversity of strategies from producers in developing countries. Building 
on this rich landscape, the chapter that follows will provide a literature review analysing 
the competing narratives framing the flower industry.  
 
  33 
2. Cut flowers in prose: a literature review 
2.1. Introduction 
Ensconced between the romantic materialities of providing an everyday, perishable, 
luxury commodity for the global North, and being a lifeline for millions of families in 
Kenya, the flower industry has been rich fodder for empirical literature. Despite the 
celebration of colour and variety that the industry boasts, it postures as a wallflower 
situated between paradoxes and silences of elite ownership, impoverished wage 
labour, environmental degradation, invisible smallholder farmers, informal business 
networks and global power struggles in trade policy.  
 
The literature on the sub-sector is dominated by authors from the global north, 
particularly the Dutch who have historically been the centre of knowledge production 
on cut flowers. The Kenyan face of scholarship on the flower industry remains scanty 
with the leading scholars being Professor Margaret Opondo who has written 
extensively77 on gender and governance in the industry, Dr. Maurice Bolo78 who 
conducted extensive research on  the participation of smallholders in the cut flower 
industry  and the late Professor Mary Omosa on the social impact of codes in the 
industry (Omosa & Njiru 2006). There is a second group of Kenyan researchers based 
at agricultural research institutes with donor funding who have published on  plant 
science and agricultural economics of various flower varieties (Muriithi 2011; Muthoka 
& Muriithi 2008; Muthoka 2008). Outside of this, Kenyan scholarship on the flower 
sector is skewed towards MBA theses on themes such as competitiveness, 
environmental challenges and the politics of certification on flower farms  (see Awuor 
2013; Moriasi et al. 2014; Kabiru et al. 2017).   
 
2.2. Categories of empirical literature on the Kenyan cut flower 
industry 
I have identified five main strands of empirical literature on the Kenyan flower sector. 
These include four strands in development policy literature and one strand in the 
critical Political Economy literature mostly done by economic geographers and 
sociologists summarised in table 2.1.1. below. In addition, there is agronomic literature 
                                                 
77 See for example publications such as Dolan & Opondo 2002; Dolan & Opondo 2005; Hale & 
Opondo 2005; Opondo 2006; Tallontire, Opondo, et.al 2011   
78 See for example publications such as Bolo et al. (2006); Bolo (2010); Bolo et al. (2012) on 
smallholder flower farmers in Kenya    
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done by Kenyan scientists, technical papers such as baseline studies of smallholder 
flower farmers carried out by consulting firms and research groups typically funded by 
donor agencies (Fintrac 2010; Wilshaw 2013; Buxton & Vorley 2012; Buxton 2012), 
and business and supply chain studies coming out of various MBA programs. Another 
category are journalistic articles published as interest pieces around peak seasons 
such as Valentines’ day and which cover issues of interest to ethical consumers such 
as labour rights on flower farms, environmental impacts of the industry and the politics 
of certification.  
 
This overview of empirical literature will focus on the first two categories – 
development policy literature and political economy literature - which intersect on the 
question on governance through private voluntary initiatives. These two categories of 
literature have been instructive on the strategies that mid and small-scale Kenyan cut 
flower producers employ to navigate shifts in global export markets.  
Summary of two categories of empirical literature  
 
Table 2.1. 
Source: Author’s analysis 
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Review of development policy literature pertaining to the Kenyan flower 
industry  
Development policy literature on the Kenyan cut flower industry has four strands, the 
first of which analyses the origins, dynamics, evolution and performance of Kenya’s 
flower sector under shifting global trade policy paradigms (Jaffee 1992; Jaffee 2001; 
Hughes 2000a; Dolan 2005; Laibuni et al. 2012). The most prominent author thereof, 
a World Bank agricultural economist Jaffee (1992), highlighted the foreign ownership 
characteristics of firms in Kenyan horticulture, particularly in cut flowers and early on 
raised interesting and important questions about who is benefiting from the lucrative 
sector. The ownership of flower farms in determining producer strategies is an 
important emergent theme, and also finds resonance in the GPN theory 2.0. as 
influencing value capture.  
 
The second strand which emerged from the late nineties takes on a rights-based 
approach79 and addresses challenges from the perspective of labour and gender, and 
later on environmental issues. The literature concerning the gendered nature of the 
flower value chain has been especially prolific. It has been researched from the 
perspective of the gendered division of labour in the flower value chain (Barrientos 
2000, 2001; Dolan et al. 2002; Dolan & Sutherland 2002; KHRC 2012), the link 
between adoption of codes of conduct and gender dynamics in flower farms 
(Barrientos et al. 2003; Tallontire et al. 2005; Omosa & Njiru 2006; Opondo 2006; 
Barrientos & Smith 2007; Riisgaard & Hammer 2011;) and “social upgrading” which is 
discussed further below (see Bernhardt & Milberg 2011; Evers & Amoding 2014; 
Barrientos et al. 2015; Barrientos et al. 2016). 
.  
 In the 2000s literature on the rights based approach focussed on the extent to which 
certifications have limited the negative impacts of the market model of employment on 
flower farms. In the mid-nineties, many leading flower farms had subscribed to various 
codes of conduct and certifications in order to guarantee market access and build 
confidence in their production processes. The emergence of the rights- based 
                                                 
79 In this body of literature on the rights-based analysis of value chains, leading scholars such as 
Barrientos and Smith (2007) make the distinction between process rights such as principles of 
freedom of association and no discrimination, that are based on intrinsic principles of social justice 
based on ILO conventions, and outcome standards which are entitlements to a certain standard of 
work for example a health and safety policy, a living wage or working hours.  
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literature was reactive in the sense that it evolved in conversation with concerns by 
European consumers and civil rights groups locally and in particular in the UK about 
workers’ rights. Opondo (2006:5) details that the poor condition of workers was 
highlighted in a spate of what can be thought of as ‘blood and roses’ early media 
reports that uncovered the exploitative underbelly of the industry (Bolger, 1997; Wolf, 
1996). By 2002, Christian Aid and Oxfam had launched investigations and consumer 
oriented campaigns against sourcing arrangements by UK supermarkets that worked 
with exploitative farms. The main labour rights issues raised over time have been poor 
wages, sexual harassment, dangerous working conditions, forced overtime, 
casualization of employment and paternalistic managerial styles (KHRC 2012). This 
mushrooming literature contributed to the pressure to implement industry reforms and 
by highlighting progress particularly around Valentines’ day each year, developed 
greater transparency between consumers, supermarkets and producers. It now has 
new form under the banner  of “social upgrading”80  (Barrientos, et. al, 2010; Bernhardt 
& Milberg, 2011; Evers & Amoding 2014;  Barrientos et. al, 2015) which involves better 
work, standards and rights for workers and smallholders and evolving forms of labour 
management on farms (Gibbon & Riisgaard 2014).  
 
A third strand under the development policy literature is focussed on the industry’s 
interaction with the environment, in particular the water-energy-land nexus. It 
highlights contestations around the use of Lake Naivasha, the potential of renewable 
energy, concerns over the carbon footprint– termed the “flower miles” debate (Holt & 
Watson 2008:324), land user rights contestations and the “flowers for food debate” 
(Kirigia et al. 2016) which is the perceived competition for limited arable land between 
food and flower production. In terms of water intensity, the cut flower industry is a very 
thirsty sector indeed. Mekonnen et. al (2012) worked out that the water footprint of one 
rose flower is estimated to be 7-13 litres per year81. Further, the quality and quantity 
of water in the lake has deteriorated significantly over time (Kitaka et al., 2002; Mavuti 
& Harper 2005; Gitachi, 2005; Nyangena & Willem te Velde 2012). This has led to the 
                                                 
80 Barrientos, Gereffi and Rossi, (2010) explain that social upgrading integrates the early GVC 
depiction of workers as labour - a factor of production and a ‘rights focus’ that examines conditions 
and entitlements of workers. Social upgrading is therefore “the process of improvement in the rights 
and entitlements of workers as social actors, and enhances the quality of their employment (Sen 
1999; 2000). This includes access to better work, which might result from economic upgrading” (pp.7) 
81 Mekonnen et. al (2012) Between 1995-2006 a total of 16 mega cubic metres per year (Mm3/yr) was 
virtually exported via cut flower exports from the Lake Naivasha basin. 
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displacement notably of Maasai pastoralists from the surrounding pasturelands and 
the aggravation of conflict between them and the flower industry management (Fayos 
2002). The carbon footprint82 of cut flowers as they are transported from farm to market 
or “flower miles” is another major theme in the environmental literature on the flower 
industry (Williams 2007 ; Holt & Watson 2008).  
 
The competition for the use of arable land between the flower industry and local 
agricultural and pastoralist land user rights is particularly acute in Kenya, a food-poor 
country. Given the political complexities associated with land ownership and use in 
Kenya, there has been very little academic literature on this (see Kirigia, Betsema et 
al (2016) 83 and the topic receives coverage only sporadically in journalistic articles 
(see for example, Financial Times, Feb 27 201584; Reuters, Jun 30 2016)85.  
 
The fourth strand of development policy empirical literature discusses the participation 
of smallholders in the flower industry. Since smallholders operate on the margins of 
global production, there is little scholarship on their experiences and contributions. 
Two robust empirical studies of Kenyan smallholder flower production in Kenya 
informed my own research on smallholders in the sector – Bolo (2012) on farmer-
exporter partnerships and a baseline study conducted by Fintrac (2010). A third study 
by Zylberberg (2013) discusses Wilmar Agro Ltd.86 as a case study to analyse 
sustainable means of incorporating smallholders into the formal economy. Bolo (2012) 
employed the Global Value Chain (GVC) analysis and innovation systems theory as 
the two main theoretical frameworks for his analysis of contractual outgrower groups 
and non-contractual spot market arrangements in relation to ‘farmer – exporter’ 
partnerships (2010:94). The effect of farmer-exporter partnerships on farmers’ 
capabilities was that exporters safeguard their power in the value chain through 
                                                 
82 Williams (2007) did a comparative study of cut flowers produced for the British market and found 
that each rose grown in the Netherlands produces 2.91 kg of CO2 while a Kenyan rose produces only 
0.5 kg of the same. 
83 The report (2016:6) concludes that, “it is difficult to assess the impact of Dutch agribusiness on food 
security and no direct linkages exist between FDI and food security”. 
84 Financial Times, 27 February 2015. Accessed at https://www.ft.com/content/4839da78-b8fa-11e4-
a8d0-00144feab7de  
85 Reuters, June 30, 2016. Accessed at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-landrights/kenyas-
flourishing-flower-sector-is-not-all-roses-for-maasai-herdsmen-idUSKCN0ZG0Z0 
86 Wilmar Agro Ltd. was one of my case studies of organised smallholder flower farmers in Kenya and 
is discussed in detail in chapter eight. 
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detailed, restrictive contracts that keep smallholders mostly “locked in” (2010:94) to 
production functions which prevents them from undermining the exporters’ functions 
in the market. He concludes with policy recommendations87 that in order to enhance 
the sustainability of smallholders, initiatives should build farmers’ capacities to 
innovate and adapt to constant changes in their environment.   
 
In sum, the empirical literature outlined above is concerned with explaining the 
historical evolution of the cut flower industry in Kenya. It is also concerned with the 
physical and social materialities within which the industry is embedded, and the 
partnerships and contestations between diverse stakeholders over resources. These 
themes foreground debates on sustainability and governance which are discussed in 
section that follows on the critical political economy literature.  
 
Review of the critical political economy literature pertaining to the Kenyan 
flower industry  
This section outlines two main angles of the critical political economy literature -  
studies pertaining to governance of the flower industry through private voluntary 
initiatives, and secondly, culturally grounded critiques of the flower industry. The first 
sub-section of critical political economy literature pertains to the governance of the cut 
flower industry through certifications, private voluntary initiatives and codes of 
conduct. These formal institutions of governance emerge from European markets, 
multi-stakeholder initiatives, independent third parties, international organisations and 
national industry bodies. Since the mid-nineties,  the Kenyan flower industry has 
emerged as one of the most codified industries in the world (Jaffee, 2005; Opondo 
2006; Humphrey, 2008; Nelson & Tallontire 2011).  
 
The rise of private voluntary initiatives in the flower industry is located in the processes 
of globalisation, neoliberalism and deregulation of global trade which has placed 
governance beyond the reach of any one country (Hughes 2001; Blowfield 1999). In 
Kenya, the proliferation of codes must be understood in the context of state 
deregulation under the Structural Adjustment Programs which was at its apogee in the 
                                                 
87 Bolo’s (2012:177-180) policy recommendations revolve around articulating smallholder farmers’ 
research and training needs, reforms and inclusiveness in research institutions working with 
smallholders, and strengthening smallholders’ market intelligence gathering. 
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early 1990s, and the subsequent abdication of this governance gap to the private 
sector. Doing so also minimised the risk of doing business for multi-national 
companies operating in countries with weak regulation. In the same moment, the UK 
government passed its Food Safety Act which required traceability in horticulture 
chains including in sourcing flowers. This made large supermarket chains such as 
Tesco seek more transparent relationships with their horticultural suppliers and build 
supply chains with only a few large, sophisticated Kenyan suppliers whose production 
quality conditions they could verify (Barrett et. al 1997, 1999; Hughes, 2000:12).  
 
The proliferation of codes also emerges from exposés on the exploitation of labour 
under expansion of the global trade in cut flowers. The strategic shift of production to 
the global south was driven by the existence of “cheap labour” which existed as a 
result of weak labour regulation and enforcement. The industry remains characterised 
by feminised88 and flexible labour (Tallontire et al. 2005; Opondo 2006; Coles & 
Mitchell 2010). Another major force behind the temporary employment of seasonal 
labourers in flower farms is the seasonality of the flower trade driven by peak seasons 
such as Valentine’s Day and Mother’s day (Riisgaard, 2011:436). Further, the 
perishability of the flowers means that workers have to work long hours in harvesting 
and spraying and are subsequently exposed to harsh chemicals in greenhouses over 
long periods of time, which is the main health hazard in flower farms. Though the time 
sensitivity, aesthetic and high-end nature of the flower industry set it apart, the labour 
issues89 (Dolan et. al, 2002) which private codes of conduct arose to check are 
common in other labour intensive global supply chains.  
 
Certification schemes in the flower industry also gained prominence alongside 
debates on sustainability and transparency. They first codify consumers’ demands to 
producers for ethical, transparent sourcing and sustainable production practices that 
protect workers and the environment (Dolan, 2007). Certifications then transmit 
                                                 
88 Opondo (2006:2) explained that the ostensible feminine traits of dexterity, attention to detail and 
reliability aligned with industry demands of quality, consistency, speed and meticulousness in 
handling a luxury, highly perishable aesthetic commodity. 
89 These include employment insecurity, overtime work, sexual harassment, Low wages, lack of 
access to maternity leave, minimal union membership among the workers, poor communication 
between workers, supervisors and management, poor transport facilities, frequent exposure to 
chemicals, lack of opportunities for promotions, lack of a proper complaints procedure; and lack of 
awareness of codes among the workers (Dolan et. al, 2002) 
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information to customers and end-users about a product’s technical specifications, its 
compliance with health and safety criteria or the processes by which it has been 
produced and sourced” (Nadvi, 2008:325). As Kuiper & Gemählich (2017:38) explain, 
the two main features of certification schemes is the assertion that they are creating a 
sustainable business, and the visible logo that transmits this information and 
confidence to consumers. However, as Timms' (2017) shows, the persistent invisibility 
of certification particularly to consumers and florists is puzzling given the fact that they 
are meant to signal sustainability of production practices. She suggests that this 
invisibility could be due to the assembled nature of the final product into bouquets with 
flowers of mixed origin, lack of consumer interest or awareness, doubts as to whether 
a certified flower is necessarily an ethical flower and perhaps even perceived 
reputational risk from explicit promotion. The high information costs of this process 
underscore the knowledge-intensive nature of the flower industry. 
 
Rising concerns with sustainability have led to literature that analyses the link between 
subscription to certifications and effects on labour rights protections. The general 
conclusion is that though labour rights have improved over time in part due to the 
schemes, subscription to certifications does not challenge underlying power relations 
since the schemes remain ‘the masters’ tools’ and therefore instruments of control. 
(Barrientos & Smith, 2007; Kuiper & Gemählich, 2017; Nelson, Martin, & Ewert, 2007; 
Opondo, 2006; Riisgaard, 2009; Riisgaard & Gibbon, 2014). The effect of certifications 
has also been discussed in reports commissioned by NGOs such as Fairtrade 
(Wilshaw (ed.) et al, 2013; Klier, 2012; Leipold & Morgante, 2013).  
 
Ethical and culturally grounded analyses in critical Political Economy literature 
The second theme in the theoretical literature provides an ethical and culturally-
specific analysis of the global cut flower trade. This body of work covers themes such 
as governmentality90 (Hughes 2001; Dolan 2007; Kuiper & Gemählich 2017), the 
underpinnings of ethical trade and corporate social responsibility (Hale & Opondo 
2005; Blowfield 1999; Blowfield & Dolan 2008; Opondo 2006; Omosa & Njiru 2006; 
                                                 
90 Dolan (2007) discussed the notion of governmentality in the context of Fairtrade arguing that it 
translates consumers’ humanism into technologies (standards, audits and certification) of regulation 
and surveillance, which shape the African subject as less than full partners in the intended partnership. 
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Neilson & Pritchard 2009) and cultural sensitivities91 of the relations of production in 
the flower value chain (Hughes 2000; Dolan 2007; Hughes, McEwan & Bek. 2015) 
and in north-south horticultural trade generally (Freidberg 2003). Cultural narratives of 
production help consumers forge the feeling of being in relationship with the 
producers, who in the throes of globalisation are so far yet by global logistical 
technologies rendered so near (Hughes, McEwan and Bek, 2015). Further, applying 
a  postcolonial critique of institutional hybridity92 to GPN theory (Hughes, McEwan and 
Bek, 2015:254)  allows for a critique of knowledge flows93 in the production network 
by foregrounding understandings of the economy from the Global South.  
 
This review of critical political economy literature has outlined themes in research 
pertaining to the governance of the cut flower industry through private voluntary 
initiatives, as well as providing culturally-specific analyses. These analyses engage 
substantively the Global Value Chain theory on issues of governance and power 
dynamics between industry actors. The review further notes that the body of work on 
the political economy flower industry using the Global Production Networks lens is still 
growing, and this thesis is part of that development.  
 
2.3. Strands of theoretical literature  
Overview of Global Commodity and Global Value chain approaches  
The Global Production Networks framework which is the main theoretical framework 
herein, has its roots in Global Value Chains (GVC) and Global Commodity Chain 
(GCC) theories. These are anchored primarily in Economic Geography and 
Sociological analyses. Hopkins & Wallerstein (1977) developed the “commodity chain” 
approach as part of World Systems Theory (WST) as a way of understanding the 
global, historicised and uneven dimensions of capitalist production processes. Their 
framework was set at the national level and categorised the world economic system 
                                                 
91 The call to a deeper consideration of the cultural influences such as norms, routines and value 
systems shaping global value chains, network dynamics and development outcomes has been 
articulated by several scholars including Bair (2005:168), Hess and Yeung (2006:1198); and Neilson 
and Pritchard (2009: 9)  
92 Hughes, McEwan and Bek (2015) use the postcolonial notion of economic hybridity from the work of 
Eiman Zein-Elabdin (2009; 2011) which argues for a more culturally sensitive understanding of the 
institutional contexts shaping global production networks.  
93 An example is the consideration of who defines and sets the standards for ethical trade. Friedberg 
(2003) explains how ethical interventions coming from the Global North construct agency within the 
global North as ethical, while production in the Global South is constructed as inherently unethical and 
in need of regulation.  
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into core, periphery and semi-periphery. Michael Porter (1985,1990) later popularised 
the use of the chain metaphor by using it to explain how firms manage their 
relationships with other firms in competition for cost differentiation.  
 
The Global Commodity Chain (GCC) was conceptualised by Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 
(1994). This perspective provided a meso-level analysis which was focussed on inter-
firm relations from production to market, and policy recommendations for upgrading 
geared towards producers in developing countries. In it, Gereffi introduced the 
concepts of ‘lead firms’ which have influence over other actors and explained how 
connecting to them can influence the ability of firms in developing countries to 
upgrade. Subsequently GCCs evolved into Global Value Chains (GVCs)94,  a switch 
which is generally credited to researchers at the Institute of Development Studies at 
Sussex (Neilson & Pritchard 2009: 38).  
 
The main analytical categories of the Global Commodity Chain approach as 
developed by Gereffi (1994:96-7) were: (1) an input-output structure (ii) territoriality 
(iii) governance and (iv) an institutional structure. The analysis of governance has 
since dominated the GVC research agenda, as was evidenced in the review in the 
previous section on GVC analysis in the flower industry. Gereffi developed two ideal-
types of governance - buyer-driven and producer-driven commodity chains. In buyer-
driven chains such as the cut flower industry (Hughes 2000), lead firms capture value 
and knowledge through branding and design, rather than technology (Gereffi 1999; 
Gereffi & Memedovic 2003). The two ideal types of governance have since been 
critiqued for being too crude (Fold, 2002:230) and rigid (Raikes et al. 2000:21). The 
dichotomy has also been critiqued for being too narrow and abstract (Clancy 1998; 
Gellert 2003; Henderson et al. 2002). Gibbon et al. (2008:321)  also criticised the 
distinction, since rather than being comprised of a single homogenous entity, a single 
GVC is actually made up of several ‘strands’ as differentiated by variety of product 
type, institutional configuration or end market95. Finally, it was recognised that actors 
                                                 
94 Bair (2005: 162) explains that at a meeting at Bellagio in 2000, researchers favoured value chain 
terminology over commodity chain for its inclusiveness, and adopted it in order to develop a shared 
language for those researching global industries. 
95 For example, the flower industry has thousands of flower varieties, an institutional configuration 
comprising a range of private voluntary initiatives governing market access, and bifurcated markets split 
between the Dutch auction and Direct Markets.  
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other than buyers or producers (such as NGOs or certification bodies) could have a 
very important stake in chain governance (Ponte 2007).   
 
GVC analysis posits that static idea that the power and role of the lead firm is taken 
as given. It overlooks for example, that within the flower industry there are 
contestations among the characteristic lead firms (the Dutch auctions and 
supermarkets) that are in dialectical relationship with the strategies of producers in the 
global south who are fighting for their survival. The relevant and useful concept 
emerging from the GCC buyer driven/producer driven analysis is the conceptualisation 
of “big buyers”. This is the locus of commercial capital (Bair 2005) which was identified 
by Dolan & Humphrey (2000) as giant retail outlets or supermarkets. At the Dutch 
flower auction, the term ‘big buyers’ specifically refers to wholesale buyers (Maharaj 
& Dorren 1995; Hughes 2000) placing bids and who then supply florists, retailers and 
supermarket chains with specific orders.  
 
Complementing the notion of the “big buyer” is the concept of the “focal firm”96 (OECD 
2008; Dembinski 2009). These are firms that “consistently operate value adding 
processes on both sides of the focal point, i.e. both in production and in 
marketing/distribution”(OECD 2008: 47-48). The focal point in Global Value Chains is 
described as the point at which the focus moves from production to the market. In the 
cut flower industry, consolidator-exporters are the focal firms intermediating between 
the flower producers and the big buyers at the Dutch auction and/or supermarkets, 
that oversee the conversion of the harvested cut flower into an export-ready 
commodity. They add value by consolidating various varieties of cut flowers to reach 
economies of scale, to match the seasonality of demand in export markets and to 
maintain consistency of supply. Consolidator-exporters are therefore really the ‘make-
it-or-break-it’ link to a diversity of markets for small and mid-scale Kenyan and indeed 
all producers in the global South (Cunden & Van Heck 2004; J. Wijnands 2005).  
 
                                                 
96 Dembinski (2009:121) explains that this concept is operational in the context of global value chains 
which can be divided into two segments: “a segment in which all value added activities are centred on 
the production of the good or service, and a segment in which value adding is made of efforts to reach 
the final customer or user” This structure is evident in the cut flower industry between production on the 
farm and the point of harvest when cold chain management, consolidation and sometimes bouquet 
making is carried out by exporting firms.  
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Drawing in the developmental angle of value chain relationships between buyers and 
producers, Gereffi later (1999) linked the notion of value chain governance to 
questions of uneven development in a globalised world economy, through the concept 
of “upgrading”. Upgrading refers to how producers’ positions within chains either 
enhance or restrict their ability to improve their livelihoods (Neilson and Pritchard 2009: 
39). The term was previously restricted to mean only industrial upgrading, which is 
how firms can improve their competitiveness within the chain. Later the concept of 
economic upgrading was introduced in regard to moving into higher value added 
activities and more lucrative markets. In the cut flower industry, this concept of 
upgrading (discussed further in chapter three), has been expanded by Barrientos et 
al. (2011) and Bernhardt & Milberg (2011) to include the social dimension referred to 
as “social upgrading” .  
 
While Gereffi’s (1994) GCC formulation summarised governance as ‘driven’ 
emphasising the role played by chain drivers, Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005) 
further developed the concept of governance as ‘coordination’ between value chain 
activities97. This conceptualisation led to the formulation of five forms of governance 
Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005:83-84) derived from transaction costs 
economics, production networks and firm level learning literature. These include 
market, modular, relational, captive and hierarchical governance, which define 
linkages between value chain activities. This typology is based on three key variables: 
the complexity of transactions, the codifiability of information and the capabilities of 
suppliers. The spectrum from market to hierarchical type of governance highlights the 
degree of firm control (Delgado and Cruz, 2013). As value chains move from market 
to hierarchy, the level of explicit coordination increases and, with it, power asymmetry 
between actors (Gibbon et al. 2008:323). The five types of governance are captured 
in table 2.2 below. The modes of governance are derived from Gereffi et al. (2005: 84-
86) are manifested at various scales within the Kenyan cut flower industry. 
 
                                                 
97 There is a third formulation of governance in value chains as ‘normalisation’ which uses convention 
theory to situate and analyse the dynamics of buyer-seller relations in their immediate normative 
environment. This is beyond the scope of this thesis. For examples of how the concept has been 
operationalised in analysing horticultural trade, see Ouma (2010) and Riisgard & Gibbon (2014). 
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Key determinants of value chain governance 
 
Table 2.2. 
Source: Gereffi et. al (2005: 86-87) 
*Generalised example is author’s analysis 
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Given this outlining discussion based on contributions from the Global Value Chain 
framework, the forms of governance reflected most clearly are the modular in regards 
to the mid-scale farms and captive in regards to the small-scale farms. This GVC 
typology of governance has however been critiqued for underplaying the extent to 
which governance is shaped by factors external to the firm, including the institutional 
landscape (Patel-Campillo 2011:84). It overlooks spatial and social dynamics of value 
chains and focusses primarily on technicalities of governance, which is very similar to 
the New Institutional Economics approach (Khan, 1995; Gibbon et al, 2008; Neilson & 
Pritchard, 2009; Coe & Yeung, 2015). Lastly, it is important to note that multiple forms 
of governance can coexist within GVCs (Gibbon & Ponte 2005).  
 
GVC analysis is useful for explaining how specific steps within the chain are 
coordinated, but ill-suited to explaining overall governance. Additionally, as noted by 
Krauss (2015), this typology of firm-centric governance renders too strong a focus on 
the private sector. This top-down analysis also obscures the role of critical 
intermediary firms (such as consolidator-exporters) between producer and buyer and 
thereby lacks the granularity required to shed light on the diversity of market practices 
by the range of actors in a production network. Further, the chain structure of 
governance in the GVC framework limits the complexity of relations involved in 
globalised trade. Lastly, as Gibbon et. al (2008) point out, the GVC analysis takes as 
given the power of lead firms rather than explaining how it is that this control comes 
about.  
 
The flower industry in GVC literature  
Gaining ground in development policy in the 2000s, the Global Value Chain (GVC) 
theory provided an excellent framework for the analysis of governance as seen in the 
proliferation of certifications in the flower industry. In particular, it provided a useful 
lens to analyse power dynamics in the buyer-driven value chain, contestations 
between labour and capital,  gendered labour relations therein,  possibilities for 
upgrading and the consolidating effects large retailers or “big buyers” have on other 
actors upstream in the value chain (See Hughes 2000; Hughes 2001; Dolan & 
Humphrey 2000; Dolan& Opondo 2002; Oxfam 2004; Tallontire et al. 2005; Riisgaard 
2009).  
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Governance in GVC literature is defined as “non-market coordination of economic 
activity” (Gereffi et.al, 2001:4) and incorporates formal and informal rules, norms and 
networks. From the GVC perspective, certifications transmit information on the nature 
of products and processes of production, reduce complexity and facilitate coordination 
across the value chain (Humphrey & Schmitz 2001; Henson & Humphrey 2008). In 
addition to the reduction of transactions costs, standards  exist to  codify information 
for two main purposes in global value chains– risk management and product 
differentiation (Gibbon & Ponte 2005; Nadvi 2008; Henson & Humphrey 2010). These 
two aspects of certification are particularly relevant to the governance of the flower 
industry which operates virtually contract-free (Macchiavello & Morjaria 2015).  
 
Risk management standards generally refer to standards that provide assurance that 
producers have complied with certain defined requirements (such as the Dutch MPS 
standard) while product differentiation standards distinguish the product in terms of 
the quality of its production process from others typically by a visible consumer label 
(such as Fairtrade). It is also possible though rare for a standard to possess both 
attributes. Further this is not a rigid dichotomy, but also includes the possibility that as 
regulations are enhanced over time, risk management standards will evolve to take 
the place occupied by product differentiation standards while product differentiation 
standards adapt to more nuanced and newer attributes (Henson & Humphrey 2008; 
Riisgaard 2011). 
 
The variety of origins of certification, codes of conduct and the pre-dominance of some 
over others is telling of the contestation of power in the flower value chain. Blowfield 
& Dolan (2008:15) note that there is a “political economy of knowledge production” 
with respect to standards especially looking at their origins, the stakeholders involved 
or excluded, how they are legitimated and implemented. Standards have great 
ideational power in contestations over knowledge production, the construction and 
distribution of value, quality, consumer ethics and who gets legitimating power in a 
globalised economy (Dolan 2007; Ouma 2010; Moberg & Lyon 2010; Nelson & 
Tallontire 2014). The originator of a particular code of conduct boasts knowledge over 
the construction and protection of consumer value and interests in that society and by 
association acts as a gatekeeper to prosperity (or not) of the producer seeking access. 
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Naturally, the originator’s interests become embedded in the information that is 
transmitted via compliance to the code. For example, the first standards in the industry 
were developed by corporate buyers and so were technically oriented and weak on 
social issues (Riisgaard 2011:440). Northern originators’ ability to keep raising the 
standards and minimum requirements98 for certification represents shifting goal posts, 
such that only the most capable, nimble and sophisticated suppliers can gain entry, 
while the rest are locked out. 
 
Certifications also provide insights into the dynamics of extra-firm bargaining since 
they often do not originate from the market itself (Gereffi et al., 2001:4), but are 
nevertheless implemented through market mechanisms such as price-setting (Kuiper 
& Gemählich, 2017). They do however refer to or converge around international ‘best 
practice’ models of governance under the auspices of multi-stakeholder initiatives 
(MSIs)99. These standards are not neutral mechanisms but institutional 
mechanisms100 with different forms of implementation arriving at different results on 
the ground (Riisgaard 2011:436).  
 
The flower industry in GPN literature 
Though hugely influential, the GVC framework is limited in terms of its consideration 
of the variety of players and the diversity of their strategies, the realities of multi-scalar 
governance and power dynamics in the global economy. The Global Production 
Network (GPN), as the analytical lens, provides the tools to engage the micro and 
relational experiences of actors in the cut flower chain. This literature review yielded 
only a few examples of studies of the flower industry as analysed using the GPN lens.  
 
                                                 
98 A good example was the change made to Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs) by the EU for flowers 
and other horticultural producer imported to the European Union in 2013 which saw a large proportion 
of Kenyan produce intercepted. Flower companies which violated the MRLs were banned from 
exporting until corrective actions were instituted. Accessed at: 
http://www.kenyaflowercouncil.org/blog/?p=5623 
99 For example, in the 1990s codes began to converge around the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) core labour rights and adopted other ‘good governance’ principles such as independence 
through third party auditing and inclusivity through MSIs 
100 The way these codes of conduct play out within the context of the Kenyan flower industry is 
discussed in depth in chapter eight.  
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Hughes (2000) first and perhaps most influentially advanced the suitability of the 
network metaphor101 to an analysis of the cut flower commodity trade. Networks 
portray webs of interdependence rather than fixed, uni-directional relationships, and 
also bind together multi-directional flows of information. Hughes (2000:213) explained 
that “Applying the metaphor of the network, at least at its most general level, to the cut 
flower trade offers a productive analytical framework within which both to adapt 
Gereffi’s (1994a, 1994b) notion of buyer-driven commodity circulation and to identify 
the forces driving competitive pressures in the sphere of production.” Hughes’ (2000) 
perspectives are instructive for highlighting the complex dependencies among various 
actors, the power of retailers and how they capitalise on their knowledge to construct 
and deconstruct the idea of value in the cut flower production network.   
  
More recent work such as Patel-Campillo (2011)  applies GPN theory to the Dutch 
flower industry to illustrate how producers’ strategies, regulation and historical 
trajectories influence and transform chain governance over time102. Taylor's (2011) 
PhD thesis used GPN theory to examines the early stages of Ethiopia’s flower industry 
and the relationships between its actors. He concludes optimistically about the 
potential for value capture locally and argues for the importance of territorial 
embeddedness of actors (Taylor 2011:160) so as to endogenise developmental gains 
in Ethiopia. From this evaluation of GPN literature in the cut flower industry, it is 
possible to surmise that a gap exists in the applicability of the GPN framework to the 
Kenyan flower industry.  
 
Discussion of key concepts emerging from GPN 2.0 theory 
The following part of this theoretical literature review section is divided into three parts, 
each one elaborating on key concepts in the GPN analytical framework (Coe & Yeung, 
2015) developed in chapter 4. These key concepts include networks, strategies and 
the idea of bargaining power which resonate with my empirical findings. The first 
section outlines Actor-Network Theory that animates the GPN conceptualisation of 
networks and its heterogeneity and structuration theory which is mentioned in GPN 
                                                 
101 Hughes (2000) paper predates the comprehensive development of the Global Production Network 
approach as a general theory by such as Henderson et. al (2000) and later Coe & Yeung (2015)  
102 Patel-Campillo (2011:81) explained how in the development of the Dutch cut flower agro-industry, a 
combination of actors’ strategies and state regulation can effectively reverse power relations from 
buyers (buyer-driven chain) to producers (producer-driven chain). 
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theory as a means of resolving the tension between structure and agency in production 
networks. The second section engages institutional theory to provide a relational view 
of the firm and develop associated ideas of the reduction of transactions costs and 
governance of global production networks. The third section points to key ideas arising 
from endogenous growth theory that enable a critical analysis of the cut flower industry 
as a ‘knowledge intensive’ industry (Hughes 2000). It allows us to investigate un-
acknowledged flows of knowledge, how knowledge is institutionalised and its role in 
the development of the industry.  
 
Conceptualizing networks in relation to the flower industry 
Actor-Network Theory 
GPNs theory uses networks as an organizing principle for global economic 
relationships. By encompassing all relevant sets of actors and relationships, it goes 
beyond the GVC approach of focussing on inter-firm transactions (Coe et al. 
2008:272). To develop the idea of networks, GPN theorists borrowed from Actor-
Network Theory (ANT)103  developed by Bruno Latour and Michael Callon and John 
Law to emphasise the relationality of objects and agency in heterogenous networks104. 
Associations are of primary importance and power is located in the strength of those 
associations (Cressman 2009).  
  
As employed within the GPN framework, Actor-Network theory is useful105 for 
analysing the cut flower industry as a heterogeneous network in which the variety of 
institutional actors, the production and logistical technologies, and techniques interact 
to make and remake relations in the network (Hughes 2000). ANT’s dynamism106 
                                                 
103 ANT is a relational and network-focussed theory that was developed to understand processes of 
technological innovation and the scientific development of knowledge. 
104 ANT treats human and non-human actors as equal agents, in what is known as the principle of 
generalised symmetry (Callon 1986a). In doing so, ANT breaks down dichotomies such as human 
and non-human, knowledge and power, structure and agency. “Reducible neither to an actor alone 
nor to a network…An actor-network is simultaneously an actor whose activity is networking 
heterogeneous elements and a network that is able to redefine and transform what it is made of” 
(Callon 1987:93). 
105 However, ANT does not focus on why networks work per se, but rather on the infrastructure of 
actor-networks. It accords equality to all the actors  and so is unable to explain the asymmetry of 
power.  Henderson et al., (2002) therefore find ANT alone unable to explain the processes of 
economic development because it fails to explain the underlying structures that influence power 
relations.  
106 Henderson et. al (2002:442) explain that ANT is useful for GPN theory because it helps in defining 
space and distance as “relational scopes of influence” and therefore redefining what we mean by 
‘global’ and ‘globalisation’. We cease thinking of them simply as geographic bounds and see them as 
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helps to show how the connections between entities are formed. It is also useful as a 
lens into the formation, breakdown and reformation of heterogeneous producer 
networks as they negotiate entry into export markets. Lastly, ANT’s focus on agents 
and on processes shaping human interaction complements institutional theory 
(discussed below), which focusses on streamlining tensions between structure and 
agency in networks.  
 
Converging institutional theories and GPN 2.0.  
Structuration theory and GPN 
In GPN theory, Yeung (2014:44) makes use of ‘structuration’ (Giddens 1984) to 
provide a relational understanding of how firms operate within the rules, regulations, 
policies, and norms that constitute their production networks. Structuration resolves 
the tension between structure and agency with the view that actors’ values and actions 
are embedded, enlivened and constrained within the structures they are located in, 
and in turn inform and shape those same structures. The institutions configure actors 
and include among others shared beliefs, norms of doing business, institutional 
arrangements, policies, regulations and contracts. GPN uses this notion to explain that 
firms exercise agency through the creation of institutional routines and through firm 
strategies107 (Fuller & Phelps 2018). This agency is in turn shaped by a firm’s dynamic 
capabilities (Coe & Yeung 2015) which are a reflection of its ability to learn, 
experiment, absorb R&D and codify information.  
 
New Institutional Economics and transaction costs 
North (1992:74) introduced the notion of institutions as “the rules of the game of a 
society or more formally the humanly devised constraints that structure human 
interaction.” Of particular interest under the New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
framework was the institutional environment or the ‘rules of the game’ which can be 
formal or informal such as  judiciary, property rights and contracts, and what 
Williamson (1998:75) referred to as the institutions of governance or the ‘play of the 
game’ which include markets, firms and hybrids such as environmental cooperatives. 
The rules of the game become institutionalised when power relations are repeated 
                                                 
dynamic phenomena that change over time. Secondly, ANT rejects simple dichotomies such as the 
‘global-local’ nexus and ‘structure-agency’.  (Henderson et al. 2002:459). 
107 Chapters six, seven and eight characterise the institutional routines and firm strategies of Kenyan 
cut flower producer networks. 
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over time and form a pattern. These institutional arrangements are the mechanisms 
that coordinate economic activity thereby reducing uncertainty in exchange.  
Markets operate under incomplete information and limited mental capacity to process 
that information108 which determines the cost of transacting. That is not to argue that 
the price mechanism does not work, but that it is costly and uncertain in doing so. 
(Amsden, 1989; Toye, 1995). Coase (1937, 1960) famously elaborated that 
transactions costs arise because information is costly and is held asymmetrically by 
different transacting parties. Coase (1937) earlier conceptualised firms and markets 
as alternative governance structures because they accomplish for transactions what 
technology is meant to. These transactions costs include search and information 
costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing and enforcement costs. Institutions 
therefore matter because they minimise these information asymmetries, reduce costs 
and facilitate the enforcement of contracts by constraining market participants’ 
behaviour and choice (North 1992; Bates 1995; Chang 2014). In the absence of formal 
contracts as is the case in the flower industry (Macchiavello & Morjaria 2015), informal 
institutions109 such as trust within gentlemen’s networks, familial ties and reputation 
built on consistency of quality become the rules of the game, and are the foundation 
of relational modes of governance in value chains.   
 
NIE exhibits a few limitations in institutional analysis. It holds to a neo-classical 
framework in which institutions emerge spontaneously, and therefore fails to explain 
how institutional change comes about (Knight, 1992). It is also limited in its view that 
market institutions exist primarily to facilitate exchange. Institutions inhabit and carry 
out a wide range of socio-political purposes beyond facilitating economic efficiency 
(Knight, 1992; Bates, 1995; Polanyi, 2001). An acknowledgement of the 
embeddedness of markets in institutional arrangements as first articulated by Polanyi 
(1944) led to a shift in development policy from “getting the prices right” to “getting the 
institutions right” (Scoones et al. 2005).  
                                                 
108 Instrumental rationality holds that ideas and ideologies do not matter, and that efficient markets 
characterise economies. North (1992:73) argued that the limitations of neoclassical economics are 
rooted in instrumental rationality, which makes it an institutions-free theory. NIE expands neoclassical 
economics by abandoning instrumental rationality and centering the fact that we have incomplete 
information and limited mental capacity with which to process information.  
109 The use of informal mechanisms to guarantee contractual performance has been widely explored 
in economic literature for example, Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff 2002; Greif 2005; Fafchamps 
2010. 
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Building further on the notion of the embeddedness of markets, Chang & Evans 
(2005:2) critique NIE’s singular focus on institutions as constraints, because it 
obscures the constitutive role of institutions in incorporating ideas and culture and 
shaping how groups and individuals shape their preferences. Chang & Evans (2005) 
put forward a more comprehensive framing for institutions as, “devices which enable 
the achievement of goals requiring supra-individual coordination and, even more 
important, which are constitutive of the interests and worldviews of economic actors.” 
Institutions are therefore constraining, enabling and constitutive mechanisms, which 
should be seen as socially constructed in response to changes in world view and also 
constitutive of interests and ideology (Chang & Evans 2005:28). Speaking about the 
development of export agricultural markets in particular, Ouma et al. (2013:228) 
explain that the making of markets is a joint venture. “Markets are not seen just to be 
‘‘there’’ and ‘‘do’’ things as soon as all obstacles have been removed, they have 
actively to be created and shaped by – among others – the work of development 
organizations110.”  
 
A relational view of the firm in GPN 
This understanding of the firm and the market as governance structures enables us to 
think of the relational qualities of the firm in global production networks. The firm forms 
the starting point for the analysis of economic activity and can be anything from a small 
family business to a multi-national corporation. The term ‘relational’ is used in the 
literature on global value chains to discusses various dynamics of interaction between 
chain or network actors. It has been used to define relational governance,  one of five 
earlier discussed forms of governance in a value chain (Gereffi et al. 2005a). The term 
relational has also been used in GPN literature in the context of ‘relational rents’111 
which is one of the forms of value generated by a firm’s asymmetric access to various 
inter-firm relationships.  
 
                                                 
110 The heterogeneity of ‘makers of the flower market’ includes the role of development organisations 
which provide philanthropic capital such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, USAID, Fintrac, 
and the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) 
111 Relational rents as previously discussed could involve, “The management of production linkages 
with other firms, the development of strategic alliances, or the management of relations with clusters 
of small and medium sized enterprises” (Henderson et al. 2002:449).  
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Within the framing of GPNs, a relational perspective of the firm involves understanding 
its relationship to the territory in which it is embedded and operates. To expound on 
the relational view of the firm within a territory, the firm-territory relationship, Dicken & 
Malmberg (2001:346) explain that we need to reconceptualise the firm as not only 
legally bound entities or owners of proprietary assets but as, “institutions with 
permeable and highly blurred boundaries—in other words, conceptualizing them as 
“networks within networks” or “systems within systems.” Firms interact with territories 
and industrial (or agricultural) systems under a governance system that sets the rules, 
institutions and regulations for the interaction as shown in the image below.  
The firm-territory nexus 
 
Figure 2.1 
Source: Dicken and Malmberg (2001:347) 
 
Firm-territory relationships finds resonance in the idea of “nested institutions” as 
elaborated by  Aggarwal (2005) which explains how broader regimes influence the 
design of new institutions that are narrower in scope.  Nested institutions can emerge 
either around an issue area or regionally112. Aggarwal (2005) also discusses the 
creation of parallel institutions113, which is when institutions deal with separate but 
                                                 
112 For an example of nesting of regional institutions, Aggarwal (2005:4) gives the example of the 
development of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation grouping (APEC) in 1989 and its relationship 
to the predecessor of the WTO, the Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). To reconcile 
tension between GATT and Asia Pacific regional interests, APEC was seen as “a better alternative to 
using GATT, which permits the formation of free trade areas and customs unions”(Aggarwal 2005)  
113 The proliferation of codes of conduct has led to the emergence of what Riisgaard, (2011:437) refers 
to as ‘parallelism’, which is where standard schemes operate in parallel in the same issue area. A 
means of reconciling this institutional conflict is the recent emergence of ‘baskets of standards’ that 
seek to benchmark parallel codes in an issue area to one highly esteemed code, in a bid to avoid audit 
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related issues, as another way of reconciling institutional conflicts. The relational 
concepts of the ‘Firm-territory nexus’ and ‘nested institutions’ find resonance for 
example in the development of the Kenya Flower Council’s certification which is 
benchmarked to the Global G.A.P. standard while adapting to local realities of 
production114.  
 
2.4. The concept of bargaining power  
Bargaining power115  is linked to the agency of producers using a range of strategies 
to survive and thrive in a global production network, and is defined as the ability to 
negotiate with influence to bring about desired change (Ladd, 1964:157).  
 
GPN theory discusses power under three main categories - institutional, corporate and 
collective power (Coe &Yeung 2015). While illuminating the locations of power in a 
GPN, the theory does little to elaborate on the actual process of contestation and 
bargaining that occurs given the asymmetry of power between actors. To incorporate 
the idea of bargaining power into the GPN approach, it is necessary to first 
acknowledge that geography and location of the actors determine the scope of 
influence of each actor (Arias 2016; Allen 2003). Secondly, Allen (2003) who helped 
shape the idea of power in GPN theory, elaborated that power is distinctly relational 
rather than contained in access to limited resources:  
“Power as an outcome cannot and should not be ‘read off’ from a resource 
base, regardless of its size or scope. Power in this sense is no more to be found 
‘in’ the wood of musical instruments. It is, as suggested, a relational effect 
[italics mine], not a property of someone or some ‘thing’.” Allen (2003:5) 
 
With this in mind, there are two aspects of bargaining power highlighted by Arias 
(2016:266) – episodic bargaining power and non-decisional bargaining power. The 
third, ideological bargaining power is briefly mentioned to frame the possible long term 
                                                 
fatigue and mainstream the sustainability requirements.  These are discussed in chapter eight under 
extra-firm relationships. 
114 Elaborated further in chapter eight. 
115 The literature on bargaining in value chains typically discusses bargaining power in terms of supplier 
and buyer bargaining power. An analysis of supplier power would highlight the level of differentiation in 
inputs and services, possibilities for forward integration and supplier concentration. Buyer bargaining 
power includes a consideration of for example the concentration of buyer power, access to information, 
switching opportunities and costs (Joosten, 2007:3).  
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effects of exercising the first two, but further discussion is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
 
Episodic bargaining power116 (Dahl 1961; Clegg 2002) refers to how one actor by 
using its strategic resources succeeds in making the other actor do something they 
would not otherwise do. It is “about decision making situations and cannot simply be 
equated to the strategic resources or reputation held by the agents, since such 
resources [may or may not] be mobilized during the bargain” (Arias 2016:82). The 
event is shaped by rules, relations and resources which are in turn shaped by more 
fundamental systemic forces (Alsop 2004:23). In the flower industry, an example of 
episodic bargaining power is in the scenario where market intermediaries (known as 
‘ethical agents’) with the backing of philanthropic capital117 negotiated for amendments 
to the requirements of the Rainforest Alliance certification, thereby enabling 
smallholders to supply summer flowers to ASDA and Sam’s Club (Buxton & Vorley 
2012). While the certification constitutes the rules, the episodic bargaining process 
here points to the systemic power of integration into informal networks in the flower 
industry.  
 
Non-decisional power  is derived from Bachrach & Baratz (1963) that attempted to go 
beyond Dahl’s (1961) view of decision making power which assumed that all matters 
of concern were surfaced and pursued in decision making spaces. The concept of 
Non-decisional power was built on two faces of power (Bachrach & Baratz 1962) which 
acknowledges agency in decision making and structure which accounts for 
institutional bias. Non-decisional power can be seen where one actor limits the scope 
of the political process available to the other actor, when issues are deliberately left 
out of the agenda by one of the actors. Bachrach and Baratz (1962) found that some 
issues were never voiced or pursued in recognized political arenas or with appropriate 
decision makers and concluded that power also exists covertly118, that is, outside 
                                                 
116 This is the first of “three circuits of power” articulated by Clegg (1989) as the most visible and 
easily accessible circuit. The other two are dispositional power which concerns social integration, 
according to the rules of the game and facilitative power, which provides the context for the other two 
and is the basis of system integration (Haugaard and Ryan 2012:47). 
117 The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the IIED, The Sustainable Food Lab and commercial experts 
developed this flower smallholder market access program known as the New Business Models for 
Sustainable Trading Relationships (NBMSTR). 
118 Arias (2016:266) gives an example of non-decisional power in how mining multi-nationals in Chile 
have created the belief that if the state intervenes in any way, the MNE will leave the country. 
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political arenas, and argued that non-decision making power was ‘the less apparent 
but nonetheless extremely important face of power’ (Bachrach 1970: 9).  
 
The third relevant aspect of bargaining power is Lukes’ (2005) notion of ideological 
bargaining power119 which refers to when actor A exerts influence over actor B so as 
to make them completely change their perspective and defend the interests of actor A 
as if they were Actor B’s own interests. It refers to “how continually strong bargaining 
positions in terms of episodic and non-decisional bargaining power can shape the 
perceptions of the less powerful actors in the long term, to ensure the acceptance of 
their role in the existing order”(Arias 2016:82). These conceptualisations of  bargaining 
power are grounded in the understanding that power is not something that can be 
materially possessed120 (Arias, 2016:266) but rather it is circumscribed by a sphere of 
activity and by the bounds of relationships.  
 
In the following section, we explore the concept of a knowledge economy in the 
literature, through the lens of the flower industry.  
 
2.5. The knowledge economy and intellectual property rights in the 
flower industry  
The ‘knowledge economy’121 has been defined as, “production and services based on 
knowledge-intensive activities that contribute to an accelerated pace of technological 
and scientific advancement as well as equally rapid obsolescence” (Powell & 
Snellman 2004:201). It has also been defined as an economy in which knowledge is 
the key input for production in contradistinction from an agricultural economy in which 
land is the main resource or an industrial economy in which labour and or coal for 
example are the main resources (Houghton & Sheehan 2000). In the economy, these 
advancements can be measured through the increasing relative share of the gross 
domestic product that is attributable to “intangible” capital (Powell & Snellman 
                                                 
119 It is based on Lukes’ conception of the three dimensions of power, where the third dimension of 
power is defined as “the power to prevent the formation of grievances by shaping perceptions, 
cognitions, and preferences in such a way as to ensure the acceptance of a certain role in the existing 
order (Lorenzini, 2006:92)”.   
120 For example, bargaining power among producers in the flower industry is not primarily derived 
from possession of specific physical assets or technologies. Rather, it is linked more to producers’ 
strategic integration into export networks through various forms of collective action and ownership and 
utilisation of knowledge. 
121 The idea of the knowledge economy was popularised by management theorist Peter Drucker (1959) 
when he described the rise of the knowledge worker as one who whose main asset is her knowledge. 
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2004:201). Global firms that122 are knowledge leaders in their fields typically exhibit 
enormous outlays of R&D spending (Nolan et al. 2008:36-37).  
 
The flower industry was first analysed as “knowledge-intensive” by (Hughes 2000b) 
and later by Bolo & Adeya (2006). Building on Appadurai’s (1986) formulation of 
technical, social and aesthetic knowledges, Hughes (2000:218) explained that: 
 
“Other critical knowledges shaping the flower industry include an understanding 
of cold-chain management in international logistics, seasonal dynamics of 
markets in relation to flower varieties, the codes of conduct that govern 
competitive participation and access to markets, and the increasing 
digitalisation of flower markets globally.” 
It is important to analyse the disjunctures between the cut flower industry and the local 
economy so as to contribute to this important but under-explored aspect of the flower 
industry.  
 
The role of knowledge in the economy 
Knowledge is key to the long-run growth of an economy (Romer 1986)123,  as seen 
through investments in R&D and in advancing human capital (Becker et al. 1990) to 
spur innovation.  Developing policies that drive efficiencies or cut costs of doing R&D 
with respect to intellectual property, trade, competition, education and taxes can 
influence the rate of innovation and drive economic growth (Howitt 2008).  
 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) protections are necessary institutions because 
knowledge is considered an impure public good given that it is non-rivalrous but is to 
some extent excludable. With no charge, there would be no incentive to produce 
knowledge and therefore for knowledge to be privately provided, certain protections 
                                                 
122 Nolan et al. (2008:37) “Each of the main automobile assemblers spends between US$2–8 billion 
annually on R&D” (DTI, 2005) 
123 Romer's (1986) theory of endogenous growth explained that the rate of endogenous growth is 
determined by forces that are internal to the economic system especially forces which govern 
opportunities and incentives for technological knowledge. The rate of technological progress is driven 
by ideas and innovations such as new products and processes. While investments in physical capital 
are subject to diminishing returns, knowledge as input in production has increasing marginal 
productivity. Many innovations therefore emerge from investments in R&D and in what Becker et al. 
(1990:13) termed as Human Capital. “Since human capital is embodied knowledge and skills, and 
economic development depends on advances in technological and scientific knowledge, development 
presumably depends on the accumulation of human capital.” 
  59 
or property rights must be availed (Stiglitz 1999). However, excessively strong 
property rights regimes can also hinder innovation. Since there are extensive 
externalities associated with innovation meaning that the originators might fail to get 
their dues, the issuance of patents as protections has been used to curtail competition 
and in some cases create monopolies (Stiglitz 1999:11).  
 
IPRs have been a controversial issue in developing country contexts particularly in the 
wake of the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreements under the 
WTO (Chang 2001; Maskus 2001). Much of the theoretical literature weighs the costs 
and benefits124 of introducing IPR protections in developing countries particularly in 
the context of global trade between “northern innovators” and “southern imitators” and 
the tendencies of IPR to favour producers over consumers (Chin & Grossman 1990; 
Diwan & Rodrik 1989; Helpman 1992; Markusen 1998). However, Chang (2003) 
showed from a historical perspective that there is no sound theoretical or empirical 
evidence supporting the argument that strong IP laws are necessary for the economic 




This literature review has provided an overview of the empirical and theoretical 
literature framing the interactions of the Kenyan flower industry with the global 
economy. The empirical literature outlined two streams – development policy literature 
focussed on materialist concerns over resources and actors and contestations therein, 
and critical political economy literature which is focussed on debates around 
sustainability and governance within the industry. The theoretical literature review 
traces major themes emerging from Global Value Chain (GVC) literature leading up to 
the suitability of the GPN theory as the analytical framework. In regards to the flower 
industry, GVC theory (particularly notions of the buyer-driven chain and the five modes 
of governance) is engaged mainly to provide an analysis of governance given the 
proliferation of private voluntary initiatives in the sector. Furthermore, the chapter 
introduces Dembinski’s (2009) notion of ‘the focal firm’ to highlight the centrality of the 
                                                 
124 The costs include a reduction in revenues of industries which imitate the products from developed 
countries, and increases in the prices of protected products. The benefits of introducing IPR might 
include increases in local innovation, in FDI, R&D and technology transfer. 
125 Plant Breeders’ Rights are discussed in detail in chapter five.  
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consolidator-exporter as the key intermediary in the cut flower trade. Only a few 
studies use the GPN framework to analyse the flower industry, and these engage the 
GPN network metaphor as well as the conceptualisation of actors’ strategies and value 
capture to discuss the sector’s dynamics in Ethiopia and Latin America. Having 
surmised that no GPN analysis of the Kenyan flower industry has been undertaken, I 
operationalise the GPN framework to offer a micro and relational perspective on the 
strategies of Kenyan mid and small scale flower producers’ navigating shifting export 
markets.  
 
The chapter then isolates and discusses in sequence four key concepts in 
conversation with the GPN framework. These concepts include networks, institutional 
theories, the notion of bargaining power and the knowledge-intensive nature of the 
flower industry. Respectively, these concepts outline the heterogeneity of actors and 
the relational view of the firm that recognises agency embedded within particular ‘rules 
of the game’. The idea of bargaining power among producers is portrayed as a 
contested practice emerging either in episodic or non-decisional forms, and which 
plays out through their networks and their utilisation of knowledge. With these key 
ideas from the literature, the next chapter develops the analytical framework.  
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3. Conceptualising Kenyan cut flower producer networks, 
strategies and knowledge implications  
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter develops the analytical framework building on the overview of the 
bifurcated structure of production and flower export markets provided in chapter one, 
and the analysis of empirical and theoretical literature in chapter two. This third chapter 
will engage the Global Production Networks (GPN) framework to conceptualise the 
networks, strategies and knowledge implications emerging from the sample of mid and 
small-scale Kenyan cut flower producer networks as they adapt to the demands of 
shifting export markets.  
 
This research employs the network rather than the chain metaphor126 because that 
more accurately portrays the heterogeneous, differentiated and nested nature of 
relations of production and marketing locally (horizontal dimension) as well as trade 
globally (vertically). Although the GPN framework is more suitable for understanding 
the overall form and functioning of the Kenyan flower industry, elements of the GVC 
analysis such as the five modes of governance (Gereffi et al. 2005b) and the concept 
of ‘big buyers’ (Dolan & Humphrey 2000) are retained. It also contests with the 
limitations of other key GVC notions such as ‘upgrading’ in favour of the more 
relational idea of ‘strategic coupling’ articulated in GPN.  
 
The thesis question which asks, “What strategies do Kenyan cut flower producer 
networks employ to seek greater bargaining power in response to shifts in 
export markets?” seeks to shed light on the practices, relationships and 
contestations that make up small and mid-scale producer strategies navigating 
changes in export markets in Europe and beyond. This section theorizes these 
producer practices and relationships by exploring the merits and limitations of the 
Global Production Network 2.0 theory, which provides a lens through which we can 
better understand the complexity of actors in relation to each other as they work to 
                                                 
126 As discussed in the theoretical literature review, chain and network frameworks remain the major 
ways of analysing complex production, value addition and market participation processes in global 
industries. 
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create, enhance and capture value, their strategies, and their developmental impacts. 
In this regard, the chapter is guided by the sub-question below (1 of 3): 
Thesis sub-question 1: To what extent does the Global Production Networks 
framework explain how cut flower producers adapt to shifts in export markets? 
a) To what extent does GPN theory explain the interests and position of the 
variety of actors in the Kenyan cut flower production network in line with the 
shifts in export markets? 
b) To what extent does GPN theory help us to understand the strategies of 
actors as they adapt to shifts in export markets? 
c) What are the strengths and limitations of GPN theory in explaining the 
development implications for the localities where the Kenyan cut flower 
network is embedded? 
 
To answer this question, this chapter will discuss the application and limitations of 
GPN, evaluate its suitability to the cut flower industry and then operationalise an 
attuned version of the framework to the empirical findings on the strategies and 
relationships of cut flower producers from my research127. The chapter then develops 
the conceptualisation of bargaining power from producers’ perspectives and then 
moves on to the developmental implications of the industry by engaging GPN’s 
concept of strategic coupling in reference to the cut flower knowledge economy.  
 
3.2. Global Production Networks 1.0 application and limitations 
Analysis of the three main categories of analysis – Value, Power and 
Embeddedness 
The Global Production Networks (GPN) framework was developed to provide a more 
rigorous and dynamic approach128 to globalised economic relations. Henderson et. al 
(2002: 448) developed the initial GPN framework (henceforth referred to as GPN 1.0) 
along three categories (summarised in figure 3.1). 
                                                 
127 The adapted version is summarised in appendix A and cut flower farmers’ strategies in the 
schematic 3.1.  
128 The GPN framework also developed in response to a call to the ‘relational turn’ in Economic 
geography (Massey et al 1999), which emphasised “actors and structures that effect dynamic changes 
in the spatial organization of economic activities” (Yeung 2005:1). 
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- Value in both the Marxian sense of surplus value and also in terms of economic 
rents129. Value is conceptualised in terms of how it is created, enhanced and 
captured 
- Power which is categorised into three forms: corporate power, collective and 
institutional power 
- Embeddedness which means the connection between agents and with the 
environment or context within which they operate. This is discussed along three 
fronts: territorial, network and societal embeddedness.  
This formulation of GPN represented a move away from the commodity focus used in 
Global Commodity Chain and Global Value Chain frameworks, and towards a 
discourse of production. It enabled a refocussing on the “social processes and 
circumstances underlying the production of goods and services and reproducing 
knowledge, labour and capital” (Henderson et al. 2002:444). Production according to 
GPN theory is defined as the “collective participation in value adding activity by a 
variety of actors in different sectors, industries and locations to create finished goods 
or services” (Coe & Yeung, 2015:34). This is a useful analytic point for my research 
which is centred on cut flower production, a process which entails breeding and 
propagation of plant material, growing, consolidating, transporting and packaging the 
flowers for sale. These processes of production are very knowledge intensive (Hughes 
2000a) and it is therefore key to outline these previously under-researched dynamics 
surrounding the (re)production and management of knowledge in the cut flower 
industry.  
 
Approximately 15 years into the development of GPN theory, Coe & Yeung (2015:3) 
describe a Global Production Network as “an organizational arrangement, comprising 
interconnected economic and non-economic actors, coordinated by a global lead firm, 
and producing goods or services across multiple geographic locations for worldwide 
markets”. This description emphasises three key elements of GPNs – a diversity of 
actors, strategies and multi-scalarity or a recognition of multiple locations as the sites 
of global economic production with a particular focus on the sub-national dimension 
since that is where development actually takes place. It gives equal importance to sub-
                                                 
129 Coe & Yeung (2015: 16) “Rent is created in a situation where a firm has access to scarce 
resources that can insulate it from competition by creating barriers to entry for competing firms.” 
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national and regional dynamics, rather than foregrounding national level interactions 
as the GCC/GVC approach does (Coe et. al 2002). This unique multi-scalar approach 
of the GPN is particularly relevant to my work on both mid and small scale flower 
producers whose strategies are grounded in a range of agro-ecologies, while at the 
global level it allows for the expression of shifts in export markets.  
 
 
GPN 1.0. A framework for analysis 
 
Figure 3.1. 
Source: Henderson et al. (2002:448) and Coe & Yeung (2015: 18) GPN 1.0: A schematic representation 
 
The overall appeal of the GPN theory for my research rests on two of its key tenets – 
the analytical categories of value, power and embeddedness, and the utility of the 
network metaphor, both of which are further developed in the revised version of the 
theory, GPN 2.0. The argument will employ the first two categories of value and power 
for an analysis of producer strategies while the third category, embeddedness, will 
emerge strongly in the narrative on the regulatory landscape in which producers 
generate, enhance and capture value and exercise power130.  
 
                                                 
130 See chapter eight for an in-depth discussion on the regulatory landscape of the Kenyan flower 
industry. 
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Value 
The first category discusses value creation, enhancement and capture which 
encompasses the strategies observed among mid-scale cut flower farmers as they try 
to better position themselves as preferred suppliers within shifting export markets. 
Value creation is concerned with the use of technology to generate value, the various 
ways of converting labour power into labour, and the possibilities thereof of capturing 
various forms of rent. Value enhancement entails the process of technology transfer, 
improvement and whether local firms can begin to generate organisational, relational 
and brand rents on their own (Henderson et al. 2002:449). Value capture is dependent 
on government policy131 and corporate governance which facilitate the repatriation of 




The second analytical category on power is relational, and by use of the network 
metaphor eschews a zero-sum conception of power as derived only from lead firms. 
GPN 1.0’s conception of power therefore allows us to highlight the agency and 
autonomy of small and intermediary firms which use a range of strategies to survive 
and thrive in globalised trade (Henderson et al. 2002:450).  
 
Corporate power refers to the lead firm’s capacity to influence decisions and resource 
allocations, decisively and consistently in its own interests, through the control over 
key resources, like information, knowledge, skills and brands within a GPN 
(MacKinnon 2012). Global lead firms often exercise power through the asymmetric 
control of information. Lead firms such as supermarkets or the ‘big buyers’ at the Dutch 
auctions have corporate power to influence producer strategies. Secondly, ‘focal firms’ 
identified as consolidator-exporters exercise corporate power in their ability to link 
                                                 
131 Chapter nine outlines contestations between the flower industry and the state on value capture 
issues including taxation. 
132 Linked to the category of value as described above, in chapters seven and eight I discuss two 
strategies producers employ as they manouever through the demands of export markets. The first are 
intra-firm strategies which pertain to the management of flower varieties for supply to export markets, 
as well as the management of labour in mid-scale farms. The second are inter-firm strategies that 
correspond to the diversity of relationships between flower farms and focal firms which are consolidator-
exporters. These two strategies map on to GPN forms of value creation through generation of various 
kinds of rents (Kaplinsky 1998, 2005) such as organisational rents, technological rents, relational rents 
and brand rents (Henderson et al, 2001:449) as elaborated in table 4.1.  
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producers to buyers and add value to the cut flower commodity by managing 
economies of scale, diversity of varieties in accordance with demand and maintaining 
the aesthetic value of the flowers by managing the integrity of the cold chain. In the 
midst of this, smaller firms can and do find ways to navigate, manoeuvre and negotiate 
the exercise of power by lead firms but their capabilities are limited by various 
shortcomings of technical capability, high information costs and weaknesses in 
collective action.  
 
Institutional power is defined as power exercised by local and national institutions, 
international institutions, the Bretton woods institutions, UN agencies and various 
financial institutions. It comes into play in considering the dominance of private 
voluntary initiatives which govern market access in the flower industry, as well as the 
public regulatory structures such as taxation, traceability and trade policy instruments 
which span local, national and regional borders.133 
 
Third, collective power refers to the actions of collective agents who influence the 
workings of the sector. These include firms (trade and labour unions, employers’ 
associations), consumers and civil society organizations (NGOs involved with human 
and environmental issues, neighbour councils, consumer associations and political 
parties) and academia (Henderson et al., 2002). The notion of collective power leaves 
room for the producers’ autonomous, creative and collective forms of engagement with 
the market 134 
 
                                                 
133 A popular narrative for the development of the Kenyan flower industry is that it has flourished 
because the government ‘stayed out’ and let the private sector manage the sector with relative 
independence. However, an historical analysis of the origins of the sector show very active government 
support133  of private sector efforts elaborated in chapter one. The nested nature of institutional power 
(Aggarwal 2005) in the flower industry emerges through the interplay of the public and private forms of 
governance 
134 Among mid-scale farmers their collective power is seen in the mutual creation of an export 
marketing firm between four farms, as well as under the umbrella of the Kenya Flower Council which 
lobbies for the corporate interests of its producer members. The main limitations on smallholders’ 
collective power are high information costs, weak group governance and weak integration into global trade 
networks. 
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Embeddedness 
Territorial embeddedness as developed in GPN 2.0 refers to how firms are 
anchored135 in different places from the local to the global (Henderson et al, 2002: 
452) and how they operate within territorial influences based on local policy, 
infrastructure, regulatory arrangements and incentive structures (Coe & Yeung, 2015: 
177).  
 
Network embeddedness refers to the structure and stability of actors’ relationships, 
both formal and informal regardless of their country of origin or local anchoring. Hess 
(2004: 174) explains that the literature on embeddedness stresses the central role of 
concrete personal relations and networks of relations to generate trust. Network 
embeddedness seems to be a necessary condition to facilitate Gereffi et. al’s (2005) 
relational mode of governance which relies on trust and familial connections for market 
coordination136.  
 
Societal embeddedness was added later to GPN 1.0 theory (Hess, 2004: 176) refers 
to the ‘genetic code of firms’ which account for their cultural, institutional and historical 
origins.  The concept steps away from an over-spatialized perspective, and roots itself 
in the Polanyian view which accounts for the discursive relationship between the firm 
and the institutions it interacts with137.  
 
The table in appendix A summarises an effort to map the GPN 1.0 categories of value, 
power and embeddedness to the Kenyan flower sector. The first two categories of 
value and power are much more detailed than the section on embeddedness which 
further underscores the rationale for focussing the analysis of my field work on the first 
                                                 
135 The establishment of the flower industry in the lake Naivasha region as well as in the Central 
highlands shows territorial embeddedness between the industry and the local agro-ecology and 
critically with the availability therein of relatively cheap, migrant labour. Secondly, territorial 
embeddedness is seen in the interaction of Kenyan flower producers with the meshwork of private and 
public forms of governance expounded on in chapter 8 of this thesis. 
136 For the Kenyan cut flower industry, network embeddedness consists of the nurturing of trust 
between firms in a contract-free environment (Macchiavello & Morjaria 2015) via gentlemen’s 
agreements, as well as the existence of a myriad of codes which transmit information and police 
access and reputation in the industry, and therefore coordinate market relationships. 
137 I refer to societal embeddedness in chapters one and seven in highlighting the elite origins and 
ownership of the commercial cut flower sector seen in investment from foreign (European) and Kenyan 
political circles, European engagement in production and the exploitative use of migrant and mostly 
female labour on plantations. 
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two categories138. The third category on embeddedness is considered cross-cutting 
and emerges in the discussion on extra-firm bargaining which will be elaborated in 
chapter eight of this thesis. Since my argument is concerned with the strategies, 
relationships and contestations of mid and small scale cut flower production networks 
which call for a more micro and relational perspective, we now consider the suitability 
of the revised version of the GPN theory known as GPN 2.0 discussed below.  
 
3.3. Evaluating the suitability of Global Production Networks 2.0 to 
empirical findings 
Having discussed the basic framework for GPN theory and its relevance to my 
empirical findings along the analytical categories of value, power and embeddedness 
from GPN 1.0, this section transitions to explaining why the revised version of GPN 
theory – known as GPN 2.0 –   is particularly suited to understanding the Kenyan cut 
flower production network. GPN theory in its original formulation was criticised for a 
failure to specify the causal mechanisms linking the key analytical categories of value, 
embeddedness and power to how the global economic system actually works. In 
response to this challenge, Coe & Yeung (2015) developed a more advanced 
theoretical framework for the Global Production Networks labelling it GPN 2.0. This 
sought to elucidate how global production networks work. In doing so, GPN 2.0 
provides compelling conceptualisations of three central aspects of my research – 
actors, strategies and networks. 
 
Conceptualisation of actors in GPN 2.0 
GPN 2.0 places economic actors into three categories – firms, extra-firm actors and 
intermediaries, which renders itself well to a robust analysis of the array of actors from 
my field work ranging from breeder farms, flower farms, consolidator-exporters, 
freighters, export handlers and the Dutch auction and European retail giants which are 
the lead firms or more accurately, the big buyers (Dolan & Humphrey 2000). The view 
of the firm employed under GPN 2.0 is useful because it is relational in nature, that is: 
“firms are collective social actors rather than production functions or cost minimisation 
                                                 
138 While the categories of value, power and embeddedness provide a useful macro-framing for 
analysing the functioning of actors in the cut flower production network, this framework is but the first 
step to a thorough consideration of the empirical findings. My argument is concerned with the strategies, 
relationships and contestations of mid and small scale cut flower production networks. This more 
detailed micro and relational perspective is provided in the revised version of the GPN theory known as 
GPN 2.0, the suitability of which is discussed at length in section 3.3  
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devices (Coe & Yeung, 2015: 127). Thinking of firms as collective social actors or as 
“societally embedded”(Hess 2004) actors also allows us to develop a richer, more 
complex image of cut flower industry actors considering for example, their corporate 
cultures, norms,  ownership modes and technological capabilities.  
 
While accounting for historical contingency and structural dynamics, GPN 2.0 theory 
places actor agency and intentionality at the centre of understanding how global 
production networks actually work. GPN 2.0 also outlines the importance of identifying 
a lead firm, which in the cut flower production network is changing from the Dutch 
auction to supermarkets.  Identifying the evolution of the lead firms in the flower value 
chain enables a clearer understanding of the mechanics of coordination and control in 
the production network. Medium and small scale cut flower farms, hitherto 
underexplored producers in the sector, are the primary suppliers whose strategies of 
value generation, enhancement and capture are under study in light of the shift in 
export markets. The role of extra-firm actors in particular the state comes into play in 
the contestations over the tax regime regarding duplication of taxes and trade policy 
negotiations at the regional and global levels, as well as voluntary private certification 
bodies that are increasingly shaping the access to markets and governance within the 
industry. GPN 2.0’s unique proposition is in highlighting the role of intermediaries139 
categorised as financial, logistical and in standard-setting. It acknowledges that 
intermediaries have often been the ‘missing links’ in GPN discussions.  
 
Analysis of the network metaphor in GPN theory 
The ‘network’ metaphor in GPN theory portrays “production systems … as networked 
and recursive meshes of intersecting vertical and horizontal connections in order to 
avoid deterministic linear interpretations of how production systems operate and how 
value is generated and distributed” (Coe & Yeung, 2015:18). The network concept 
therefore breaks from the rigid understanding of intra-firm hierarchical control (as in 
Fordism) to an acknowledgment of inter-firm and extra-firm networks (Coe & Yeung, 
2015:34). In its initial formulation, GPN went beyond the GVC approach of focussing 
                                                 
139 The role of the intermediary in the cut flower industry is emphasised by employing Dembinski's 
(2009) concept of the focal firm to describe consolidator-exporters which link producers to direct 
markets and coordinate just-in-time delivery as well as enhance the value of the cut flowers through 
various forms of volume consolidation into bouquets, packaging and marketing.  
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on inter-firm transactions to encompassing all relevant sets of actors and 
relationships140 (Coe et al 2008:272).  
 
The network metaphor also allows for the articulation of autonomous action of 
domestic firms within globalised systems of production (Henderson et al. 2002:445). 
It enables a fuller conceptualisation of the varieties of ways in which power is exercised 
for example, in the rejection of zero-sum power of lead firms and acknowledgment of 
the power of local firms to exercise their own strategies (Henderson et al 2002: 450). 
The notion of autonomous action is useful for understanding the variety of contested 
relationships that small and mid-scale producers engage in to obtain greater 
bargaining power. It also remains cognizant of the wider structural limitations upon 
those actions and the dialectical relationship between the actor and those constraints 
(Coe & Yeung, 2015: 18). In doing so, the framework situates itself at the intersection 
of structure and agency, a position coined as ‘structuration’ by the sociologist Anthony 
Giddens (1979,1984). This perspective eschews the determinism implicit in value 
chain literature and allows for a richer, grounded explanation for the variety of 
strategies that Kenyan cut flower producers employ in a bid to secure lucrative export 
markets. Having outlined the depiction of actors, networks and strategies as the 
relevant aspect of GPN 2.0 theory to my research, the section that follows 
operationalises the framework to my findings.  
 
Conceptualisation of strategies in GPN 2.0 
GPN 2.0 addresses the shortcomings of the initial formulation of GPN theory by 
explaining causality in GPNs, that is, why global production networks emerge and how 
they evolve141. In addition to conceptualising actors as inherently relational, the theory 
seeks to explain causality by identifying three dynamic drivers of value activity which 
include cost-capability ratios, sustaining market development and exerting financial 
discipline (Coe & Yeung, 2015: 81) and they are depicted in figure 3.2. below. 
                                                 
140 This view was developed from selectively incorporating ideas from Actor-Network Theory (ANT) 
developed by Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, and John Law and is elaborated on in the literature review. 
Dicken et al. (2001) used the network metaphor in the GPN framework to provide a relational view of 
the firm not as individual agent but as constitutive of the wider network through which power and 
development effects intersect. This network formulation is relevant for analysing the strategies of actors 
which are collectively responsible for ‘making the market’ (Ouma, 2010) in diverse and intersecting 
ways.  
141 The reasons why the Kenyan cut flower production network evolved are however beyond the scope 
of this thesis and so these drivers will not be evaluated further. 
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The causal mechanisms of Global Production Networks 
 
Figure 3.2. 
Source: Coe & Yeung (2015: 124) 
 
In addition to explaining why global production networks emerge along the three 
dimensions mentioned above, GPN 2.0 shows its strength in explaining how a range 
of economic actors organize and govern their value-added activities by laying out the 
strategies of corporate actors within global production networks.  We can think of the 
causal dynamics depicted in the figure 3.2. above as independent variables and the 
strategies of actors as the dependent variables which interact to influence 
development outcomes. Strategy is worthy of consideration because it “represents the 
purposeful response of actors to the challenges of competitive dynamics in the face of 
real world uncertainty” Coe & Yeung (2015: 125). 
 
Cut flower farmers’ strategies – a schema 
Acknowledging that there is little research on how firms reorganise their value activities 
within in order to meet emerging market challenges, GPN 2.0 outlines three strategies 
employed by firms often in intersecting ways: (i) Intra-firm strategies of coordination 
(ii) Inter-firm strategies of control and partnership and (iii) Extra-firm interactions which 
are forms of bargaining. 
 
(i) Intra-firm strategies of coordination entail processes of internalization and 
consolidation. Internalization refers to when a firm engages in horizontal 
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specialisation - “a strategy of expanding into adjacent markets and or products/ 
services by fully exploiting firm specific proprietary assets” (Coe & Yeung 
2015:129).  It allows the firm to act in greater economies of scope. 
Consolidation requires the firm to integrate its resources and capabilities. 
This strategy manifests differently for lead firms (The Dutch Auction and 
supermarkets), focal firms (consolidator-exporters) and producers (cut flower 
farms)142.  
 
(ii)  Inter-firm strategies of control and partnership.  
Inter-firm control is described as “a highly-managed externalization strategy through 
which a lead firm outsources a very significant part of its value activity to independent 
suppliers and contractors and exercises strong control over their production processes 
and product quality (Coe & Yeung, 2015: 135)” Hierarchical or captive forms of 
governance (Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005) are common where the power 
dynamic is asymmetrical in favour of the lead firm. Suppliers tend to be ‘locked in’ to 
their production functions with little capacity to move into higher value added functions 
(Bolo, 2010). Modular relationships are seen more often between capable mid-scale 
producers and consolidator-exporters.  
 
Inter-firm partnership is defined as the collaboration, co-evolution and joint 
development of a lead firm and its strategic partner or key suppliers in the same global 
production network (Coe & Yeung 2015: 142). Lead firms and their strategic partners 
must complement each other in terms of resources and capabilities, and secondly 
standards and codification schemes must exist in order to establish trust and 
confidence between partnering firms.  Firms enter into cooperative relationships where 
the risk environment is high e.g., operating in volatile markets, or susceptibility to 
supply chain disruptions. In the flower industry, inter-firm coordination can be seen 
whereby a supermarket as lead firm partners with a brand-name global consolidator-
exporter firm to ensure a consistent, high volume supply of quality, certified flowers. 
This partnership reduces the transaction and coordination costs and minimises risks 
in supply disruption for supermarkets seeking a large, diverse and specified volume of 
high quality flower varieties. It enables consolidator-exporters to capitalise on their 
                                                 
142 The variety of firm strategies are discussed in chapter seven. 
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vast local supply networks to ensure consistency and just-in-time supply to their 
customers. Over time, this form of coordination further leads to a “cascade effect” 
(Nolan, Zhang, & Liu, 2008) where supermarkets tend to opt for a fewer, larger 
strategic partners e.g., signing only with one large consolidator-exporter and this 
preference cascades to working with select large scale flower farms rather than a 
variety of smaller ones. This reduces the transaction costs of coordinating supply 
across multiple consolidators, and also minimises the effort of maintaining multiple 
relationships given that the industry is virtually contract-free (Macchiavello & Morjaria 
2015).  
 
(iii) Extra-firm interactions are predominantly bargaining strategies (Coe & Yeung, 
2015: 129).  
Extra-firm bargaining entails a two-way process of negotiation and accommodation 
between firms and extra-firm actors in order to reach a mutually satisfactory outcome 
as far as the creation, enhancement and capture of value is concerned (Coe & Yeung, 
2015:151). GPN 2.0 theory outlines three objectives for actors engaged in bargaining 
strategies – market power, proprietary rights and social and political legitimacy. The 
role of state actors is key in regulating specific sectors, negotiating trade agreements 
at a regional or international level, assuring institutional support for protection of R&D 
investments among others. The proliferation of certification mechanisms to regulate 
behaviour of firms within the flower industry checks market access by policing the 
quality of production processes.  The form of extra-firm bargaining employed shows 
the variability of actors’ strategies depending on which territories they are embedded 
in, that is their national identities, competing local and international interests and 
changing positions in the global economy. 
 
These three strategies are summarised in table 3.1. below. They provide perspectives 
which show how despite the arguments made in GVC literature about the leviathan-
like power of lead firms and the limitations of producers’ power in buyer-driven value 
chains, Kenyan cut flower producers at the mid and small scale show use a diversity 
of strategies to navigate their way and adapt to the demands of shifting to more 
lucrative export markets. Recognising the variability and intentionality of actors’ 
strategies in this process of seeking out new markets contributes to our understanding 
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of the practices of how cut flower firms create, enhance and capture value and 
exercise their bargaining power in the process.  
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Schematic of intra-firm, inter-firm and extra-firm strategies employed by mid-scale cut flower producers 
 
 
Table 3.1.  
Source: Author’s analysis 
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Mapping GPN 2.0 network configurations to Kenyan cut flower producer 
networks 
GPN 2.0 theory provides a richer, fuller explanation of the various network 
configurations employed by cut flower producers in an effort to manage shifts in export 
markets. Global Production Networks typically have a distinctive lead firm and then 
interact with a constellation of firm and extra firm actors described as ‘strategic 
partners’ and ‘specialised suppliers’, and the customer to show the dynamics of 
networks within and between industries. The two main organizational configurations 
according to the theory are a Strategic Partnership Model and a Lead Firm-centric 
model, discussed below in relation to the Kenyan cut flower industry.  
 
In a Strategic Partnership model, “a global lead firm engages another firm as a 
strategic partner to provide partial or complete solutions for its product to key 
customers” (Coe & Yeung, 2015: 59). GPN 2.0 draws on examples of ‘specialised 
suppliers’ and ‘strategic partners’ from the manufacturing and service industries to 
develop this network configuration.  However, in the cut flower industry, what GPN 2.0 
refers to as the strategic partner translates into the consolidator-exporter, that links 
the “big buyer” (supermarket) in direct markets to the grower for the supply of cut 
flowers. Although the Dutch auction is designed for wholesale of cut flowers, it does 
not stipulate viable scale to producers, which allows smallholders with limited volumes 
to participate. The consolidator-exporter firm adds value to production by sharing 
export market information about trends in demand, manages the cold-chain and 
maintains the integrity of the aesthetic value of the flower commodity, contributes to 
export-readiness by packaging the cut flowers into bouquets, maintains the 
consistency of demand and supply, and ensures just-in time delivery to direct markets.  
Given the complexity of roles that the consolidator-exporter plays, it does not fall neatly 
into the binary characterisations of a ‘specialised supplier’ or  ‘strategic partner’143 as 
laid out in GPN 2.0, but rather renders itself more to the notion of “focal firm” 
(Dembinski, 2009:120) within the production network. Dembinski (2009) studied the 
                                                 
143 The flower industry does not map neatly onto either one of these two typologies because of the 
importance of seasonality and variety in the industry. Consolidator-exporters are both specialised 
suppliers and strategic partners because they deal in supplying specialised/specific varieties based on 
orders that are specific based to the market. Depending on the scale of producer that they source 
flowers from and the market, they can also be a strategic partner. For example, the supermarket Marks 
and Spencer is moving towards having only one strategic partner, MM, to specially supply its cut flower 
demand, and MM’s flower portfolio is one third owned by a large-scale Kenyan farm, Veg Pro. 
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interactions between very large enterprises and SMEs and explained that a firm plays 
a focal role when it operates value adding processes on both sides of the focal point144 
within a global value chain – that is in production and in marketing. He further explains 
that in the automotive, cinema and software industries he had researched, focal firms 
tended to be large global firms listed on stock markets. The Dutch Flower Group145 is 
a family of 25 businesses engaged in the cut flower trade and the largest trader in the 
industry. It is a good example of a focal firm in the cut flower industry, that is engaged 
in consolidation and export.  In order to cut down on costs and minimise risks, 
supermarkets can choose to engage in direct sourcing and internalise the focal role of 
the consolidator-exporter as explained in the model below.  
 
In a Lead Firm Centric model, there is no strategic partner but rather the lead firm 
dominates the entire network. In the Kenyan cut flower industry for my sample of mid 
and small scale flower producers, the lead firm is the supermarket. The supermarket 
may choose to internalise the functions of the consolidator-exporter so as to cut down 
on the costs of contracting an external firm. The lead-firm centric model is seen in 
direct sourcing arrangements where the supermarket has a subsidiary146 that sources 
directly from growers, thereby internalising the critical functions of cut flower 
consolidation and export. Increasingly, direct sourcing is seen as a way to enhance 
the image of sustainable sourcing and transparency to the consumer. Another form of 
the lead-firm centric model can be seen in the case of vertically integrated large scale 
flower farms which enter into joint ventures with large focal firms located in export 
markets and that strategically supply large supermarkets147.  
 
                                                 
144 Dembinski (2009:121) explains the focal point of a global value chain to be the point where “the 
focus of attention moves from production to the market”. 
145 The Dutch Flower Group is discussed in detail in chapter seven as part of a network configuration 
for mid-scale cut flower farmers. 
146 A good example of this is International Procurement Limited which is ASDA’s sourcing firm that 
purchases cut flowers or packed-at-source bouquets directly from Harvest flower farm in Kenya. 
147 A good example of this is the partnership between MM Group, a leading supplier of fresh produce 
to Marks & Spencer supermarket in the UK and Veg Pro flower farm in Kenya. MM’s flower portfolio is 
jointly owned by three leading large scale flower farms in Kenya, Colombia and South Africa. MM’s 
sourcing strategy is to become more important to fewer growers. That way, they can have deeper 
relationships with the growers and have greater influence over their production strategies. 
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Through analysing these networks148, the focal role of consolidator-exporters is 
posited as a hybrid between an intermediary and a new locus of power given the shifts 
in export markets. The dynamics between consolidator-exporters and producers are 
discussed in detail in the empirical chapters on mid-scale and small scale producers. 
 
3.4. The formulation of power in GPN 2.0 and its limitations 
The nature of power  
The idea of power, its agents, where it is located and how it is exercised has been 
much theorised in the social sciences (see for example Clegg, 2002: Lukes, 2005; 
Hearn, 2012). Producers’ strategies exercised in a buyer-driven network entail greater 
bargaining power therein. While GVC theory that claims that power is exerted primarily 
by the lead firms and other actors merely respond to this impetus, GPN goes beyond 
this uni-directional understanding. Coe & Yeung (2015: 66) define power as, “the 
capacity of an actor to exercise and achieve control over a particular strategic outcome 
in its own interests that can be realised only through the process of exercising.”  
 
Power is both structural in the sense of emerging from a firm’s position or strength of 
association in network149, and relational in that the exercise of power is witnessed in 
an evolving set of social relations (Coe & Yeung 2015:66). This GPN 2.0 portrayal of 
power as both relational and structural is relevant, because it allows us to engage the 
complexity of actors’ roles, asymmetry of power and change over time. The power of 
lead firms to shape global production networks comes from their “asymmetric control 
and internalization of key resources (physical, political, economic, social and 
technological) (Coe& Yeung 2015: 65).  If asymmetries of power between producers 
and lead firms characterise relations within the production network (described by 
Gereffi et al. (2005b) as captive or hierarchical governance in a value chain), then 
local producers will not be able to capture much of the value created and this has 
negative developmental implications (Amin and Thrift, 1994; Coe et. al, 2004). In this 
regard, the GPN formulation of power finds resonance with the conception of power 
                                                 
148 Though originally, these network configurations were developed with manufacturing industries in 
mind, they are nevertheless useful as a heuristic device for analysing the flower industry, by highlighting 
the often overlooked but critical position of consolidator-exporter firms as focal firms.  
149 Coe & Yeung (2015) explain that this structural view of power comes from economic sociology. They 
critique it for failing to explain the dynamic and qualitative nature of the exercise of power which includes 
the degree of mutual trust, commitment and reciprocity in partnership, durability and endurance. These 
finer qualities emerge in my empirical observations of cut flower farmers’ relations in their production 
network.  
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put forward by Allen (2003). He clarifies the location of power as being in relationships 
rather than resources:  
“Power as an outcome cannot and should not be ‘read off’ from a resource 
base, regardless of its size or scope… It is, as suggested, a relational effect, 
not a property of someone or some ‘thing’. Power… is often disguised as 
resources and in that sense we need to disentangle the two; we need to 
distinguish clearly between the exercise of power and the resource capabilities 
mobilized to sustain that exercise” (2003, p. 5).  
 
This relevance of this quote can be seen at the inter-firm level in the rise of 
consolidator-exporters as a new focal point of power within the cut flower production 
network. While they have immense resources most of which are knowledge-based 
such as cutting edge cold-chain technology, and international logistical expertise, it is 
their ability to identify reliable, high quality flower producers, consolidate their produce 
and connect them to various buyers in direct export markets that has seen them 
emerge as indispensable. In effect, the locus of the power of consolidator-exporters 
lies in their relational capabilities which enable them to intermediate between the 
globalised production and marketing ends of the cut flower production network.  
 
At the extra-firm level, GPN 2.0 depicts the exercise of power again as both structural 
and relational. Coe & Yeung (2015: 63) explain that power is exercised only in relation 
to other firms in the network or its network embeddedness, that is its position, status 








                                                 
150 For example, the dynamics of producers’ collectives within production networks can enhance or 
diminish producer power. Empirical findings show the power of the mid and large commercial flower 
farmers organised under the Kenya Flower Council in lobbying for the signing of the Economic 
Partnership Agreement for duty free access to European markets. On the other hand, “Size does not 
always matter” (Coe et.al, 2008: 276) and contrary to conventional wisdom, though large players may 
dominate, smaller players exercise their relative autonomy by organising in various forms of collectives 
(discussed in detail in chapter seven). 
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Bargaining power - Building on GPN 2.0’s notion of power  
 




Figure 3.3.  
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
GPN theory made advances over the GVC notion of power as capacity of action over 
others, and articulated it as a relational concept of collective endeavours developed 
from network relationships (Hess 2008).  GPN 1.0 then put forward the three locations 
of power – corporate, institutional and collective power151, and these categories are 
retained in GPN 2.0.  
 
Beyond identifying the locations of power, the GPN 1.0 theory does little to elaborate 
on the actual process of contestation and bargaining that occurs given the asymmetry 
of power between actors. For this reason, GPN theory has been criticised for lack of 
depth152 in the study of power (Arias 2016) and similarly, the concept of bargaining 
power in GPN 2.0 has also been underplayed. The range of contestations between 
producers and other firms in the flower production network account for bargaining 
power. Bargaining power is not so much a location as it is a practice intersecting 
corporate, institutional and collective power as shown in figure 3.3 above.  
 
                                                 
151 As discussed previously (and summarised in appendix A) 
152 This is a break from other literature in political economy that is explicitly concerned with for example 
investigating the power of multi-national companies in developing countries, and the challenges these 
relationships can cause in terms of dependency on capital, technology and knowledge (See for example 
Harvey, 1982; Massey, 1984; Cardoso & Faletto, 1979). 
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As a relational concept within the flower industry, bargaining power plays out in extra-
firm strategies as flower producers navigate the complex regulatory system. Three 
producer bargaining strategies are identified:  compliance by the capable to the range 
of private voluntary codes, contestation by powerful, organised producers in regards 
to locally enforced regulation, and circumvention by less capable producers seeking 
paths of least resistance to export markets. Producers at the mid and small scale use 
their corporate power to manage and allocate existing resources and market 
information and comply to certifications where possible. Furthermore, they tap into 
their collective power through various collectives and export configurations in relation 
to consolidator-exporters to capitalise on economies of scale so that their flowers can 
be viable in export markets. Once organised, producers can use their institutional 
power to lobby for more favourable market access regulations. The section that follows 
evaluates GPN 2.0’s conceptualisation of development and its suitability for Kenya’s 
cut flower industry.  
 
3.5. The conceptualisation of Development in GPN 2.0 
The conceptualisation of development in GPN 2.0 has a threefold focus on value 
capture trajectories, the sub-national scale, and strategic coupling. GPN 2.0 provides 
a powerful and relevant analytical lens through which to study the local developmental 
impact of Kenyan cut flower production networks.  
 
According to GPN theory, the notion of value capture refers to “the ability of firms to 
retain the surplus within their organizational boundaries in the context of wider power 
dynamics within a global production network” (Coe & Yeung, 2015: 171).  It is a much 
more well-rounded concept than ‘upgrading’153 which refers to the range of strategies 
that firms may pursue in order to enhance their functional position within a value chain. 
Upgrading has been criticised for being too static, linear, deterministic, overly focussed 
on supplier firms and conflating the means (strategies) with the ends (greater value 
capture) (Coe & Yeung, 2015: 172-3). Drawing from examples in South Africa’s wine 
industry, (Ponte & Ewert 2009) broaden out the boundaries of upgrading arguing that 
                                                 
153 There are three essential forms of economic upgrading (Gereffi 1999) (1) upgrading of a product 
so as to improve its quality or design; (2) upgrading of a process in scale and speed and in efficiency 
and productivity; (3) and functional upgrading which is acquisition of new functions to increase the 
added value of activities in the chain. Upgrading has been expanded to include ‘social upgrading’ 
which is about better work, standards and rights for workers and smallholders. 
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the process should be about ‘securing a better deal’ for smaller players, which 
sometimes coexists with downgrading154. Ultimately, going up the value-added 
ladder155 is only one way among many of securing that better deal and sometimes 
deepening and building capabilities and networks at the same stage of the value chain 
can  be transformative. Fernández (2015:214) further explains that the concept of 
upgrading left us with an “imprecise concept of power” which network approaches 
have since sought to clarify. 
 
Going beyond the constraints of upgrading, GPN 2.0 asserts that value capture from 
coupling with global production network actors is a necessary condition for regional 
economic development (Coe & Yeung, 2015: 170). The ability of a firm to capture 
greater value depends on the capabilities of the firm, influences at the level of the GPN 
which might include asymmetry of power between actors and how easily a firm can be 
replaced, specificities within the industry such as slow demand growth and local 
conditions in the territory where the firm is anchored (Coe & Yeung, 2015: 177). The 
notion of value capture ties back to how Kenyan cut flower producers use diverse 
strategies at the intra, inter and extra-firm levels to navigate access to export markets.  
 
Expounding on development at the sub-national scale enables GPN 2.0 to move 
beyond the confines of national-level analysis espoused by the GCC/GVC frameworks 
and embrace the multi-scalar realities of GPNs.  Mapping this sub-national focus to 
the Kenyan flower industry, the sector is established mainly in Naivasha in the Rift 
Valley, and in the Central Highlands which offer ideal type year-round climate, agro-
ecologies and access to rural and migrant labour. In addition, at the sub-national level, 
there are increased contestations between the flower industry and the county 
governments156.  
 
                                                 
154 Downgrading may make sense where lower value products sold in larger amounts may be the 
most profitable strategy for some firms, at least in the short term (Gibbon & Ponte, 2005).  
155 Tokatli (2013:1000) explains that “simply entering into higher value added activity does not 
guarantee the capture of additional value, as this often happens due to a shift in responsibility for this 
activity from the buyers to the suppliers.” 
156 For example, the Kenya Flower Council is engaged in lobbying for streamlining of the proliferation 
of taxes which have been instituted under the new county-level administrative set up. Beyond the sub-
national scale, however, Kenyan producers do not have similar power to lobby international codes of 
conduct governing the industry, and must comply or exit the market.  
 
  83 
The insertion of firms into global production networks is the key mechanism driving 
economic development. GPN 2.0 conceptualises the developmental interaction linking 
the advantages of regions to the needs of global production networks through 
reasonably stable transactions as “strategic coupling”. Regional assets can therefore 
only be employed for development when they meet the strategic needs of GPNs. This 
process implies intentionality and strategy and is an outcome of a dynamic bargaining 
process157 between the agents in a production network based on how they employ the 
strategic resources they hold (Arias, 2016: 34). The articulation of a region into a global 
production network also requires supportive regional institutional infrastructure such 
as investment incentives and policies that aid trade (Coe, Hess, Yeung, Disken, et al. 
2004). Regional institutions can also help to balance out power asymmetries by 
anchoring global capital and unleashing regional potential. Coe & Yeung (2015: 174) 
further explain that the process of strategic coupling is dynamic, it is also not automatic 
or always successful. Over time a firm can capture less value and may decouple from 
a global production network until it is able to improve, and may then recouple with the 
same or another GPN. While the aggregate effect of coupling between Kenyan flower 
farms and the global flower trade has been analysed in terms of contribution to foreign 
exchange, creation of jobs and its impact on the environment, little has been said 
about the knowledge impact of this interaction, which we turn to next.  
 
GPN 2.0 acknowledges the knowledge transfer implications of enrolment into GPNs 
(Coe & Yeung, 2015:183). It helps to explain how access to and over-reliance on new 
technologies accompanied by the leaching out of indigenous knowledge places 
limitations on the extent of value capture. The knowledge economy surrounding the 
Kenyan flower manifests in three ways: relationships, systems of knowledge 
management such under intellectual property rights regimes, and various 
infrastructures of production introduced via the flower industry158. These are 
summarised in figure 3.4. below. 
 
                                                 
157Regional institutions can also help to balance out power asymmetries by anchoring global capital and 
unleashing regional potential. Coe & Yeung (2015: 174) further explain that the process of strategic 
coupling is dynamic, it is also not automatic or always successful. Over time a firm can capture less 
value and may decouple from a global production network until it is able to improve, and may then 
recouple with the same or another GPN. 
158 The empirical findings around the cut flower knowledge economy are discussed in detail in 
chapters six and eight 
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Three key aspects of the cut flower knowledge economy 
 
Figure 3.4. 
Source: Author’s own 
 
The flower industry is positioned as a centre of knowledge production in terms of 
variety development and innovative use of production technologies is concerned, and 
identifies disjunctures in the relationships between the fast-paced industry and 
national agricultural research centres in the country. The disjunctures are traced back 
to clashing interests and work cultures between the private and public research bodies 
in the industry. The flower industry has been instrumental in the development of 
systems of proprietary knowledge management such as Plant Breeders’ Rights 
Protections under the 1991 UPOV convention which spurred investment from large 
multi-nationals in the sector. On infrastructures, the flower industry has pioneered and 
set the bar on advanced production technologies159.  
 
Value capture from the cut flower knowledge economy is dependent on whether it is 
‘endogenised’ in terms of building local capabilities or ‘enclaved’ (Melese & Helmsing 
2010). Capital flows, the embeddedness of the actors involved and state support play 
a big role in determining this dynamic. Discussing the flower industry in Ethiopia160, 
Melese & Helmsing (2010:36) explain that, “endogenisation is a two-way process. It 
                                                 
159 This includes cold-chain technologies in horticulture, the use of Integrated Pest Management to 
diminish the use of chemical pesticides, innovation in water recycling systems to reduce water intensity 
of production among others.  
160 Melese and Helmsing (2010) found that endogenisation was taking place at an incipient stage in 
Ethiopia but that Dutch FDI had little direct interest to share technologies 
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depends both on the degree to which FDI has an interest to draw on domestic firms, 
enter into relationships and share technologies; and on the interest and ability of 
domestic firms to take up such opportunities, and on the creation of supporting 
institutions and infrastructures to make this take-up possible… which rests largely with 
government.”  
 
Based on the ownership structure breakdown161 the Kenyan flower industry has 
however evolved more towards local industrial and political capital. Innovation from 
the industry’s knowledge economy is enclaved within the interests of these capital 
flows, rather than linking more widely into other sectors, which is further complicated 
by the asset specificity of production in the cut flower industry. However, while the 
mechanics of production knowledge such as in propagation, have been localised over 
the years through training, the science and innovation of, in particular breeding, 
remains the proprietary knowledge of European flower breeding firms.162 Due to weak 
integration into the research system and high information costs, smallholders’ 
innovations at the farm-level are neither legally protected under IP law163, nor 
institutionalised in such a way as to enable them to capture value from it.  
 
3.6. Concluding thoughts 
This chapter has evaluated the suitability of the GPN lens for analysing the Kenyan 
cut flower sector in line with the research question, “To what extent does the Global 
Production Networks framework explain how cut flower producers adapt to shifts in 
export markets?” It found the first two of three analytical categories of value and power 
in GPN theory particularly useful for understanding the strategies of producers. The 
third category of embeddedness is used cross-sectionally to discuss governance and 
network relationships. The revised version of GPN (GPN 2.0) as articulated by Coe & 
Yeung (2015) is found most useful for analysing the sector on three fronts. It provides 
a micro and relational lens through which to study strategies, networks and 
development among mid and small-scale cut flower farms in Kenya and their varied 
                                                 
161 See chapter one for the breakdown of corporate ownership of the flower industry. 
162 That said, it is also important to underscore that knowledge flows do not only occur from the outside-
in, but can also be seen locally in the development of new varieties by Kenyan smallholder farmers 
growing summer flowers. 
163 Chapter seven outlines a few isolated cases of smallholder farmers who developed new 
commercially viable varieties of summer flowers and managed to go through the process of obtaining 
plant variety protection under the Plant Breeders’ Rights statutes.  
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networks. Furthermore, GPN 2.0 puts forward a relational view of power, and identifies 
corporate, institutional and collective power as three main locations of power within 
production networks. My analysis goes a step forward to discuss bargaining power as 
the practice of contestation that intersects those three locations in the cut flower 
industry. The chapter then operationalises GPN 2.0 using empirical findings mid and 
small scale cut flower producers, which is summarised in table 3.1. on inter-firm, intra-
firm and extra-firm strategies.  
 
This chapter applies the two network configurations in GPN 2.0 - the lead-firm and the 
strategic partnership models -  to the Kenyan flower industry. Its main contribution 
here is to eschew the binary function of strategic partner/ specialised supplier which 
is drawn from manufacturing and service industries, and to introduce Dembinski's 
(2009) notion of the ‘focal firm’  in relation to the critical role of the  consolidator-
exporter which links  producers to big buyers. The chapter argues that building 
relationships with these focal firms is absolutely essential for producers seeking more 
lucrative   export markets. The power of the focal firms in turn rests not so much in 
their physical resources but in their relational capital and ability to link the downstream 
and upstream segments and manage information between the two.  
 
The chapter then discusses the limitations of GVC’s conceptualisation of upgrading in 
favour of GPN 2.0s notion of development as value capture. The chapter highlights an 
overlooked aspect of strategic coupling, which is the interaction between the needs of 
the GPN and the resources of the local industryfrom a knowledge-sharing perspective. 
Acknowledging the knowledge intensive nature of the cut flower industry, the chapter 
depicts the industry as a centre of knowledge production. The chapter highlights the 
disjunctures in how the industry couples with global trade and the local economy in 
terms of relationships, systems of knowledge management and technological 
infrastructures. It argues that endogenisation of the knowledge from the cut flower 
industry ‘follows the money’ and is enclaved within the bounds of local industrial and 
political capital.  
 
Chapter four that follows leads into the methodology of conducting research among 
the range of actors in the Kenyan cut flower production network.  
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This chapter is concerned with outlining the research design and five qualitative 
research methods used to answer the central research question: 
 
“What strategies do Kenyan cut flower producer networks use in seeking greater 
bargaining power amidst shifts in export markets?” 
 
Foregrounding the bifurcation of export markets in the cut flower trade, the research 
question probes the mid and small scale producers’ practices, relationships and 
contestations which together make up their strategies for market access. This 
necessitates an in-depth understanding of the actors in the production network as they 
relate to each other. While the GPN framework operationalised in chapter three 
enables us to analyse this complex, layered network and how producers have survived 
and adapted to changing export market landscape, chapter five that follows unpacks 
the heterogeneity, capabilities and embeddedness of the various actors engaged in 
production and marketing.  
 
This research employed five main research methods which include semi-structured 
interviews, site visits, documentary analysis, trade shows and fairs, and workshops to 
capture a sample of perspectives and practices of the key actors shaping the Kenyan 
flower sector. The table below summarises the methodology in order of reliance, used 
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Variety of research methods used to answer thesis sub-questions 
 
Table 4.1. 
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
This chapter shows how my research generated knowledge through diverse and 
intersecting qualitative techniques to develop a rich hitherto untold narrative of the 
realities of cut flower farmers’ experiences navigating the bifurcated European export 
markets. Fieldwork did not engage in a comparative study of mid and small scale 
flower producers but rather shows them as existing in parallel, with synergies 
emerging only when driven by local or European export markets.  
 
4.2. Rationale for the selected field work methods 
The plurality of methods for my research presents a collage typical of the multi-
disciplinary nature of Development Studies. Semi-structured interviews, site visits, 
documentary analysis, trade shows and fairs, and workshops correspond to inductive 
and grounded methodologies found broadly within the social sciences, and more 
specifically within ethnographically oriented research. As Glaser (1978) elaborated, 
grounded theory methodology is a series of inductive processes that produce theory 
that is embedded in the research context, rather than forcing the data to a 
predetermined speculative theory. Employing Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967) requires the stating of theoretical assumptions up front and then discursively 
testing and engaging it with observed relationships emerging inductively from the data. 
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In this research, chapters two and three outline the shortcomings of GVC theory164 
and make the case for the use of GPN framework as a lens for the Kenyan flower 
industry which employs the network formulation, and analytical concepts of strategies, 
power, value capture and strategic coupling. Gaps in the literature can also inform 
assumptions taken into the field.  For example, the GPN framework has not been 
deployed to capture the heterogeneity of the Kenyan flower sector nor its interaction 
with the knowledge economy, and there is very little empirically grounded literature on 
smallholders in the Kenyan flower industry, which construes the assumption of 
invisibility or marginality and weak participation.  
 
Research is organised for the purpose of uncovering relationships between actors in 
order to account, inform and refine theoretical conceptions of how the world works  
(Cloke et al. 2004). In this regard and in light of testing the theory against data, my 
field work challenged in particular the enfeebled perception and silences surrounding 
the position, creativity and capabilities of smallholders by highlighting the agency and 
bargaining power of mid and small scale producers. It pushed back on the uni-
directional understanding of governance by showcasing heterogeneity, complexity 
and contestation of producers’ relationships, and the relational nature of their 
strategies for market access. Uniquely, it spotlights the critical but often overlooked 
role of consolidator-exporters as focal firms in the GPN, and the knowledge-intensive 
nature of the industry as a focal point of development interactions discussed as 
“strategic coupling” in GPN 2.0 theory. 
 
The rationale behind the use of the five different qualitative methods was to gain 
insights into the formal and informal functioning of cut flower producer networks, and 
to triangulate the information availed. As an industry where aesthetics and 
appearances are most highly valued, flower industry officials go to great lengths to 
protect the image of the industry from any potential negative press. Triangulation of 
information in this context is therefore important to check for narrative inconsistencies, 
as well as draw out common threads of narratives espoused by those interviewed. 
Similar to Neilson and Pritchard (2009:62), my research established that triangulation 
                                                 
164 Outlined in the literature review chapter (See Hughes 2000; Hughes 2001; Dolan & Humphrey 
2000; Dolan& Opondo 2002; Oxfam 2004; Tallontire et al. 2005; Riisgaard 2009) 
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across various sources, “brought into focus the differences in interpretation among 
industry participants, emphasising the complex nature of processes under 
investigation.”  
  
Quietly Blooming – considering reticence in the research approach 
An overarching consideration that informed a varied approach to field work was a prior 
understanding of the reticence of the cut flower industry, particularly towards academic 
researchers and journalists. From my literature review, particularly work done by 
Opondo (2006),  it became clear that the Kenyan flower industry became averse to 
researchers in the 2000s when scathing exposés165 were published of the industry’s 
labour and environmental rights violations. As the industry embraced reform 
thereafter, it also carefully curated its public image, and with that research access 
(Mwangi, 2018 [forthcoming]) that might shed light on other issues in the industry was 
policed. Experientially, I was aware of the aloof image of the industry in the Kenyan 
popular imagination, conjured by the elite ownership circles of Europeans, the Kenyan 
political class and Indian industrialists. Visually, the industry is also physically sealed 
off from everyday interaction as portrayed by images of sealed greenhouses stretching 
into the horizon, tightly guarded gates and high electric fences. Even at the local point 
of sale at the Nairobi Flower Market, the flower trade occurs under shadow in the wee 
hours of the morning between four and seven o’clock in the morning. This 
foreknowledge and being an industry outsider made it all the more necessary to build 
trust through gatekeepers, snowball interviews through references once in the field, 
and to triangulate the information obtained thereof. The next section will elaborate on 
the process and structure of each field work method employed.  
 
4.3. Overview of field work structure and sites 
As the PhD field work plan in figure 4.1 below illustrates, my field work in Kenya was 
prefaced by literature reviews on the Kenyan and global flower industry and by 
preparing interview guides. Secondly, it shows that my field work in Kenya and the 
Netherlands was organised into three phases all of which took place in 2016.  
                                                 
165 Outlined in the literature review in chapter two. Leading international NGOs such as Oxfam (2004) 
and Christian Aid (2008) in the UK, and more recently the Kenya Human Rights Commission (2012) 
also wrote reports highlighting exploitative and unethical business practices of Kenyan large scale 
producers. 
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Figure 4.1.  
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
The first phase involved field work in Kenya conducting semi-structured interviews, 
and farm sites with industry officials based in Nairobi and with the production network 
of mid-scale farms in Naivasha, Nyahururu, Kiambu and Kikuyu. I conducted 
interviews with smallholder flower farmers in Thika, Murang’a, Nyeri and Njabini which 
are all located in the Central Highlands and Rift Valley regions. These locations and 
the overall area under study is outlined in red in map 4.1. below.  I also attended the 
fifth edition of the International Flower Trade Expo (IFTEX) in Nairobi in June. The 











  92 
Field work research sites in central Kenya and the Rift Valley 
 
 
Map 4.1.  
Source: Kenya Flower Council website; author’s analysis 
 
 
The second phase involved field work in the Netherlands at two sites highlighted in 
red in map 4.2. - the Royal FloraHolland auctions at Aalsmeer and Naaldwijk. There, 
I interviewed a range of import handlers, buyers and auctioneers. This interview phase 
took ten days in June 2016. In July and August 2016, I began transcribing the 
interviews and analysing collected data. The third phase of field work was carried out 
in September 2016 for one month, in which I attended the Naivasha Horticultural Fair, 
Africa’s biggest horticultural fair, which brings together a range of industry actors 
including flower producers, input and service providers, regulators, freighters, 
marketing agents and government regulators. I also took the opportunity to conduct 
more interviews with consolidators, sourcing managers, and smallholder farmers.  
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Research sites at two Dutch flower auctions, Netherlands 
 
 
Map 4.2.  
Source: van Heck & Ribbers (1997); Levelt (2010:153); author’s analysis (in red) 
 
4.4. Research methods 
1. Interviews 
Prior to going to the field, I developed an outline of the key institutional actors in the 
Kenya flower industry, which was useful for developing a shortlist of prospective 
interviewees. Having had no prior contact with the industry beforehand meant I had to 
establish contacts once I was physically in Kenya. With a letter of introduction from 
the University of Cambridge, a research affiliate position at the University of Nairobi, 
Institute for Development Studies as well as a research permit from the National 
Council for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI), I approached the Kenya 
Flower Council (KFC) for support in identifying a sample of flower farm managers and 
smallholder groups for interviews. Given the insularity of the industry, “snowballing” or 
chain referral sampling (Biernacki & Waldorf 1981) through references from the initial 
set of introductory interviews proved essential for mapping a network of industry 
actors. The techniques’ embeddedness in social networks suited the study of 
production networks which is at the heart of this research. Snowball sampling is 
particularly useful when researching sensitive issues or dealing with hard-to-reach 
people, because it relies on insider information to gain access (Biernacki & Waldorf 
1981).  
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Beyond the institutional introductions from the KFC, personal contacts played a big 
role in securing interviews in an overwhelmingly male- dominated, fast paced and 
insular industry. The difficulty in securing interviews was aggravated by the timing. My 
field work began in January 2016 and the first two months of the year are the busiest 
as the flower industry ramps up production to meet demand for roses at Valentine’s 
Day in mid-February. Seeking interviews then was a time-consuming and subjective 









Source: Author’s analysis 
 
The proportional categorisation of people interviewed is displayed in image 4.2. above. 
The twelve categories of actors represented in the proportional representation of 
interviewees feed into the visualisation of the flower industry as a production network, 
as portrayed in image 5.1 in the next chapter. Of the ninety interviews conducted, 
eighty-three of the interviews were carried out in Kenya while seven were conducted 
at Aalsmeer and Naaldwijk, Netherlands. Given the focus on production networks of 
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mid and small-scale farms, thirty-three percent166 of those interviewed were 
downstream actors and in direct contact with the flower farmers. Mid and small scale 
farms combined (26%), industry regulators (14%), local traders (14%) and 
consolidator-exporters (9%) account for the largest segments of interviews. Though 
the proportion of local flower traders is significant, these were mostly brief though 
illuminating interactions that provided a holistic view of the diversity of smallholders’ 
participation as they engage in the local Nairobi Flower Market and in export markets, 
which is the focus of the research. The remainder of the interviews were upstream and 
pivot around the consolidator-exporter as focal firm linking the flower farm outwards to 
export markets. The research does not cover interviews with direct market actors such 
as super markets or florists. These sites were studied through everyday observation 
and already existing information in secondary sources.  
 
My research sample profiles seven mid-scale farms and seven small-scale farms. To 
put this in perspective, there are over 180167 mid and large scale commercial flower 
farms, and the last available baseline studies estimated 5-10,000 smallholder farmers 
(Bolo 2010; Fintrac 2010). The Kenya Flower Council168 estimates over 300 active 
exporters of cut flowers from Kenya to the EU. This thesis therefore makes no claim 
that the producers interviewed are representative of the sector, but rather that my 
research sample provides unique insights on their networks, strategies and bargaining 
power in shifting export markets as differentiated by scale. That said, the concentration 
of the mid-scale farms in my sample in Naivasha area, where 60% of all flower farms 
are located (Riisgaard & Gibbon 2014:103), gives on average a fair glimpse into their 
production and marketing practices169. This is further compounded by the fact that the 
farms were identified by the KFC for being on average strong performers and good 
representatives of the industry. Further, smallholder farmers engaged in horticulture 
are also generally concentrated in the highlands and cooler parts of the Rift Valley, 
where the smallholders in my sample were located, thereby providing a realistic 
snapshot of the overall picture.  
                                                 
166 As shown in the pie chart figure 4.2: Input providers (4%), consolidator-exporters (9%), 
agronomists (4%), freighters (2%) and local flower traders (14%). 
167 This figure is an approximation based on data from Riisgaard and Gibbon (2014:104) that stated 
177 commercial flower farms in Kenya in 2011.  
168 Kenya Flower Council website accessed at http://kenyaflowercouncil.org/?page_id=158 
169 See chapter six on mid-scale farms for a proportional breakdown of the representation of farms in 
my research sample. 
  96 
Detailed breakdown of 90 interviewees in Kenya and the Netherlands  
 
Table 4.2. 
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
The interviews conducted spanned the breadth of the production network as shown in 
table 4.2 above  and included:  flower farm managers and production specialists, input 
suppliers, flower breeding firms, smallholder farmers, consolidator-exporters, 
freighters and logistics experts, industry consultants, government and private sector 
regulators and certification agents, government research institutes, policy makers,  
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packaging and value addition specialists, agricultural officers, flower handling import 
agents at the Dutch auction, local flower traders and government agencies in charge 
of agriculture, horticulture, exports and trade policy. Providing a gendered view of the 
research participants, twenty five percent of the people interviewed were women, 
three of whom included flower farm directors and a HR manager while another was 
the general manager of a smallholder outgrower group. In the category of local flower 
traders, fifty percent were women. Also notable were two women at the helm of 
industry, that is, the CEO of the Kenya Flower Council as well as the Managing 
Director of the Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Services (KEPHIS). These 
observations are significant because while overall the management of the industry 
traced from the farm to the auction is overwhelmingly male, women are dominant as 
plantation workers, florists and other workers engaged in the final-point of contact with 
the flowers before presentation.  
 
The interview format 
The interview format was semi-structured which is a process that involves use of 
interviewing “with an interview protocol that is somewhat set, but that also relies on 
open-ended questions to allow for spontaneity by the participant”(Savin-Baden & 
Howell Major 2011:177). To set the parameters of discussion, I prepared a set of 
interview guides prior to the meeting based on the position of the interviewee in the 
production network (Berg 2007).  The questions centred around the interviewee’s 
profile, views of their role and everyday activities, the nature of their relationship with 
other actors, the identity, and perception of the flower industry, engagement in 
knowledge production and sharing and R&D, interaction with export markets and the 
local impact of their activities.  
 
All the interviews were conducted one-to-one rather than with focus groups and lasted 
on average two to three hours which provided rich detail that is a key strength of the 
data. All but one of the interviews were recorded170.  The majority of the interviews 
with industry officials were held in English but when interacting with local traders and 
smallholder farmers I would switch to Kiswahili and Kikuyu. This is because Kiswahili 
is the national language and traverses barriers of class, urbanisation and formal 
                                                 
170 Confidentiality issues are addressed at the end of the chapter 
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education, while Kikuyu as my mother tongue enabled a familial connection that 
helped to dispel suspicion and enabled the conversation to flow.  
 
The open-endedness of the semi-structured format was useful because it ‘broke the 
ice’ especially with reticent farm managers who were suspicious of researchers’ 
intentions and enabled me to sense the tone of the research participant. I learned that 
with farm managers the best way of ‘breaking the ice’ was to engage them on the 
technicalities of production such as varieties and cost breakdown which provided me 
with a rich body of data that I had not anticipated171.  The open-endedness of the 
questions also allowed the interviewee to steer the conversation to the issues they 
found pressing at the time such as double taxation, currency crunches and audit 
fatigue. At the same time, silences around certain issues such as ownership questions, 
workers’ welfare and representation and relationship with the government also 
provided insight into what are considered the more sensitive ‘black box’ dynamics of 
the sector. The image of the flower industry therefore emerged as curated both 
through what was said and what was silenced.  
 
The two techniques of accessing and conducting interviews - snowballing and the use 
of semi-structured interview guides -  also present limitations that shape the narrative 
of this thesis.  Though often considered a spontaneous process, snowballing is 
challenging because the researcher has to first find participants and initiate the referral 
chain, verify the eligibility of potential respondents, monitor the referral chain and data 
quality (Biernacki & Waldorf 1981:144; Patton 1990). The method provides access to 
self-referential social networks that are bound by specific power relations, which are 
in turn made visible when the reference or access is provided (Noy 2008). This is 
particularly the case in this elite industry since often elitist groups enforce their power 
by monitoring and controlling accessibility (Moyser & Wagstaffe, 1987; Odendhal & 
Shaw, 2001). For example, the Kenya Flower Council in its capacity as industry lobby, 
representative and certification agent provided references of the farms it believed were 
‘best practice’ farms or those that were known to be amenable to researchers. Farm 
managers obliged in part to maintain a good relationship with the lobby body. This 
means that the farms that do not necessarily ‘tow the line’ according to the KFC were 
                                                 
171 This data from mid-scale farm managers is expounded on in chapter six. 
  99 
placed out of my purview. This creates a sample bias which might obscure the overall 
reality as far as farm practices are concerned. The use of semi-structured interview 
guides though allowing for flexibility and the ability to further probe the interviewee, 
sometimes may lead to rather limited conversations with the more reserved 
interviewees.  
 
2. Site visits  
The research took place over two sites – production sites which were the mid and 
small scale farms in Kenya, and wholesale markets at local and international levels 
which include the Nairobi Flower Market and the Dutch Flower Auctions. Site visits put 
forward a micro-perspective since in production the study was located at the firm level, 
at the same time providing insight into the globalised nature of firm relations. I carried 
out semi-ethnographic172 observations during site visits to the Nairobi Flower Market 
as well as the Royal FloraHolland Dutch flower auctions at Aalsmeer and Naaldwijk.  
 
Access to all the mid-scale farms was mediated through the Kenya Flower Council 
and confirmed via a series of email and telephone exchanges. Farm managers had to 
organise security passes for me which were issued at the gate, typically tightly 
secured, where I showed or left my ID card. The interviews with farm managers were 
held in their offices and I was only allowed supervised visits to the greenhouses and 
packhouses thereafter which lasted about an hour or less. I had some basic interaction 
with the production and irrigation managers who showed me the farms and no direct 
contact with labourers other than to ask for permission to take a photograph. The 
reservations in interaction confirmed previous reports about the reticence of flower 
industry officials to outsiders. 
 
Following up on references first provided by the KFC, I visited smallholders’ farms in 
the Central highlands and Rift Valley. Visits to Wilmar’s smallholders’ farms were 
accompanied and facilitated by Wilmar’s agronomists, who tended to fill in on the 
technical or financial questions. There was a sense of deference to the company’s 
position among some, while some other farmers challenged the agronomists’ positions 
                                                 
172 The observations made were only partially ethnographic due to the short amount of time I had to 
observe the activities, typically a few hours in which I took notes, pictures where allowed and where I 
conversed with some of the people I observed.  
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particularly on how the company splits profits with farmers. This dynamic was useful 
methodologically because it illuminated the contested nature of the relationship 
between farmer and outgrower, and helped to triangulate the information.  
 
The semi-ethnographic study of the Nairobi Flower Market was mediated through a 
gate-keeper from the Kenya Agricultural and Livestock Research Organisation 
(KALRO). The visit, which took place at the crack of dawn involved brief conversations 
with seven local flower traders as they went about their business, I made detailed 
observations173 market demographics, interactions and varieties.  
 
Site visits to the Dutch auctions involved guided tours of the auction rooms, vase-life 
inspection halls, cold storage facilities and the auction highways by flower importers, 
and other auction agents such as the big buyers. I was connected to them via 
references from Kenyan research participants which highlights another way in which 
snowballing was effective.  These visits provided insights into auction “software” that 
cannot otherwise be deduced such as the intensely masculine nature of the auction, 
the attention to detail, familial and straightforward nature of business norms, the 
sophistication and speed of the logistical organisation, the relationship of the 
wholesale buyers to the flower-as-commodity. I also noted the ‘stickiness of tradition’ 
in agents’ scepticism about operational changes such as digitalisation of sales and 
nostalgia for the more tactile live-bidding process. Visiting both local and export 
markets highlighted connections between the two spaces since the Nairobi Flower 
Market (NFM) trades in the ‘rejects’, or rose stems that did not make the quality 
standards for export access.  
 
Site visits illuminated the territorial and cultural embeddedness of firms engaged in 
production and marketing. It also brought to life the discursive nature of the firm-
territory relationship, and the multi-scalar nature of intra-firm relations as embedded 
in the sub-national, the local and the global as put forward in GPN analysis.  
 
                                                 
173 The dynamics of the Nairobi Flower market are highlighted in chapters 1 and 7 
  101 
3. Documentary analysis 
To gain a thorough understanding of the different lenses through which the flower 
industry has been empirically studied, I analysed a wide range of literature which I 
organised into five overall categories shown below in table 4.3. below174. 
Table showing documents analysed and emergent themes 
 
Table 4.3. 
Source: author’s own 
 
In line with grounded theory methodology (Charmaz 2006:6), I familiarised myself with 
the literature before  commencing my field work to ensure that I was conversant with 
prevailing issues in the industry, and then after field work conducted the critical review 
of literature, placing it in conversation with the data collected. As table 4.3. shows, the 
documentary analysis was intersectional in approach and multi-disciplinary in 
nature175. Savin-Baden & Howell Major (2011:127) explain that bringing together such 
a wide range of documents from different disciplines for analysis is a form of bricolage, 
                                                 
174 These were discussed in detail in the literature review chapter. The development policy literature 
and Critical Political Economy literature were particularly instructive in shaping the analytical thrust of 
this thesis. 
175 The documentary analysis engaged literature from political economy, economic and human 
geography, sociology, critical agrarian studies, gender studies, public policy, agricultural economics, 
environmental science, business and management studies. 
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where the literature is fitted to the data and this enables the researcher to “transcend 
disciplinary boundaries in a search to explain ‘what is going on with this data?’ ” This 
means of reviewing literature is also true to the inter-disciplinary nature of 
Development Studies and shows the interconnectedness, and contested nature of the 
development processes and phenomena we study in the field as seen through various 
lenses.  
 
4. Trade Shows and Fairs 
The 5th annual International Flower Trade Expo (IFTEX) held in Nairobi in June 2016 
as well as the 14th annual Naivasha Horticultural Fair (NHF) in September 2016 were 
important industry events that I attended in the course of my field work. IFTEX is the 
main industry networking event that brings together hundreds of regional and 
international sector players. These included among others breeders, propagators, 
flower growers, cargo and trade suppliers. The aim of the expo is to connect 
international buyers from a range of markets to opportunities to purchase Kenyan cut 
flowers. The exposure generated for Kenyan growers at this forum is critical in 
developing relationships in supplying direct markets. For international buyers, the 
focus is on ascertaining the range of varieties, quality and capabilities of growers to 
supply consistently and at scale.  
 
The Naivasha Horticultural Fair is the biggest forum for horticulture players in Africa, 
so it was important as a means of showing the interconnectedness of floriculture to 
the horticultural sector overall. There were nearly 200 exhibitors ranging from 
breeders, input suppliers, freighters, certification agents, government regulators, 
growers and export agents. The trade shows showcase the societal embeddedness 
of the industry, and the importance of in-person interaction among potential business 




I attended the Flower Sector Sustainability Workshop at Coventry University, UK 
hosted by the Centre for Business in Society in July, 2017176. The aim was to build a 
                                                 
176 The workshop was hosted by Dr. Jill Timms and Dr. David Bek, who are co-heading the research 
project “Promoting Ethical Flowers for Improved Working Conditions in Supply Chains: The 
Disconnect Between Increased Certification and Poor Purchaser Knowledge” funded by the British 
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stakeholder network that brings together academics studying the flower industry, 
certification agents such as Fairtrade and MPS, exporters such as MM Flowers177 and 
supermarkets such as the Co-op. The main lessons emerging from the workshop 
included interesting discussions on the ‘puzzle of invisibility of certifications’ to 
consumers, the relative lack of interest in certifications by florists and the challenges 
this poses for sustainability initiatives. The workshop also highlighted the 
responsibilities of ensuring ethical supply between producers, retailers and 
certification agents. Exposure to the sourcing work of MM Flowers gave me a glimpse 
into the vertical integration and consolidation of Kenya large scale flower farms into 
foreign markets through wholesalers, which I had not previously had while in Kenya. 
This exposure affirmed the foundational categorisation I had made of the Kenyan 
production network as bifurcated between small and mid-scale farms, and large scale 
vertically integrated farms.  
 
4.5. Research analysis 
Field work has a life of its own and researchers must be flexible enough to let their 
analyses be led by the data to sometimes unchartered horizons. Charmaz (2006:2) 
explains that data forms the foundation for Grounded Theory and our analysis of this 
data generates the concepts we construct. After seven months of field work, my 
research analyses took place in two phases – the first was to accurately transcribe the 
interviews which were recorded in three languages (English, Kiswahili and Kikuyu). 
The challenge of translation of concepts from Kiswahili and Kikuyu to English helped 
me to focus on the meaning and context of the interview and to bring out the cultural 
embeddedness of the data. The second phase entailed line-by-line coding of the 
interview transcripts (Charmaz 2006:11) using Atlas ti software. Once the emergent 
concepts had crystallised from this process, I then wrote memos based on the key 
conceptual findings emerging from each interview which helped me to piece together 
the key argument and the thesis’ narrative.  
                                                 
Academy/Leverhulme Trust. Accessed at https://www.coventry.ac.uk/research/research-
directories/current-projects/2017/promoting-ethical-flowers-for-improved-working-conditions-in-supply-
chains-the-disconnect-between-increased-certification-and-poor-purchaser-knowledge/ 
177 MM Flowers is the UK’s leading, vertically integrated cut flowers specialist, supplying major UK 
and European retailers. It is an integrated flower company owned by the largest rose producers in the 
world in partnership with Munoz group. In Kenya, MM sources roses directly from Veg Pro, (VP 
group). In Colombia, it sources roses, chrsyanthemums, alstroemeria and hydrangea from Elite 
Flowers.  
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Emergent theoretical categories which formed the pillars of my analytical framework 
include the notion of strategies, the heterogeneity and dynamism of networks among 
producers, as well as the contested nature of relationships producers and institutional 
actors in a show of agency and bargaining power178. The initial process of coding 
enabled me to see gaps in the ‘big picture’ I was building and thereby prompted my 
second trip to Kenya, where I collected additional data on smallholder networks and 
their varied relationships with consolidator- exporters. 
 
Coding is a subjective process that impinges the researcher’s framing on the data 
because the naming of concepts comes from one’s own understanding. It therefore 
impinges a socially constructed understanding of the phenomena. That said, coding 
is an iterative and creative process that enabled me to extract meaning and develop 
and internally coherent narrative of the forces at play in shaping the Kenyan cut flower 
production networks.  
 
4.6. Issues arising from conducting field work in the Kenyan flower 
industry 
Having foregrounded this methodology chapter by explaining the overall reticence of 
the cut flower industry to outsiders, this section outlays the various challenges of 
access experienced in the course of conducting field work primarily in Kenya. It does 
so by discussing the positionality of the researcher, managing reciprocity in field work 
settings, and ethical considerations. It also discusses the performativity of the 
researcher in terms of managing the challenges that arise from one’s positionality, as 
well as the importance of reciprocity in institutionalising knowledge obtained from field 
work. 
 
I was considered an industry outsider because I had no prior direct contact with the 
flower industry, even though I previously worked in Agriculture more broadly writ as a 
development consultant at Dalberg Global Development Advisors. My work entailed 
providing advisory services for the public sector with various ministries of Agriculture 
in Eastern Africa. Kenyan flower industry circles are small and insular and people build 
                                                 
178 The concept of bargaining power is explained in the literature review and exemplified in the three 
empirical chapters, in particular chapter eight. For example, the flower industry lobbying the state on 
streamlining of the tax regime. 
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trust and credibility through informal gentlemen’s networks and personal references.  
The challenges of access were experienced not only at the point of introduction but 




The origins of the difficulties I experienced with access were twofold – first, those 
arising from the social dynamics of the flower industry particularly the previously 
described aversion to researchers, the gendered dynamics of interaction in a largely 
male-dominated industry, and the near-impermeability of the informal networks that 
set the boundary lines between insiders and outsiders. The second source of access 
challenges was navigating my own positionality, as a Kenyan, female, foreign-
educated researcher who was returning home to conduct field work. Positionality can 
be understood as a coming to terms with the intersecting, changing aspects of our 
identities or the plurality of selves that we bear as researchers who are ‘othered’ in 
various ways in fieldwork sites (Mollinga, 2008). 
 
The protection of industry image is of paramount importance as it mirrors the aesthetic 
nature of the commodity it produces where value (vase-life) is indeed in the eye of the 
beholder. The image of the sector has also been impacted by local and international 
human rights activists and consumers in Western markets acting to secure ethics in 
processes of production. It came as no surprise then, when I realised that to secure 
interviews as an industry outsider with mid-scale commercial flower farm 
management, I would need a reference and introduction from a reputable gatekeeper.  
 
The Kenya Flower Council, as the industry representative was critical in identifying a 
sample of ‘researcher friendly’ mid-scale farm managers, and smallholder farmers for 
me to interview. Even with such an introduction, I experienced some hesitation in the 
interview setting. For example, one manager of a prominent farm in Naivasha initially 
refused to speak with me, and to be recorded, and proceeded to simply fill out the 
interview guide I had brought with me. He later relaxed his guard as I explained that 
the information was for academic purposes only, and that I had no business interests 
nor was I ‘working for someone’ in the industry.  
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Navigating my positionality involved a performative balancing of various parts of my 
identity including gender, class and age depending on the research setting. The 
majority of the interviews I conducted in Kenya and in the Netherlands, were with 
middle-aged men who had been working in the flower industry for decades. Further, 
while a fair amount of the authoritative research and scholarship in this industry has 
been carried out by women, all except three179 are white and based in universities in 
the Global North. The positionality I bore by virtue of being young, female and Kenyan 
in that setting had the effect of not being taken seriously by the male interviewers at 
first glance. However, the effect changed from dismissive to either keen or defensive 
when the interviewee learnt of my affiliation to the University of Cambridge. The class 
privilege and academic authority that came with the institutional affiliation sharpened 
their attention, while also eliciting a sense of cautionary distance because ‘whatever I 
write would be taken very seriously thereafter’. Managing the gender dynamic within 
that interview setting curated a functional performativity180. For example, in order not 
to antagonise the farm manager (and therefore jeopardise the interview) as he 
explained what was effectively a sexist hiring policy181, I had to ‘play along’ in 
agreement with what he proposed as culturally accepted truths about women’s 
docility, domestic subservience and long-suffering.  
 
Positionality, Performativity and Reciprocity in fieldwork 
The nature and importance of reciprocity in conducting field work emerged from 
dealing with the slow, bureaucratic procedures of obtaining a local field work permit. 
The government of Kenya requires academic researchers conducting fieldwork locally 
to apply for permits from NACOSTI. I had difficulties submitting my application online 
months prior to commencing my field work. However, once in Nairobi I visited the 
                                                 
179 Notably, Professor Maggie Opondo and the late Professor Mary Omosa whose work is on 
governance and the gendered nature of the cut flower industry. Alice Nakhumicha Muriithi is a plant 
physiologist who worked at KARI and has systematically published particularly on smallholder 
engagement in floriculture in Kenya. There are other women who have conducted research on the 
sector and published most commonly MBA theses. However, this point refers to those who have 
systematically conducted high impact research on the political economy of the flower sector.  
180 I explore the idea of performativity in the field work setting in a forthcoming chapter, Mwangi, N. 
(2018) in Johnstone, L. (ed.). ‘ “Good that you are one of us”: Positionality and Reciprocity in conducting 
field work in Kenya’s flower industry’ in The Politics of Conducting Research in Africa: Ethical and 
Emotional Challenges in the Field. Palgrave Macmillan. In it, I characterise the shifts between 
positionalities in three ways: ‘slipping between’, emphasising or downplaying some positionalities and 
‘playing along’ or acquiescence. These shifts are part of the process of seeking access and building 
rapport and collaboration with participants. 
181 This issue is explored in chapter six under labour management dynamics. 
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administrator severally in-person and in a few weeks my proposal was finally 
processed. This process speaks to the importance of building rapport through face-to-
face, inter-personal relationships with institutional gatekeepers, especially when 
considered an outsider.  
 
One of the conditions of obtaining the NACOSTI research permit is that the researcher 
is locally affiliated with an institution in Kenya and commits to sharing their work with 
NACOSTI. This requirement is an attempt to build up and locally house the body of 
knowledge produced within Kenya with Kenyan research bodies. To meet this 
stipulation, I decided to apply for a research associate position at the University of 
Nairobi, Institute of Development Studies (IDS), which was a less-than-straightforward 
process. The brochure with information on the application was out of date and the 
application was churned through four months of bureaucratic delays. It was also 
relatively expensive, costing approximately 70 pounds. These challenges abounded 
even after receiving some inside support from a family friend who is a member of 
faculty at the University. The IDS finally granted me the research associate position 
on the condition that I would share with them the knowledge gained in the process. I 
intend to share a copy of this thesis with them for their reference.  
 
An element of performativity can be seen in how in the process of my interaction with 
IDS, I downplayed my foreign higher education so as not come off as entitled or bullish. 
There have been reports of foreign-educated students struggling to gain 
acceptance182 within local institutions partly because they are perceived as 
competitors, and because their foreign education may be resentfully perceived as a 
rejection of the local system of higher education. Nevertheless, the fact that I could 
‘slip between’ and accentuate or downplay various positionalities (that is being Kenyan 
and an insider while being foreign as a Cambridge student) in order to build rapport 
as required, manifests the privileges of class access at play within the Kenyan 
academy that still reflect the esteemed position rendered to knowledge production and 
producers based in the Global North. 
 
                                                 
182 See for example the case with the University of Nairobi school of law and graduates from foreign 
law school programs. University World News. Africa Edition, 17 November 2017. Court scraps pre-law 
bar exam for law school entry.  
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One of my goals was to better understand the relationship and knowledge flows 
between the Kenyan academy and the flower industry. My research associate position 
at IDS unfortunately did not yield an in-person discussion with any of the faculty 
despite multiple efforts to do so.  A series of strikes183 in the public university system 
also ensued a month into my field work thereby creating a further impediment to 
interaction within the academy. It meant that I was only able to establish the situation 
with knowledge flows from the flower industry perspective.  
 
Seeking out local institutional backing is also a way for the researcher to respect the 
role of the research bureaucracy in localising and making public knowledge produced 
through the field work encounter. The process creates a shared sense of public 
responsibility in the researcher as co-creator of knowledge with and through the 
society from which it finds its meaning. While none of the institutions in which I 
conducted interviews asked to see the NACOSTI research permit except one (the 
Export Promotion Council), I made it a point at the beginning of each interview to 
explain the permits and references I had obtained. This was particularly important for 
building credibility and trust in the rigour of my research, while conducting interviews 
in government institutions. Private sector actors cared more about the KFC reference.  
 
4.7. Analytical and ethical considerations 
The general criteria used to evaluate the rigour and quality of research in the social 
sciences are reliability, replicability, generalisability and internal validity (Boaz & Ashby 
2003:7) though these are largely derived from quantitative traditions (Bryman 2001). 
While I believe that my field work is largely replicable (Sumner and Tribe, 2012), it is 
also highly contingent on my positionality. For example, in addition to the issues on 
gender, class affiliation previously discussed, I also believe that being ethnicity 
influenced my field work access. Being a member of the Gikuyu community, speaking 
Kikuyu and understanding the norms of social engagement therein allowed for some 
measure of ethnic familiarity, which gave me unique access to smallholder farmers in 
rural Kenya. In regards to generalisability, my research presents more of a snap shot 
than a proportional representation of cut flower production in Kenya.  It offers micro 
                                                 
183 See for example, The Star News, 9 March 2016. Varsity academic staff strike threat;  Capital News 
5 April 2016. University of Nairobi campuses shut after violent protests and Daily Nation Newspaper, 
13 April 2016. University of Nairobi suspends 139 more students over strike.  
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and relational insights into the market strategies, networks and bargaining practices 
of two previously understudied scales of production – the mid and small scale. The 
internal validity of research pertains to the approximate truth about inferences 
regarding cause-effect or causal relationships (Web Centre for Social Research 
Methods)184. Rather than inferring a causal relationship, the thrust of this thesis is 
concerned with analysing the dynamics of existing producer practices, relationships 
and relative power in relation to the markets in which they operate.  
 
Throughout my research, I ensured that I complied with University ethical 
requirements. That involved checking for informed consent for every person I 
interviewed, and also asking for their permission prior to recording the interview. 
Though I did not have the chance to record every interview based on the research 
setting, there was only one commercial farm manager who declined being recorded 
for fear that the information might be leaked to competitors or the media. He however 
had no qualms with me taking detailed notes of the conversation. Beyond this, I also 
ensured that I obtained permission to make use of the information shared in interviews. 
As a matter of integrity, I agreed to share my thesis with the Institute of Development 
Studies (IDS), the Kenya Flower Council and NACOSTI.  
 
One of the ethical difficulties I encountered in interviewing marketing agents in 
particular, was to manage their expectations for business enhancement. Upon 
realizing that I was based in the UK at an elite university, some of them assumed that 
I could open up business opportunities to supply British florists. Conversely, one import 
handler at the Dutch auctions thought that, because I had been referred to her by one 
of her top Kenyan smallholder flower growers, I was somehow assessing the quality 
of her work and would report back to the supplier in Kenya. I took pains to explain that 
my involvement in the flower industry was purely academic and I could offer no such 
guarantee of reaping business rewards, or of relaying business performance 
assessments from one partner to another.  
 
                                                 
184 The Web Centre for Social Science Research Methods. Accessed at 
https://socialresearchmethods.net/kb/intval.php 
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4.8. Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the five research methods which include semi-structured 
interviews, site visits, documentary analysis, trade shows and fairs, and workshops 
were useful for answering my overall and underlying research questions. It has also 
highlighted the peculiar challenges of gaining access to conduct research in the flower 
industry – an elite, reticent, gendered and relatively obscure industry amongst 
Kenyans. The research experience raised serious considerations regarding 
awareness of the researcher’s positionality, the performativity experienced in seeking 
flexibility in various research settings, and the importance of reciprocity in the field 
work encounter so as to develop genuine knowledge exchange. Ethical considerations 
raised revolve around maintaining transparency and managing the expectations of the 
research participants in line with my academic mandate. Finally, the chapter clarified 
the scope of the research methodology employed by stating that it makes no claim 
that the research sample presented is representative of the industry as a whole, but 
rather that its goal is to provide an incisive view into an understudied yet important 
scale of production in the cut flower industry. Building on the categorisation of actors 
summarised in figure 4.2. and foregrounding the empirical chapters, chapter five will 
now discuss how the network of actors in the flower industry is involved in growing 
and selling a Kenyan flower.  
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5. How to grow and sell a Kenyan flower 
5.1. Introduction 
It often comes as a surprise to consumers of cut flowers in Europe, that the flowers so 
readily available from supermarkets and florists, are more often than not imported from 
developing countries, particularly Kenya. Consumers want flowers to be natural, 
unique, fragile symbols of humanity, warmth and affection. And these romantic 
narratives of their production have been engendered by marketing campaigns. Cut 
flowers are commodities designed for cultural trends185. They are artificially bred to 
resist fragility and so fulfil the retailers’ quality guarantee of 7-10 days’ vase-life186 and 
that they ‘travel well’ from the highlands of Kenya to retail points globally. Two main 
aspects of the nature of the ‘rose-as-commodity’ influences the character of the 
production network – extreme perishability, and aesthetic value. 
 
Building on the literature review in chapter two which explored the narratives around 
the interaction and impact of the Kenyan flower industry in globalised markets, this 
chapter addresses the technical aspects of the production and marketing process. It 
details the complex set of interactions among the wide variety of actors in the cut 
flower production network summarised in figure 5.1. below. These include breeders, 
growers, consolidator-exporters, freighters, import handlers and auction agents who 
are involved in getting the flowers from production in Kenya to first point of sale in 
European markets.  This chapter will discuss the auction as the final point of sale since 
direct markets are far too diverse to be characterised here in technical terms. The 
heterogeneity of actors and their recursive interactions lends itself to the network 
formulation articulated in GPN 2.0 theory (Coe & Yeung, 2015:18) outlined in chapter 
three. Since there is too much disparity on the production undertaken by smallholders, 
this chapter will discuss only rose production and export, which is the main export from 
mid-scale farms. The information herein is derived from documentary sources and 
general observations of the internal interactions of the industry actors.  The next 
section discusses the archetypal process for every rose – breeding.  
                                                 
185 For example, red for Valentine’s Day, white and yellow for Easter, pink for Mothers’ Day 
186 Vase life refers to the period during which a cut flower or cut foliage retains its appearance in 
a vase. For consumer, the longer the vase life, the more desirable the flower. Vase life is terminated 
when the average consumer discards the stem based on petal wilt, necrosis, discoloration, or 
abscission; bent neck; leaf and stem discoloration; drying; or general stem decline (Dole et. al 2013) 
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Visualisation of the Kenyan mid-scale cut flower production network 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Production actors involved in Kenyan floriculture 
Source: Adapted from Taylor (2011: 81); author’s analysis 
 
5.2. Breeders and Propagators - Accessing plant material 
Rose bushes are planted for 5-7 years after which they begin to lose their vigour187 
and must be replanted. This quality means they are a long-term investment and 
varieties must be carefully selected. Typically, a commercial flower farm will obtain its 
plant material from a flower breeding company (henceforth ‘the breeder’) and then 
propagate the material so that it can be planted at scale. Breeding entails cross-
pollinating flower varieties with desirable characteristics to develop a variety that will 
be high quality188 and that will grow well and commercially viable. The industry is 
dominated by very large, highly competitive, family-owned, international breeding 
                                                 
187 Roses are grown from cuttings which are propagated plant material. The portion of the stalk used 
to propagate the cutting is known as a budwood and this is obtained from a hardy root stock e.g., the 
Natal Briar. 
188 For commercial rose varieties, this often means a prolonged vase life (< 10 days), between 30-80 
petals that open in good time, production of usually six stems (though can be many more) per metre 
square, tall stem length (60-80 centimetres), shades of colour. Scent which normally comes with soft, 
fragile light coloured roses are difficult to transport.  
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firms based in Europe189. There are no Kenyan-origin flower breeding firms190. New 
varieties later undergo local trials and selection to determine their viability for 
production under local conditions. New varieties later undergo local trials and selection 
to determine their viability for production under local conditions. This is a slow and 
arduous process which can take up to eleven years (Stewart 2007:131). Rose 
breeding is defined by the very high costs of developing new varieties relative to the 
costs of imitation, and only a small number (e.g., 1 in 1000 seedlings) of new products 
become commercially successful, making it especially necessary to have plant variety 
protections (Moser & Rhode 2011:423). Breeders are the vital link in research and 
design (R&D) in the flower production network.  
 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) in plant breeding were introduced and anchored in 
developing countries through the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) of the World Trade Organization. Plant Breeder’s Rights 
(PBRs)191 gave breeders temporary exclusivity on the commercialisation of the variety 
(Louwaars et al. 2006):1. Breeders can then collect royalties192 for plant material sold 
to commercial flower farms via the end-point collection system, which is where 
royalties are determined and collected at the point of sale193, usually the Dutch flower 
auction (De Jonge & Munyi (2016:42). This system means that instead of having the 
royalty included in the price of the seed that is sown, the royalty is calculated based 
on the produce sold arising from the seed. De Jonge & Munyi (2016:42) explain that 
this system works well in highly organised value chains and enables a differentiation 
between subsistence and cash crops. For Kenyan smallholder flower farmers, who 
have limited access to flower varieties obtained from breeders and who cannot afford 
                                                 
189 Examples of international flower breeding firms with operations in Kenya include Kordes (German), 
De Ruiter (Dutch), Interplant (Dutch) Olij Rozen which was recently purchased by Dümmen Orange 
(Dutch) and Meilland (French). In the UK, the best-known rose breeder is David Austin, who has bred 
over 900 varieties of English rose 
190 European cut flower breeding firms have moved their activities to Kenya, setting up trial stations, 
purchasing cut flower farms and dislocating their complete breeding programs (Sander 2011:11). 
Preesman (Dutch breeding firm) was purchased in 2011 by Zena Roses, a Kenyan flower firm owned 
by one of Kenya’s former ministers of Agriculture under the Moi regime, Dr. Sally Kosgei, and renamed 
United Selections. Accessed at Floriculture magazine October 28, 2011. 
191 Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBRs) are sometimes also referred to as Plant Variety Protections (PVPs) 
192 On average royalties are charged per plant and cost about 0.8 euro cents per plant while the cost 
of propagation is approximately 0.3 euro cents per plant. 
193 This is in contrast to many parts of the world where breeders typically charge royalties based on 
crop production information. (De Jonge & Munyi 2016:42) 
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the royalties in any case, the effect is that they are locked out of exporting their flowers 
to the auction.  
 
IPRs are based on national laws and countries enable them by setting up Plant Variety 
Protection (PVP) systems. These institutions are meant to facilitate and incentivise 
innovation and technology transfer (UPOV 2012). In Kenya, the system of IPR 
management was consolidated all through the nineties as neoliberal tenets of 
privatization were being anchored into Kenyan agriculture. IPRs were first 
institutionalised194 under the Industrial Property Act, Cap 509 of 1990 which set up the 
Kenya Industrial Property Office (KIPO). Today, IPRs are protected by the Kenya 
Industrial Property Institute (KIPI, formerly KIPO) which was established in 2002, after 
the enactment of the Industrial Property Act (2001) (Ministry of Industry Trade and 
Cooperatives website)195. The Seeds and Plant Varieties Act (Cap 326) of 1991196 
provides for plant breeders rights (PBRs) to be conferred upon breeders for a period 
not exceeding 25 years. In 1997, the Plant Variety Protection (PVP) office was set up 
to handle PBR applications and operates under the Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate 
Services (KEPHIS).  
 
To enable better access to competitive, new protected varieties which are bred 
internationally, Kenya became the first African country to become a member of UPOV 
(International Union for the Protection of Varieties of Plants) in 1999197 (KEPHIS 
presentation, March 2016). In May 2016, the 1991 UPOV convention came into effect 
in Kenya. Without careful regulation, this might lead to the strengthening of breeders’ 
rights (typically owned by foreign multinationals firms) over local farmers’ rights198. The 
cut flower sector has benefited greatly from these value-capture institutions. De Jonge 
& Munyi (2016: 31) explain that ornamental crops lead in terms of the total number of 
                                                 
194 Plant Breeders’ Rights were also emphasised in sessional paper no.1 of 1994 (Bolo 2012: 137) 
195 MITI website accessed at Accessed at http://industrialization.go.ke/index.php/state-
corporations/86-kenya-industrial-property-institute-kipi 
196 The revised edition was published in 2012. Accessed at: 
http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/ken37547.pdf 
197. This act domesticated the 1961 Act of the UPOV Convention in Kenya’s Kenya Seed and Plant 
Varieties Act (Cap 326). 
198 Compared with UPOV 1961, the 1991 revision of the convention is characterised by a widening of 
the scope of rights granted to breeders, a narrowing of the breeders’ exemption which allows anyone 
to use the protected varieties for further breeding, and a lengthening of the duration of plant variety 
protection (from 15 to 20 years). Accessed at: https://ipkenya.wordpress.com/2016/05/16/upov-1991-
enters-into-force-in-kenya-farmers-vs-plant-breeders-rights/ 
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PVP applications made in Kenya, with 692 out of a total of 1156 applications. All the 
owners of these PVPs are of foreign origin199, typically due to the complexity and 
expense of the process.  
 
While Kenyan plant scientists and technicians are trained, and involved in the 
mechanics of conducting variety trials locally as well as propagation, the science and 
technology of breeding and selecting roses remains enclaved in Europe. Given the 
knowledge-intensive nature of the flower industry, the Eurocentric geopolitics of flower 
breeding undermines possible value enhancement that could improve the global 
positioning of flower industries in the global south.  
 
5.3. Flower Producers 
This section highlights the embeddedness of the flower farm as a site of production in 
a capital-knowledge-technology and labour intensive set of interactions as shown in 
image 5.1. above. Overall, the profile of producers in the Kenyan flower sector is 
elite200 and deeply gendered. The day-to-day management and supervision of 
production is handled by Kenyan-African men. The profile of production in the flower 
industry is highly gendered. Women comprise 75 percent201 (Opondo 2006:1; 
Barrientos 2014:10) of the approximately 100,000 workers in the sector particularly in 
packhouses, where they are often paid more than lower level field and greenhouse 
workers, but also work longer hours (Barrientos 2014:10). By 1995-99, virtually all 
farms had appointed Kenyan men with experience in the larger, older farms to 
professional management roles. Further, professional growers rotated farm visits, 
particularly in the Naivasha cluster and informally benchmarked production practices 
and systems (Riisgaard & Gibbon 2014:12) which helped to improve and standardise 
the general quality of Kenyan roses. 
 
                                                 
199 73% of the 1457 applications for PVPs in horticulture overall between 1997 and March 2016 were 
for roses. Of those, 62.5% are foreign applicants predominantly (Netherlands, Germany, USA, France 
and Israel) while 37.5% are local Kenyan (De Jonge & Munyi 2016: 31). 
200 Chapter one detailed the concentration of corporate ownership the flower industry as dominated by 
industrial capital (Asian-Kenyan 52.2%); Foreign capital (White Kenyan 24.6%) and Political capital 
(Black-Kenyan 23.2%) Figures from (Mulangu 2016); (categories are author’s own). 
201 Opondo (2006) estimated between 65-75 percent of the then 40-50,000 flower plantation workers 
are women. Barrientos (2014) found that women comprise 75 percent of the 70-90,000 Kenyan flower 
workers.  
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The informal and intricate nature of knowledge-exchange occurring in these 
gentlemen’s networks is testament to the importance of being societally embedded 
therein in order to thrive in this knowledge-intensive sector. From the nineties, a 
number of foreign consultants202 have been consistently hired by flower farms to 
advise and train on various technical aspects (J. H. M. Wijnands 2005; Hortiwise & 
FlowerWatch 2012). This is further testament to the north-south flow of knowledge in 
the sector, and the slow and limited endogenisation occurring at the upper levels of 
knowledge management.   
 
Kenya has naturally optimal conditions203 for commercial production of roses204 which 
came to dominate flower production in Kenya from 1998 (Gibbon & Riisgaard 
2014:12). There are thousands of commercial rose varieties which denotes their 
technical qualities. Based on the flower diameter, commercial rose types can be 
categorised into four basic types205, (the length from the base of the bud) – tea hybrids, 
spray roses (floribunda), sweethearts (polyantha) and intermediate roses (grandiflora). 
In general, the bigger the bud the higher the price it fetches at the auction, although 
the highest prices depend on novelty and specific rare varieties.  
 
The commercial production of roses is done in greenhouses206 and is a knowledge 
and technology-intensive process. Rose plantations are made up of multiple 
greenhouses each one two hectares in size. Production therein is carried out in soil 
beds, or in soil-less media with computer-controlled fertigation otherwise known as 
hydroponics. A few experienced commercial farms are opting to move from cultivation 
                                                 
202 Ethiopian entrepreneurs setting up flower farms often hire foreign consultants and production 
managers, many of whom are Kenyan. (Melese & Helmsing, 2010: 51-52) 
203 The Lake Naivasha cut flower cluster has thrived because of the abundant supplies of fresh water 
from Lake Naivasha, ideal temperature ranging from 22- 30 degrees Celsius during the day and 6-12 
degrees at night, equal lengths of day and night due to location by the Equator (Bolo & Adeya, 2006: 
3) and suitable humidity of above 70-80% (Joop de Hoog 2001). 
204 The modern rose and most types of the genus rose used in greenhouse cultivation form the sub 
genus Eurosa  and are part of the family Rosaceae (Joop de Hoog 2001). 
205 Tea hybrids which are the largest have a bud diameter that spans 9 centimetres or more, while 
sweethearts are those less than nine centimetres (Joop de Hoog, 2001:11). Spray roses are easily 
distinguishable because they consist of at least three rose buds to one stem. While there is no 
consensus on intermediates, these are generally rose buds which measure approximately 3.5 
centimetres. 
206 Between 2000 and 2005, ‘Israeli’ steel-poly greenhouse structures replaced existing ‘Spanish’ 
wood–poly ones which allowed for greater economies of scale in deployment of labourers. (Riisgaard 
& Gibbon 2014:11). This also shows the reliance on foreign expertise for the supply of technical 
infrastructure.  
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in soil to hydroponic production, in order to recycle water (Chandra 2006:354), have 
greater control over inputs and to avoid soil-borne diseases and pests that can wipe 
out flowers. Overall, the use of hydroponics is low perhaps due to lack of knowledge 
on its performance under Kenyan conditions (Ketter et al. 2015:112). The 
greenhouses are also equipped with other modern floriculture technologies such as 
computerised heating, misting and lighting systems, all of which require huge capital 
outlays. Notably, Amiran Kenya, considered to be the “gateway to Israeli agriculture 
in Kenya” (Embassy of Israel in Kenya)207 has provided much of the technology 
transfer208 and greenhouse technology set-up using credit schemes.   
 
Roses take approximately 7-8 weeks to grow till maturity though this depends on the 
rose variety209 and the altitude. In a year, a typical rose farm will therefore have six or 
seven ‘flushes’, which is the point in the flowering cycle when all the flowers are in 
bloom. Roses growing in higher altitudes develop bigger buds and longer stems, and 
take a little longer to mature. Productivity210 is measured in terms of number of stems 
produced per square metre, which is dependent on the variety. On average for 
intermediate varieties which are popular for supermarket sales, a farm should be able 
to produce 200-250 stems per square metre.  
 
Cut flower production is also very labour intensive and detail-oriented. Roses need to 
be sprayed with pesticides twice a day and the flower beds manually weeded and 
pruned daily. Greenhouse workers must also manually ‘bend’211 rose stems to 
enhance productivity. Roses are harvested by hand twice or thrice a day by checking 
the ‘cut-stage’ which is the degree to which the rose bud has opened, and snipping 
the stem at 50-60 centimetres. The cut flowers are then transported to the pack houses 
                                                 
207 Embassy of Israel in Kenya, June 8, 2012. Accessed at 
http://embassies.gov.il/nairobi/NewsAndEvents/Pages/Amiran-Kenya-Transforming-Farming-In-East-
Africa.aspx 
208 In the late 1980’s Amiran brought consultants from Israel to advise the future flower growers of 
Kenya on the adoption of large scale greenhouses and has also set up 90 percent of the 3000 ha of 
greenhouses in the flower industry in Kenya. Amiran is now a subsidiary of the British multinational 
Balton CP. Accessed at http://www.flowerweb.com/en/article/192572/The-Story-of-Amiran-Kenya 
209 For example, spray roses may take up to nine weeks to harvest. 
210 To enhance productivity in time for peak seasons, some rose flower farms will undertake a process 
known as ‘flushing’. This means manipulating the production cycle so that the rose bushes all flower 
just in time for the peak season harvest which maximises volumes and profits. Flushing also increases 
pressure on farm labour and some farms have to hire temporary workers or pay their workers overtime. 
211 ‘Bending’ encourages higher shoot quality because the bent shoots act as a source of carbohydrates 
since they capture ample light and photosynthesize better thereafter (Kim & Lieth 2004). 
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where pack house workers cut them to required stem length, check for any damages, 
pack the flowers in bunches and place them in plastic sleeves. The flowers are then 
left to cool in the cold store at a temperature of 2 degrees for up to 8 hours in order to 
slow down their metabolism and boosts the vase life212. Thereafter the flowers are 
packed in branded cardboard boxes and transported in refrigerated trucks to the 
airport. All this detailed manual labour means that rose cultivation is incredibly labour 
intensive, requiring on average 18-20 workers per hectare213. 
 
Farms producing roses primarily for auction sale may hire workers more seasonally in 
time with peak seasons such as Valentines’ day and Mothers’ day, while those 
exporting to supermarkets must produce consistently year-round in line with sourcing 
agreements. This requires higher worker retention and a stable or permanent labour 
force, that is however required to work more intensively and precisely in packhouses 
in a form of relative surplus value extraction (Selwyn 2016:9). On the contrary, 
exporting roses to the auction provides “a degree of protection against the 
unpredictable delivery conditions, predatory pricing and supplier service-provision” 
coming from supermarket demands (Riisgaard & Gibbon 2014:16).  
 
Locally anchored yet deeply embedded in international knowledge networks, the 
flower farm as the nexus of production holds in tension the financial, knowledge and 
labour inputs and therefore shapes much of the industry’s corporate image. In this 
buyer-driven industry, it is also the singular point of reference for the sector’s complex 
mechanisms of governance214 and reform which makes it the site of intense political 
and institutional contestation that informs the political economy of the sector. 
 
5.4. Consolidator-exporters as focal intermediary firms 
One of the peculiarities of the cut flower industry is that while production is thought of 
in terms of number individual stems, the aesthetic value of the commodity lies in 
variegated, consolidated volumes – a bunch in hand or a bouquet in a vase. Highly 
                                                 
212 The vase life is the duration of time that flowers last in the consumers’ vase, is between 10-14 
days 
213 This figure is derived from interviews with flower farm managers in Kenya. According to Thoen et al. 
(1999:14), at the end of the 1990s there was a Kenyan ‘industry standard’ for deployment of workers in 
rose production, of 12 production workers per hectare, which however did not include sprayers, 
irrigation/fertigation workers or transporters 
214 Discussed in chapter eight 
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specialised firms known as consolidator-exporters or wholesalers have evolved to fulfil 
roles straddled between production and marketing in the flower industry. 500 tons of 
cut flowers worth approximately $1.7 million are packaged and consolidated for export 
per day in Kenya (Flowerweb 2015)215. 
 
Consolidator-exporters216 are the crucial intermediaries linking mid and small scale 
farms to the bifurcated European markets. In relation to producers, they carry out two 
main functions – aggregating harvested cut flowers into exportable volumes so that 
they meet economies of scale, and secondly for those growers diversifying to direct 
markets, they help to identify buyers in export markets and facilitate supply. For buyers 
in direct markets, consolidator-exporters are critical in minimising coordination costs. 
They ensure consistency, quality and alignment of seasonality with supply of the 
required quantities and varieties of cut flower supply. Furthermore, consolidator-
exporters can provide flowers at a stable price-range. For buyers, working with 
consolidator-exporters who source widely minimises the risk of supply failure perhaps 
due to sudden onset pest or disease attacks on farms. To further reduce uncertainty, 
buyers in direct markets generally have contracts working with independent 
consolidator-exporter firms217. The capabilities of consolidator-exporters lay in 
balancing a knowledge and technology function218, deep societal and network 
embeddedness and logistical acumen219.  
 
The relational role of consolidator-exporters in supply depends on whether the firm is 
active in supplying the auction or in direct markets, as was summarised in figure 1.6. 
in the introductory chapter. Accordingly, consolidator-exporters may be categorised 
                                                 
215 Flower web magazine. Accessed at 
http://www.flowerweb.com/en/article/169517/Kenya%E2%80%99s-flower-standards-to-be-in-place-
by-end-of-2015 
216 In some of the literature, they are also referred to as wholesalers. However, as explained in 
chapter 1, to offer precision and clarity on the complexity of their roles, this thesis refers to them as 
consolidator-exporters. 
217 However, consolidator-exporters only have informal supply agreements with flower farms and 
therefore bear the risk and possible penalties in the case of supply shocks. In view of these intermediary 
roles that  consolidator-exporters play, and as outlined in chapters 1 and 2, they can be categorised as 
‘focal firms’ (OECD 2008; Dembinski 2009) in that they consistently operate value-adding processes 
on both sides of the focal point, that is both in production and in marketing. 
218 Cold-chain technology is discussed in greater detail in the section that follows on freighters. 
219 Logistical acumen comes from partnerships with globally reputable logistical firms discussed in 
section 5.4 on freight-forwarders. 
  120 
into two types – traditional, and specialised consolidator-exporters also known as 
‘flower providers’ (Hortiwise & FlowerWatch 2012:50). 
 
Traditional consolidator-exporters 
 At the auction, the role of traditional Dutch consolidator-exporters or ‘big buyers’ is 
deeply institutionalised. These are typically mid-sized family firms220 that purchase 
their flowers at the auctions or from import agents221. Some may handle the 
importation themselves.  They are one of the key determinants of European buyer 
power since they are the main customers at the Dutch auctions. They tend to buy daily 
from all the auctions in order to get the best price (Hortiwise & FlowerWatch 2012) and 
so provide their clients with less expensive flowers and a wide range of limited volumes 
of varieties they need for their daily assortments. Their domestic clients are in 
specialised retail channels and are predominantly florists, while abroad they may re-
export to other wholesalers and retailers.  
 
Traditional consolidator-exporters at the auction only make a profit margin of less than 
2% and therefore their competitiveness depends on offering a lower price than other 
firms (Wijnands 2005:72). For many Kenyan producers, the advantages of marketing 
by Dutch wholesalers at the auction outweighs those of direct marketing due to the 
coordination costs (Wijnands 2005:49). Producers may however switch between 
wholesalers, although transaction costs may increase unless they use the auction as 




Figure 1.6. showed 2 types of supply chains (4 and 5) in direct markets where the role 
of consolidator-exporters is articulated differently in relation to supplying unspecialised 
channels, in particular supermarkets. This is where the ‘flower providers’ are located. 
These are typically large or very large scale multi-national consolidator-exporters with 
their own bouquet making facilities (Hortiwise 2012:50).  
 
Flower providers’ main clients are supermarkets, which generally require fixed 
quantities of specific varieties at fixed prices over time. Price fluctuations at the auction 
                                                 
220 Some of these traditional Dutch firms have developed into large multi-national companies. 
221 The role of import agents is discussed in section 5.6 of this chapter. 
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make it a risky source for these flower providers who as a result tend to import directly 
and manage their own supply.  Supermarkets’ sourcing strategies also require close 
strategic partnerships with consolidator-exporters. They must also trust that the 
partner is capable of ensuring full transparency and compliance to the various codes 
of conduct under sustainable sourcing plans. This leads to “a whole series of joint 
ventures and vertical and horizontal strategic alliances222”(Hortiwise 2012:28). 
Supermarkets either establish their own subsidiary firms to handle the sourcing, or 
outsource the task to a large reputable multi-national firm223. Beyond these 
overarching categories, there is diversity of form among locally articulated types of 
consolidator-exporters.  
 
The evolution of the ‘flower providers’ in particular is testament to the bifurcated and 
knowledge-intensive nature of global flower markets. Overall, consolidator-exporters 
exhibit remarkable embeddedness which heightens costs of switching between them, 
and wield immense corporate and institutional power through their tendency to 
consolidation, their enforcement of industry codes of conduct, and their accumulation 
of tacit knowledge gained from these interactions over time. 
 
5.5. Freight-forwarders  
Freight-forwarders (henceforth referred to as ‘freighters224’) partner very closely with 
consolidator-exporter firms to transport cut flowers in a time and temperature-
sensitive225 system to export markets, and may be considered the industry’s pipeline. 
Overall, the time taken from harvest at the flower farm in Kenya to arrival at the 
European retailers’ ranges from 48 hours to 5 days, depending on the length of the 
supply chain. At the auction, a shipment of flowers may be spread out over a few 
auction days but is generally sold within 24-36 hours of arrival. Direct sales which cut 
                                                 
222 Leading large scale Kenyan farms such as Veg Pro and Homegrown integrate forward and form joint 
ventures with consolidator-exporters. Consolidator-exporters in general do not integrate backwards 
(Wijnands 2005: 72). 
223 These network configurations are outlined in chapter three. Chapters 7 and 8 provide three case 
studies highlighting the diversity of relationships consolidator-exporters have with mid and small scale 
Kenyan farms. 
224 Technically, freighters are vessels such as cargo ships or vehicles or people that transports cargo, 
supplies, or goods. Freight-forwarders are typically the companies that organize shipments and oversee 
the logistical and administrative operations for export/import. This thesis’ focus is on the firm definition, 
using the term freighter for short.   
225 Most farms purchase a fleet (usually 2-5 depending on volumes exported daily) of refrigerated 
trucks which make two trips daily to the airport on average.  
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out the time spent ‘on the clock’ drastically reduce the farm-to-vase time (Hortiwise & 
FlowerWatch 2012:48). Cut flowers must then provide a vase-life of a minimum of 
seven days to the consumer.  Table 5.1 below summarises the various steps and time 
involved in transporting cut flowers from the farm to the retailers.  
 




Source: Flowerwatch in (Hortiwise & FlowerWatch 2012:28)  
* marks times amended by author to accommodate research observations 
 
Two freighters to rule them all 
The two main international freight companies dealing with cut flowers in Kenya are 
Kuehne + Nagel, which has the largest market share followed by Panalpina Airflo226. 
Panalpina Airflo, which is part of the Dutch Flower Group, has carved out a niche as 
a perishables-only freight company, and in cut flowers specialises in working with 
producers operating in direct markets. These producers sell their flowers on an FOB 
                                                 
226 Panalpina Airflo was formed in 2015 when Panalpina, an international freight forwarding company, 
bought a majority share in Airflo, a Kenyan based freight forwarding company specialising in 
perishables. Airflo was originally owned by the Oserian Mavuno Group as a clearing agent for the 
chemicals they imported to grow flowers from 1988. Oserian then turned it into an export facility for 
their flowers. However, in 2011 the Mavuno group wished to return to their specialisation in cut flower 
production. The company was then sold to the Dutch Flower Group (DFG). Panalpina came on board 
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(Free On Board) basis which means that they are only legally liable for the flowers till 
they are loaded on the flight, after which the liability is the buyer’s.  In effect, the cut 
flower producer pays for the cost of transporting the flowers from the farm to the airport 
including the loading costs, while the buyer pays for the cost of air freight to the point 
of sale in export markets. Kuehne + Nagel works with producers who sell flowers 
mainly to the Dutch flower auction. Overall, cut flowers comprise of over 60% of the 
total air freight exports (Panalpina website)227. Both freight companies provide two 
main services – air transportation for cut flowers and Cold Chain Management 
(CCM)228. Precision is important in this role because transportation damages attract 
quality remarks presented to bidders at the Dutch auction. These can lead to a 
decrease in price of 5 -20% (Hulst 2004).  
 
The cost of freight229, proximity of export markets and the availability of direct flights 
determines which global markets are accessible to cut flower producers. For mid-scale 
producers selling their cut flowers at the auction, freight costs are the highest of all 
direct costs ranging between 40 and 60% of total costs230. Under further pressure by 
the recent devaluation of the Euro which is the trading currency, freight charges 
present a serious challenge to market access. For many smallholders, this cost is 
prohibitive and non-negotiable, and is aggravated because they also ship much 
smaller quantities than mid and large scale farms. Freight companies generally have 
no contracts with the flower farms. To manage the risk, the freight company cultivates 
long term relationships with flower farms and makes use of the farms’ historical 
                                                 
227 Panalpina website accessed at 
http://www.panalpina.com/www/global/en/home/news_media/news_archive_folder/news_2015/15_11
_05.html 
228 CCM includes temperature-sensitive management of flower logistics. For example, these firms 
offer vacuum cooling facilities which is the best available technology for cooling perishables. An 
increase in temperature beyond 4 degrees at any point in the cold chain compromises the quality of 
the cut flowers because it invigorates the rate of metabolism, affects water loss, tissue deterioration 
and growth of Botrytis cinerea.  
229 The freight rates for the two freight companies to the Netherlands are dollar-denominated and 
range between $1.80 - $1.90 per kilogram in 2016.  Freight rates are pegged to the costs incurred by 
freighters, which are driven primarily by the cost of the round trip. Prior to signing the block space 
agreement, the carrier typically conducts a feasibility study as to what they might import back from 
Europe. Kenya typically imports via sea freight through Mombasa. The commercial case for the return 
cargo flight transporting Kenya’s cut flowers North wards is then made by flying in imports from 
Europe to West and South Africa on the return leg. From there back to Nairobi, the cargo flight 
normally flies empty. These round trips via the various African coasts are known as ‘shore hops’ and 
are a distinctive characteristic of the dynamics of north-south flower trade. 
230 From field work conversations among flower farmers detailed in chapters six and seven 
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production data and seasonal trend information. For mid and small scale producers 
without a range of reliable, technically proficient commercial options in this space, 
cultivating strong, consistent relationships with freighters is critical to their continued 
ability to access export markets.  
 
5.6. Import handlers 
To maintain the value of imported cut flowers and prepare them for bidding at the 
Dutch auction, cut flowers must be ‘handled’ by specialised importing firms231 which 
are located within the auction232, as the last point of contact for flowers before sale. 
Import handling includes unpacking them, checking for and reporting damages or 
wilting after transport, rehydrating, cooling, sleeving and organising them in order of 
varieties in buckets and lots233 in preparation for bidding. One category of importers at 
the auction receives and resells flower boxes to customers as they are, while a second 
category unpacks the incoming boxes and rehydrates them while awaiting sale 
(Hortiwise & FlowerWatch 2012:48). Their role is critical to how successfully the 
flowers sell at the point of auction. 
 
Handling of cut flowers at the auction is a significant cost for producers (up to 15% of 
costs of production) and therefore the choice234 of import handler is a key 
consideration (Wijnands 2005:). Import handlers sometimes emerge out of the 
collective action of flower growers, who having pooled their flowers for export felt the 
need to also consolidate gains through forming their own handling and marketing 
company at the auction235.  
 
                                                 
231 A good example includes FHS (FloraHolland Handling Services). 
232 See image 51.1 depicting the position of the import handlers in the cut flower production network 
233 Imported roses are typically displayed in ‘Dutch auction buckets’. A certain number of buckets 
typically of one variety are then organised and bidded for as ‘lots’. 
234 The timeline summarised in image 1.5. described how Oserian flowers integrated forward by setting 
up East African Flowers to handle its flowers at the auction. A family company, these connections 
between Kenya and the Netherlands were fostered by familial ties, and an understanding of the Dutch 
way of doing business. Historically, for the pioneers of commercial flower farming in Kenya, the 
connection to import handlers at the auction was a key factor for success because having ‘their man’ 
at the centre of the trade in Europe meant that their business interests were well represented and cared 
for. 
235 Marginpar BV is an example of this kind of import handler at the auction that specialises in African 
summer flowers. 
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One critical role of import handlers is in developing a feedback loop with producers on 
the condition of their cut flowers upon import236, which helps to reduce information 
costs. Relationship management between import handlers and the producers which is 
anchored in a deep societal and network embeddedness, is an important aspect of 
sustaining quality and a strong reputation at the auction. Import handlers are often 
smallholders’ only connection to seasonal and marketing trends at the auction. Those 
who work with smallholders’237 produce tend to know the local consolidator-exporters 
on a personal basis and have long-term, capacity-building relationships with them.  
 
5.7. The Dutch Flower Auctions 
This section builds on from the discussion in chapter one which laid out the bifurcation 
of flower export markets. The auction remains the main point of trade for Kenyan cut 
flowers and so its operations are analyzed in detail below.    
 
Players at the Dutch flower auctions 
As the world’s biggest flower market place, the auction is itself a network of actors 
within the flower production network. Section 5.4 outlined the consolidator-exporters 
or ‘big buyers’ and flower providers, who are the main customers. Producer members 
are also a key part of the auction, which was founded on a Dutch growers’ cooperative, 
Verenigde Bloemenveilingen Aalsmeer (VBA), described in the introduction.   
 
The Dutch auctions are both a membership organization and a service agency. They 
handle over 60% of the world’s trade in cut flowers (Phillips 2016). A member of the 
auction is an agent that sells 100% of his produce at the auction, and in turn the 
auctions are obliged to sell all the members’ flowers (Wijnands 2005:37). As discussed 
in the introductory chapter, membership has been historically contested, and was only 
extended to international growers in mid-nineties. Now, FloraHolland consists of 
approximately 5000 members, and more than 7000 flower producers who supply the 
auction with flowers daily (FloraHolland, 2014). Those members who sell part of their 
                                                 
236 This quality function has gained in importance since the auction did away with its quality assurance 
service (mentioned in chapter one under reasons why producers are shifting to direct markets). 
Importers now use Whatsapp to send pictures and immediately communicate the condition of flower 
shipments on arrival.  
237 There are a few enterprising smallholders who export directly to the auction, but they cannot afford 
to travel to the auction and therefore operate on the basis of trust with their handlers.  
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produce to the auction and part to direct markets, have to declare to the auction how 
much they have sold directly and the auction charges them a commission238 on the 
value of that sale.  
 
As a service agency, the Dutch auctions provide world class transaction and logistical 
services. The auction has a dizzying array of specialists including import handlers, 
cold chain and logistics specialists, relationship managers, value addition specialists, 
plant scientists and quality experts. A critical service offered by the auction is the 
provision of a sophisticated, timely, logistical supply chain239. The section that follows 
discusses the auctions’ transaction services.  
 
How the auction works: the clock system 
As of 2008, FloraHolland had three export auctions located at Aalsmeer, Naaldwijk 
and Rijnsburg and three regional auctions at Venlo, Bleiswijk and Eelde shown in map 
1.1. in chapter one. Kenyan producers are most active at the FloraHolland auction at 
Aalsmeer, where they comprise about 50% of producers bringing in flowers daily 
(FloraHolland, 2014)240. In total, there are 38 auction clocks in Holland. In Aalsmeer 
alone, there are on average 45,000 transactions carried out on 14 auction clocks per 
day (FloraHolland, 2014). In 2016, the auction traded 4.6 Billion Euros worth of cut 
flowers (Royal FloraHolland website)241.  
 
The Dutch flower auction matches demand and supply to ascertain the price over early 
morning bids “on the clock” and has been described as the most efficient price-setting 
mechanism for flowers (Kambil 1995). Figure 5.2 shows a picture of the auction screen 
as explained by the auction. Three kinds of basic information displayed – information 
on the next lot to be auctioned, the current lot and the digital auction clock. The digital 
auction clock (right) provides two kinds of information – the minimum price typically 
                                                 
238 Wijnands (2005: 39) noted that, “Members pay a contribution fee of between EUR 450 and EUR 
1350 as well as a 3.9 % provision, whereas non-members pay a 5.9 % provision. 
239 There are internal highways that ferry flowers bought at the auction from the cold stores to cold 
trucks for distribution to various retail outlets and this helps to maintain the quality and precision of 
delivery times. The Dutch auctions also use a network of local short haul European flights and ‘flying 
Dutch men’ who transport the flowers in refrigerated trucks to various retail clients in Europe. 
240 Royal FloraHolland facts and figures 2014. Accessed at 
https://www.royalfloraholland.com/media/3949227/Kengetallen-2014-Engels.pdf 
241 Royal FloraHolland website. Accessed at https://www.royalfloraholland.com/en/about-
floraholland/who-we-are-what-we-do/facts-and-figures 
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marked in blue which is set along the perimeter of the clock’s circumference, and a 
moving red ball which traces how the going price, set by the auctioneer drops when 
the bid begins. Finally, there is also a quality index242.   
 
The auction screen at the Dutch flower auctions 
 
Figure 5.2. 
Source: Author’s own image taken at Royal FloraHolland auction, Aalsmeer  
There is typically an auctioneer who controls the bidding process and he provides 
information on each variety as it appears on the clock. Typical of the Dutch auction 
system, bids on the clock start at the highest price and quickly decline.  Big buyers, 
who are predominantly male243 company representatives place bids by pressing an 
electronic button at their desks. Placing bids for cut flowers is an immensely high-
pressure and time-bound task since buyers have to make decisions worth thousands 
of Euros in two or three seconds.  For this reason, buyers cannot rely solely on the 
quality data provided, but rather they rely on reputation of producers, whom they 
purchase from consistently and often know personally.  This is why maintaining a 
consistent presence at the auction, cultivating informal relationships and being part of  
                                                 
242 A1 (highest quality), A2, B1, B2 (lowest quality) that signifies the reliability of the supplier, minimum 
stem length, number of stems in a bunch, maturity stage, and the way in which a product has been 
cultivated for example, in greenhouses or under artificial lighting. 
243 The author only saw one woman buyer bidding in the auction rooms in a room of about 300 men. 
This profoundly masculine environment is typical of the auction bidding environment.  
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the gentlemen’s trading networks is key for producers to establish stable export 
relationships with buyers. Ketter et. al (2010:9) explains that, “most buyers purchase 
from a group of known sellers and continue to do so until the quality of the flowers falls 
short of the anticipated quality. When this happens, buyers will reconsider from which 
seller they will buy.”  Two innovations have facilitated this the digitalization244 of trade 
at the auction – the remote buying system (KOA) and the development of the auction’s 
financial intermediary services245.  
 
Remote Buying (Kopen op Afstand, KOA) 
KOA enables remote buying and requires a subscription246 to the auction.  Buyers can 
then review, filter and mark in advance the auction’s entire supply of flowers by viewing 
multiple auction clocks all on one screen (Royal FloraHolland website). Capitalizing 
on the decoupling of logistics from the price discovery mechanism (van Heck 1997; 
Kambil & van Heck 1996) presented by the digitalisation of auction services, buyers 
do not have to be physically present to bid at the auction, but can purchase lots of 
flowers through all the auction clocks from their private computers (Cunden & van 
Heck 2004). The KOA service has gained momentum in the last few years and 
currently accounts for 60% of the auction’s turnover (Rikken, 2010). The image below 
shows the wealth of information presented to the buyer in this platform. The various 
auction clocks he is interested in are shown to the left and the one he is currently 
bidding at is in the centre of the screen. Similar to bidding in person, and in light of the 
erasure of the auction’s quality assurance system (discussed in chapter one), the 
successful use of KOA also requires buyers to be very well acquainted with the 






                                                 
244 The digitalization of the auction which is described in chapter one as the second of the “internal 
shifts” that have changed the way flower trading takes place at the auction, is a central part of auction 
operations. Indeed, half of wholesale trade now takes place through online shops (CBI, 2016)244. The 
other two internal turns at the auction were the contestation over the membership of international 
growers, and the series of mergers and acquisitions. 
245 Introduced in chapter one. 
246 A subscription that costs €62.50 per month is required to access this service (FloraHolland 
website) 
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Image showing what the buyers see on the KOA remote buying screen  
 
Figure 5.3. 
Source: Ketter et al. (2010:11)247 
 
The Dutch flower auction as financial intermediary 
Witnessing producers increasingly bypassing the auction248 and shifting towards direct 
markets, the auction sought to maintain its financial dominance in the market by 
offering its services to manage transactions between producers and direct markets. It 
is cheaper249 to make use of this service rather than the full auction bidding process 
‘on the clock’ at the auction. Growers who use this financial intermediary service lower 
their information and enforcement costs250  because the auction always pays its debts. 
This guarantee is especially important given that the industry is virtually contract-free.  
 
Doing business at the auction favours large scale growers whose ability to produce at 
scale enables them to balance out the high cost of doing business at the auction, 
                                                 
247 Power point presentation by Ketter et al (2010: 11) derived from ibid paper. 
248 See chapter 1 section 1.6 on bypassing the auction clock. 
249 Members who choose to interact with the auction this way pay 1.5% as commission, rather than 
the 2.5% charged to full members. Information obtained from auction import handlers – June 2016 
250 Wijnands (2005:75) explained that, “The transparency of the prices at the auction and the 
guarantee that your entire product, if it meets the minimum quality standards, will be sold, means less 
time for information seeking. This does not mean that marketing by auction is also most profitable.” 
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which amounts to between 10—15% of the total cost of production. For smaller 
volumes, marketing costs at the auction can go up to 20% (Wijnands, 2005:39). 
Auction charges add up because they are disaggregated over the various logistical, 
membership and transaction services provided by the auction251. For a big company 
dealing with huge flower volumes this is ideal, but for a small company these costs 
could push them out. This scenario is not new. Thoen et. al (1999) explained that the 
marketing costs and the airfreight costs inhibit marketing of small volumes or low-value 
flowers from foreign growers. The information costs required to keep track of all these 
disaggregated costs, not to the mention the overall high value of all these fees means 
that it is very difficult for a small player who cannot supply large volumes to participate 
and grow. Consolidation of volumes is the key to tackling these costs most effectively.  
 
The power of the auction persists as it is the main price setting mechanism in the 
industry and so retains referential power even as growers move to direct markets. The 
provision of unparalleled transaction and logistical services, and its ability to 
innovatively adapt to changes in the global trading landscape entrench its dominance. 
Viewed from a transaction costs economics lens, transacting at the auction minimizes 
search and information costs, due to bringing transacting parties together and 
ensuring transparency of pricing at the auction. It also reduces negotiation costs 
through the bidding process, and monitoring or enforcement costs because it acts as 
a financial guarantor of payment for members. 
 
Considerations of Kenyan producers’ future engagement with the Dutch 
auction system 
The auction has undergone many changes over the century of its existence, and in 
spite of the shift by growers towards direct markets, it remains the heart of the global 
flower trade. Arguably the auction is here to stay though perhaps not necessarily in its 
current form. The popularity of remote sales in recent times might foreshadow a 
deeper engagement with the technology frontier on virtualization of trade, twenty-four 
                                                 
251 In terms of service fees, producers selling at the auction must pay a bucket fee, trolley fee and a 
lot fee. In terms of membership costs, there is the membership fee which is a commission of 2.5%. 
Then there is a yearly contribution of 600 euros including 0.5% of the member’s first few hundred-
thousand-euro turnover. A few years ago, the auction added a very small yearly contribution, but set a 
high percentage of commission. Currently, the commission is very low, but augmented with a high 
yearly contribution. There is also a capital contribution of 1% on which the auction earns interest for 
nine years and eventually pays the contributor back with interest. In this way, the auction acts as a 
bank by accruing interest. From author’s conversations with auction officials, FloraHolland Aaslmeer 
and Naaldwijk - June 2016. 
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hour online decentralized trading platforms, or perhaps a strategic use of cloud 
systems to further ease information costs. There is already significant innovation in 
the retail end using online technologies252.  
 
In Kenya, what might be seen as a local form of resistance to the power of the auction 
as a monopsony emerged in the draft Horticulture policy of Kenya drafted by the 
Government in 2012. The document put forward that the Government will set up a 
flower auction in Kenya to give Kenyan flower growers greater bargaining power in 
international markets.   
 
“Despite the high volume of flowers marketed in these auctions, Kenya as a country 
does not adequately benefit from her flowers due to various middlemen who could be 
avoided if there was a local flower auction. Therefore, the country will establish a 
regional flower auction in Nairobi [emphasis mine] to tap the economic rent of 
exporting flowers directly from Nairobi flower auction.” – Draft National Horticulture 
Policy of Kenya, 2012: p. 37253 
 
This proposition though politically and conceptually attractive, is encumbered with a 
set of practical challenges. Financially, it would be an enormous cost to set up from 
scratch the bureaucratic, administrative and logistical technologies and networks 
required to operationalize an auction in Kenya that can rival the century-old Dutch 
auction. Secondly, producers value selling their flowers in the Euro-zone and further 
afield so as to capitalize on earnings in hard currencies. The development of a strong 
local and regional market might nevertheless boost the prospects of success for a 
local auction254.  
 
                                                 
252 A few start-ups such as Bloom & Wild, Stems and Daisies and Stems by Tineke in the UK, enable 
customers to customise bouquets online from the supplier which are then packaged for letter-box 
delivery, thereby cutting out the middle-man. Accessed at: Guardian Newspaper 26 Oct, 2017.  Flat 
packed bouquets – The startups transforming the flower trade.  
253 http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/ken147935.pdf 
254 MultiFlora auction in Johannesburg handles about 300 million stems per year for sale to local and 
regional wholesalers and retailers. How we made it in Africa blog. April 15, 2011. Accessed at 
https://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/africas-largest-flower-auction-sourcing-from-across-the-
continent/9226 
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5.8. Conclusion 
Honing in on the first path of the bifurcated market which leads to the auction, this 
chapter has traced the experiences of Kenyan mid-scale farms engaged in rose 
production. It has discussed the roles, capabilities and relationships of the key actors 
who make up the Kenyan cut flower production network including breeders, producers, 
consolidator-exporters, freighters, import handlers and the Dutch auctions. The 
dynamics of the journey from farm-to-vase revolves around maintaining the aesthetic 
value of the flower-as-commodity, and critically its vase-life. This economic lifeline 
demands meticulous management of the time and temperature sensitive dynamics of 
exchange in the supply chain.  
 
The technical detail involved in actors’ roles is emphasized first to showcase the 
knowledge-intensive nature of the flower trade. The industry still relies heavily on 
foreign expertise to handle the science and technology frontier. Thus, the geopolitics 
of the industry’s knowledge economy remains oriented towards Europe. Secondly, the 
relational nature of the firms, as well as the exchange of various forms of knowledge 
in informal networks, through kinship ties and gentlemen’s networks is a testament to 
the deep social and network embeddedness that is characteristic of the cut flower 
production network. Moreover, the heterogeneity of actors showcased here makes a 
strong case for the use of the network metaphor employed in the Global Production 
Networks lens that was discussed in chapter three. We now turn to a discussion of the 
empirical findings from field work among a sample of mid-scale cut flower farms in 
Kenya. 
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6. Building a bouquet?  Variety selection, labour 
management, networks and knowledge in mid-scale 
flower farms 
6.1. Contextualising the mid-scale flower farm sample in the landscape 
of Kenyan commercial flower producers 
 
The flower industry covers over 2600 hectares of land predominantly around Lake 
Naivasha area, which accounts for seventy percent of Kenya’s total floriculture 
production (Kirigia et. al, 2016: 34). This is situated in the higher altitude areas of the 
Central Highlands, and South east of Nairobi as shown in map 6.1. below.   
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The total area of the flower farms in my research sample amounts to 248 hectares 
which is approximately 10 percent of the total area under commercial flower production 
in Kenya. The area of the farm sample ranged from 18 to 60 hectares and averaged 
35.4 hectares with the median farm being 38 hectares in area. To accurately situate 
them within the wider landscape of Kenyan flower producers, I classify them as mid-
scale commercial flower farms255. They are distinct from large scale farms which are 
typically vertically integrated and grow 3-400 million flower stems annually256. The total 
annual production from the sample of seven amounts to approximately 366.2 million 
stems per year which is about seven percent of the total national production recorded 
by the Kenya Flower Council in 2016257. The table 6.1 below summarises the profiles 
of the farm sample258 and is discussed in the next section. 
                                                 
255 See table 1.1 for the basic structure and characteristics of the industry according to scale in 
chapter one 
256 For example, Oserian farm, which is one of the best-known Kenyan large scale flower farms, 
cultivates on over 200 hectares of land around Lake Naivasha, produces 400 million cut flower stems 
per annum and employs over 4000 workers (2016) 
257 This calculation is based on a crude average of 40 stems per kilogram, used as a rule of thumb 
(Gibbon & Riisgaard, 2014). In 2016, the Kenya Flower Council recorded 133,658 metric tons of cut 
flower exports from Kenya to the EU.  
258 Data from the farm interviews was analysed according to their characteristics such as area, age, 
farm ownership, location, type and number of flower varieties grown, whether the farm is specialised or 
diversified in its production strategy, number of farm workers, certifications, choice of end-market 
(auction and direct markets), and use of technology in particular hydroponics for efficient management 
and recycling of water resources. 
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Summary of profiles of the field work sample of seven mid-scale cut flower farms in Kenya 
 
Table 6.1. 
Source: Author’s analysis259  
                                                 
259 The farms have been anonymized due to the sensitivity of the data. The complete list of people interviewed in the mid-scale segment is in appendix B. 
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6.2. Intra-firm dynamics from sample of mid-scale flower farms in 
Kenya 
This section presents intra-firm dynamics emerging from an analysis of field work 
conducted in a sample of seven flower farms. It first provides a prismatic glimpse on 
the profile of the farms, followed by a discussion on the inner life of mid-scale flower 
farms by looking at the two main focal points in flower farms – flowers and people.  
 
Only three of the farms in the sample were based in Lake Naivasha area260 which is 
the hub of floriculture primarily due to the abundant availability of fresh water. The 
other four farms were in the central Highlands261, specifically Thika, Kiambu, Kikuyu 
and Nyahururu. Flower farming has been expanding to these higher altitude areas 
allow for the development of bigger budded, longer stemmed roses (tea hybrids) which 
fetch higher prices, as well as for the abundance of land required for commercial 
production at scale. Overall the seven farms in the sample have been in existence for 
an average of 17.4 years. Five of the farms interviewed were set up in the mid 1990s262 
while two were set up in early 2000s.  
 
In terms of farm ownership, five of the seven farms, which are also the biggest in the 
sample (42, 44 and 60 hectares) are owned by European directors263 some of whom 
have become naturalised Kenyan citizens, while the other two farms are owned by 
Kenya’s political elite. Though illustrative, this profile is typical of the structure of 
ownership264 in the Kenyan flower industry.  
                                                 
260 The number of farms in Naivasha could be between 90 and 108 flower farms depending on whether 
one uses the more conservative estimate of 150 flower farms (IDS, Nairobi) or approximately 180 flower 
farms which includes farms that are part of larger conglomerate farms (Gibbon & Riisgaard 2014: 104) 
261 Two significant flower production areas not represented in the sample are Athi River (south east of 
Nairobi) and the Kericho-Eldoret-Kitale zone in the Rift Valley. 
262 The mid-1990s was perceived as the golden age of Kenyan flower farming when there was minimal 
regulation in terms of codes of conduct and certifications, the global market prices for roses were 
diversifying from chrysanthemums to roses.  This was also prior to the establishment of transfer pricing 
legislation in 2006 (see chapter eight). Kenyan producers who grow predominantly roses were able to 
capitalise on this ‘sweet spot’ in the nineties to establish their enterprises and reap huge profits.    
263 This includes Greek, French, British and Austrian heritage (including an Austrian count).   
264 Mulangu (2016) showed that 77% of flower farms are Kenyan owned and within that, Asian 
Kenyans own just about half (52.2%), White Kenyan 24.6% and Black Kenyan, 23.2%. An 
important category of ownership that is not profiled in the sample is Kenyan-Indians who participated 
in the industry historically as input suppliers, owing to their foothold in Kenyan industry, and have also 
invested in flower farms. The Kenyan-Indian community is also well established in the banking sector. 
More research is required to further understand the Indian community’s participation in the flower 
industry. For example, on the unusual diversification or shift from upstream activities in finance and 
industry, downstream to production. 
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In order to break even, one has to invest at least $2 million to set up on the minimum 
required area (20 hectares) to guarantee returns on investment, the returns to which 
will only begin to be recovered after 3-5 years when the rose crop has begun to mature. 
European owners often have access to long term loans from European development 
banks, patient capital from private equity firms265 or access to family wealth often from 
involvement in industry, to finance the venture.  
 
Patterns of variety selection on mid-scale flower farms266 
Roses constitute about 70% of the total 
volume of cut flowers exported from 
Naivasha (KFC website)267. There are 
however, hundreds of varieties grown 
locally the most popular being 
chrysanthemums, carnations, 
hypericum, statice, gypsophila and calla 
lilies. Because roses are perennial 
crops, the decision of which variety to 
grow is crucial for the success of a rose 
farm268. Therefore, one of the major aspects of a farm’s success in export markets is 
its choice of flower varieties, which is dependent on the altitude and agro-ecology, 
technical production knowledge and demand specificities in target markets.  
                                                 
265 Prime examples of this include New York based private equity firm KKR & Co. which invested $200M 
in 2014 in, Dutch-owned Afriflora farm, the world’s biggest rose farm to support its expansion plans. In 
2017, Sun European Partners bought Afriflora. Accessed at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/kkr-co-
investing-about-200-million-for-stake-in-afriflora-1401908629 
Sun European Partners also purchased Finlays Horticulture in 2015 enabling Finlays to refocus and 
consolidate its forte in the beverages industry. The Swire Group bought the Lamorna farm (British 
owned) in Naivasha. Accessed at: https://www.hortweek.com/sun-european-partners-buys-finlays-
horticulture/ornamentals/article/1368925 
In April 2018, EXEO Capital and Norfund invested US$17 million in Dutch-owned Marginpar Flower 
Group Holdings enabling it to purchase Kenyan flower farm, Carzan, Marginpar Ethiopia and Marginpar 
BV in the Netherlands. Accessed at: https://www.liquidafrica.com/agri-vie-and-norfund-in-flower-co-
investment-deal/ 
266 *All images of cut flowers shown are author’s own taken in various farms during field work 
267 The KFC estimates about 840 hectares of roses are grown in Naivasha of the total 1200 hectares 
nationally. Accessed at http://kenyaflowercouncil.org/?page_id=158 
268 Whitaker and Kollavali (2006:356) noted that, “A poor decision is costly, as the cost of re-planting 
roses can range from $120,000 to $160,000 per hectare.” 
Fig. 6.2.2. Spray roses 
Figure 6.1. Spray roses 
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As shown in table 6.1, the sample of farms had as many 
as 100 varieties and as few as 30 under greenhouse 
production. Spray roses and intermediate roses were the 
most popular sub-variant269, followed by tea hybrid roses. 
Roses are popular because they are highly productive270 
and once a rose stem is planted it will be ready for harvest 
in 8 weeks meaning that in a year, a farm can get 6-7 
‘flushes’ (big harvests).  
  
Based on their variety selection, I categorise four of the seven farms as ‘specialized’, 
two as diversified and one as ‘niche’. Being ‘specialized’ refers to farms’ primary focus 
on roses. The larger farms (40+ hectares) which are transitioning to sales in direct 
markets opted to specialize in roses only, most commonly, intermediates and spray 
roses which are popular supermarket varieties. Growers supplying the boutique UK 
florists and the Russian market also intensively grow premium tea hybrids which grow 
best and most efficiently in higher altitude locations such as the Mount Kenya region. 
Typically, in a large farm’s earlier years, it is considered prudent to build a strong 
reputation by first selling at the auction before launching into direct markets.  
 
Specialization makes it easier to produce consistently at large scale and also to 
standardize the conditions of production in greenhouses, as the quote shows.  
“The reason we grow only roses is because this strategy allows for stability of 
production year-round. This is because we can project, because we have year-
round contracts with the supermarkets. We don’t have other varieties because 
we are specialized. On 23 hectares, we grow 50 million intermediate roses for 
supermarkets like Waitrose and Tesco in the UK.” - Farm Manager, Farm-N. 
                                                 
269 These descriptions pertain to the size of the bud and are outlined in chapter five. Sweetheart roses 
are the smallest roses in the market and have buds that are approximately 2.5 cm and shorter stems 
that are 30-40 cm tall. Super sweethearts’ buds are in the range of 3-4 cm. While there is no 
consensus on Intermediates, these are generally rose buds which measure approximately 3.5 
centimetres (Joop de Hoog, 2001:11). Tea hybrids which are the largest have a bud diameter that 
spans 9 centimetres or more. Spray roses are easily distinguishable because they consist of at least 
three rose buds to one stem. 
270 For example, intermediate roses can produce 200-250 stems per m2 per year.  
 
Figure 6.2. Intermediate rose 
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The two farms categorized as “diversified” also tend 
to be the larger at 60 and 42 hectares respectively. 
Diversification refers to those farms which grow roses 
as one of a range of varieties including summer 
flowers or fillers such as Eryngium and Hypericum 
which are in high demand. Trials, and the technical 
ability to manage a range of varieties are an 
important part of a diversification strategy.  
 
Diversification complicates production practices in 
the green houses because different varieties place 
varying demands on labour intensity. Diversifying to 
spray roses demands more labour than single stem roses, but spray roses are also 
more profitable. The diversity of varieties on a farm depended on the demand and the 
range of target markets, as well as the farm’s capabilities to meet the demand at scale. 
Diversification is an ongoing iterative process with farms constantly evaluating the 
income per square metre of various varieties in order to gauge which varieties to scale 
up and which to possibly uproot.  
 
The two smaller farms (18 ha) opted to “go niche” (Farm-G) and produce unusual 
varieties such as bouvardia and delphinium which are occasion flowers, as well as 
high value spray roses for specialized direct markets while Farm M which is older, less 
technologically savvy and sells predominantly to the auction opted to produce a 
diversity of varieties in order to minimize risk of price fluctuation and/ or suppressed 
prices for standard roses at the auction. Smaller farms are at a competitive 
disadvantage when they produce standard roses because they simply cannot supply 
the large volumes required to make profit when auction margins are so small – often 
0.05 to 0.08 euro cents per stem. For this reason, it makes sense to operate as niche 
producers. Reinforcing this perspective, a receiver-manager of one of the largest 
flower farms in the country explained that,  
“If you are growing something that is really unusual, you will survive. But if you 
are trying to compete in roses, anything that is standard, your days are over.”  
Figure 6.3. Hypericum 
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The longer harvest cycle of some of these niche varieties also means that it is better 
to sell the flowers to the higher end direct markets (such as florists or non-traditional 
markets such as the UAE) and to the auction in the off-season. Variety choice is critical 
in determining a producers’ costs of production, viability in export markets and is 
formative of the grower’s reputation, which is currency in the flower industry. 
 
Operationalising the Global Production Network 2.0 framework to empirical 
findings 
The field work findings of variety selection inform the identification of three intra-firm 
strategies linking to GPN 2.0 framework. These strategies shown in table 6.2. below 
are directly correlated with the farm’s target market. Farms that target the Dutch 
auctions have a ‘diversification’ strategy that allows them to manage the risks of 
auction price fluctuations, capitalize on seasonal booms by supplying a range of 
varieties accordingly. Diversification also minimizes the risk of widespread losses from 
relying on one variety, which is susceptible to being wiped out by pests and diseases. 
The auction has the capacity to absorb a wide range and large volume of 
undifferentiated varieties of flowers to meet all buyers’ demands. Larger, older farms 
also are more likely to have built up production capabilities across a range of varieties 
and so more able to grow them with a measure of success.  
 




Source: Author’s analysis 
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In navigating the shift to direct markets, commercial flower farms have to adapt in both 
what they grow and how they grow. In terms of what they grow, farms that shift to 
supermarkets employ what I characterize as a “Triple S” strategy which is to 
specialize, standardize and scale. The choice is determined in large part by the agro-
ecology and altitude of the farm. ‘Specialisation’ of varieties to for example the higher 
value spray roses and intermediates, typically done by relatively large, experienced 
farms allows them to meet the specified needs of the 
supermarket clients. ‘Standardization’ means being 
able to uniformly supply bouquets or bunches of 
flowers as demanded by retailers, while ‘Scaling’ 
elaborated below, means expanding production so 
that the farm is able to meet the large quantities that 
supermarkets consistently demand and to manage 
peak seasons. The third supply strategy, ‘going 
niche’ is for the relatively smaller farms which cannot 
compete for supermarket supply, or produce at large 
scale.  So, they opt to secure markets with niche demands which includes the supply 
of the aforementioned ‘occasion’ varieties such as delphinium and bouvardia which 
are demanded in limited quantities for special occasions. Smaller farms are also better 
able to provide the required attention to detail necessary to grow unusual varieties. 
Larger farms are not able to compete in this segment as efficiently because of the 
sheer size of their operations which demands that they standardize the production of 
one variety at scale.  
 
Beyond knowing what to grow, the question of how to grow means addressing 
challenges of scale and expansion in terms of land in order to meet the high volume, 
regularised demand from large retailers. An experienced receiver-manager highlights 
the importance of scaling and specialization for the intensification of production and is 
worth quoting at length: 
“[Anonymized farm] was one big farm of 220 hectares. And [the Dutch farm 
owner] changed the rules on growing roses. In a standard arch within a 
greenhouse you will normally get 6-7 rows of product. He squeezed in 8 or 9. 
He stopped doing double drip lines and put in single drip lines. It's cheaper. The 
whole thing was just to get more efficient production and to put out more 
Figure 6.4. Bouvardia 
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volume. Volume, volume, volume. Because he realised the supermarkets, the 
changing tastes in Europe, people are not buying from florists. Supermarkets 
are going to rule this market… He also concentrated on one sector of the rose 
market - super sweethearts… I think that the problem is that too many people 
are growing intermediates and we have flooded the market, prices are falling. 
But, as growing techniques got better, the super sweetheart market has 
expanded. Because you can get more per square metre. [The owner] is now 
operating a 400-hectare farm in Ethiopia and is adding 1 hectare a week of new 
production. He's pumping roses intensively…” – Receiver manager of a large-
scale farm in Naivasha. 
 
In summary, this section has identified diversification, the ‘Triple S’ strategy 
(specialization, standardization and scaling) and ‘going niche’ as production strategies 
for the selection of flower varieties from the field work data. It has provided insights 
into the relationship between variety selection and a farm’s capabilities to meet the 
stringent demands in shifting to direct markets from the auction. The management of 
labour as part and parcel of a farm’s intra-firm strategies is discussed in the following 
section.   
 
Emergent dynamics of labour management on mid-scale flower farms 
The data in this section271 comes from interviews with farm managers and production 
managers. Unfortunately, I was not granted access to speak directly with the general 
farm workers272. Due to reports of frequently strained farm labour relations273, labour 
issues are highly sensitive and politicized.  
 
                                                 
271 *All images taken of workers on flower farms and displayed here were obtained with permissions 
for use and are all author’s own. 
272 The literature on labour issues in flower farms is prolific and is highlighted in the literature review 
273 Recent examples include Business Daily, April 26 2018. Finlays to close Kericho flower farms, 
blames workers' strikes. Accessed at 
https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/corporate/companies/Finlays-close-Kericho-flower-farms--
blames-workers-strikes/4003102-4531770-12hi1yl/index.html. Flowerweb online 2018. Kenya´s Union 
Boss Warns of Nationwide Strike by Flower Farm Workers. Accessed at 
http://www.flowerweb.com/en/article/197741/Kenya%C2%B4s-Union-Boss-Warns-of-Nationwide-
Strike-by-Flower-Farm-WorkersThe Star Newspaper, November 29, 2016. Flower exports hit by 
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The mid-scale flower farms in my sample hired an average of 520 general workers, a 
median of 540, with the biggest number of workers being 850 (on the 38-hectare farm) 
while the smallest (18 hectares) had 125 workers. These workers labour in production 
activities in the greenhouses and in pack-houses in post-harvest tasks. The vast 
majority of workers were women, who were also departmental heads in pack houses. 
Men are typically hired to set up farm infrastructure such as greenhouses and flower 
beds and to manage irrigation systems as technical managers.  
 
Figure 6.5. (left): Male worker in overalls preparing a flower bed in greenhouse 
Figure 6.6. (right): Women workers in protective clothing in a flower farm packhouse 
A key observation was that labour intensivity is determined in large part by variety 
choice as well as the choice of end markets as was outlined above in table 6.2.5. The 
shift towards supermarket varieties and the resultant increase in attention to detail for 
bouquet making and packaging means a ballooning wage bill as explained in the quote 
below.  
“It’s different in terms of labour intensivity. Some varieties are intensive. For … 
spray roses you need to build the heads. To build single headed roses you 
need 10 people per ha, but for sprays you'll need 15. In terms of prices, sprays 
fetch better prices so you need to focus more on sprays than on single roses.” 
– Farm Manager, Farm-S. 
 
Many farms that supply supermarkets produce consistently throughout the year rather 
than ‘flushing274’ which is done so as to obtain a bumper harvest at peak seasons. 
Flushing often requires additional labour to harvest the bumper supply. Due to the 
stability and predictability of demand in direct markets year-round, farms can avoid 
                                                 
274 See chapter five. 
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flushing and maintain steady employment on a permanent basis. Increasingly, to save 
on costs supermarkets require farms to provide bouquets as finished products that are 
‘pack at source’ which means farms often have to hire more workers to deal with 
packing according to customer specifications rather than exporting the flowers as plain 
bunches as farms do when exporting to the auction. The effect of this is a higher wage 
bill as the following quote shows. 
 
 
“[This farm] used to sell through the auction, but three years ago we moved 
entirely to direct markets. Direct marketing means that we sell a finished 
product which is packed according to customer specifications at the farm. This 
means you have to hire more workers which makes your wage bill higher.” - 
Farm Manager, Farm-P. 
 
The interviews conducted with farm managers on the seven farms revealed that the 
wage bill was approximately 30-35% of total production costs. The wage bill is 
compounded with welfare costs which include health insurance, leave days, sick days 
and maternity costs and is second only to freight costs which are on average 40% of 
the cost of production. Workers in the sample farms were paid on average between 
KSH 6-7000 ($60-70) per month not including housing allowances for farms that offer 
them (usually about KSH 2000 or $20) and bonuses for overtime. On average, the 
flower farms hire 18-20 workers per hectare. Though this figure was expected to 
decrease over time as workers became better trained and more efficient, all farm 
managers interviewed complained that worker productivity has not increased over 
time. Managers further explained that despite this, the farms were expected to comply 
with the 10% annual increment on salaries stipulated by accession to the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which is discussed further below.  
 
Variation of the wage bill between farms depends on CBA membership, certification, 
and geography, while within farms depends on the workers’ years of employment and 
role in the farm. For example, pack house workers earn considerably more than 
greenhouse workers due to bonuses, which are calculated on a piece rate over the 
daily target. The privileging of workers upstream mirrors the disproportionate 
distribution of profits in the global flower value chain where retailers retain majority 
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profits while the production end downstream is squeezed. The high wage bill is also 
influenced by competition between farms in various geographies. Farms have to pay 
salaries attractive enough to draw people from working on their personal farms (for 
those in rural Central Kenya), and competitive enough to draw them to their farm rather 
than other comparable farms in the same area. Location affects the living wage275 
especially because workers tend to be migrant labour coming from as far as rural 
Western and Northern Kenya who send money back home. These considerations are 
important because the real wages for newly hired  flower farm workers have fallen by 
an average of 40% between 2004 and 2014 despite CBA negotiations (Anker & Anker 
2017:7)276.  
 
As elaborated in table 6.1. five of the seven farms are signatory to the CBA. Of the 
two farms that are not signatory, one is in Naivasha, while the other is in Central 
Kenya. The Naivasha farm is relatively small at 18 hectares with the fewest workers 
(125) in the sample, while the farm in Central Kenya had the biggest number of 
workers in the sample (850) working on the median 38 hectares. The wage level is 
governed by two main mechanisms - Kenya’s labour legislation on which CBA 
negotiations are based, and industry certification requirements. In 2015277, the 
government set the minimum wage per month at KSH 5,436.90 (approximately $55) 
for unskilled agricultural workers (RoK, 2015).  
 
The CBA specifies a basic minimum wage which is higher than the statutory minimum. 
It also specifies cash allowances and in kind benefits (Anker & Anker 2014). It is a 
binding agreement negotiated every two years between the Flower Growers Group of 
the Agricultural Employers Association (AEA), which consists of 68 commercial flower 
farms representing about 60,000 workers, and the Kenya Plantation and Agricultural 
Workers Union (KPAWU) which is part of the Central Organization of Trade Unions 
                                                 
275 The formal definition agreed upon by the ILO and seven standard setting organisations for a “living 
wage” is “Remuneration received for a standard workweek by a worker in a particular [time and] place 
sufficient to afford a decent standard of living for the worker and her or his family. Elements of a decent 
standard of living include food, water, housing, education, healthcare, transport, clothing and other 
essential needs including provision for unexpected events.”  
276 As Anker & Anker (2017) show, living costs are higher in Naivasha where workers live in urban 
townships, than in Central Kenya where workers live in rural areas. Due to these geographical 
influences, they calculate that the net living wage in Naivasha should be KSh19,305 ($191) as of 
October 2016, while for Mount Kenya area it should be KSh12,852 ($128) per month. 
277 This is relevant for the field work which was conducted in 2016. 
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(COTU). The CBA helps to facilitate farms’ desire for long term, permanent and stable 
work forces to handle the seasonality, scale and quality of supply. Wage increases are 
pegged on the salary band and the years of experience which means that the CBA 
terms favour longer term workers than new hires (Anker & Anker 2014). Farms prefer 
to provide housing allowances278 rather than set up workers’ camps which are often 
an enormous financial burden though necessary given that farm workers tend to be 
migrants. CBA negotiations often fail to reconcile in the set time and farms have to pay 
arrears of 6-8 months279. Recently, there emerged dissension in the ranks within 
KPAWU leading to the formation of a rival trade union280. 
 
Farm managers sometimes view the CBA as a parallel or duplicate system of 
accountability to the many audit requirements of industry certifications which they 
already comply to. Further, managers view KPAWU as pressuring workers into 
membership simply to increase their numbers, rather than to fix existing labour issues 
on farms.  Two farms (Farm-G and Farm-S) that were not signatory to the CBA 
illuminate these views with the quotes below: 
“Because we are audited we have to stick to [labour] standards. And a lot of 
that overlaps with the CBA anyway or is to a higher standard than the CBA, so 
what benefit have my guys got being in the union? I don't see how it's going to 
help them other than cost them money. The problem is the Union here do 
pressurise - they want as many members as possible. But I feel that unless I 
am doing something very wrong our workers shouldn't need to be in the Union.” 
Farm manager, Farm-G. 
 
                                                 
278 According to the 2015-2017 CBA, the housing allowance is pegged at KSh 2000 ($20) for urban 
areas and KSh 1500 ($15) for municipalities. 
279 CBA negotiations completed in July 2017 mean that the starting basic salary will be at least 
between KSh 8,750 ($88) and Sh12,500 ($125) which is a 25% salary increase, and this will be back 
dated two years to July 2015. Accessed at: http://www.flowerweb.com/en/article/194626/Pay-
increase-for-Workers-in-Kenyan-Flower-Farms 
280 Disagreements over efficient representation of issues specific to flower farm workers under 
KPAWU led to the formation and recent registration of a new union – The Kenya Export Floriculture, 
Horticulture and Allied Workers Union (KEFHAU). KEFHAU has since blamed the loss of workers’ 
jobs in the flower sector to double taxation of flower farms at county and national government levels. 
In particular, the Union lamented the loss of 3000 jobs with the closure of Karuturi flower farm, which 
was placed under receivership in 2016 for failure to pay a bank debt. Accessed at: 
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2001247211/concern-over-lay-offs-in-naivasha-
flower-farms 
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“For us, it [the CBA] is not a big issue because we [pay] even above the CBA. 
If you are above the CBA, why should your guys go to the Union? They are 
happy with the terms. But you know those people who go to the Unions, go 
because they feel pressed. Our people are fine. They have never even thought 
of going.” – Farm Manager, Farm-S. 
 
An analysis of the profiles of these two farms (Farm-S and Farm-G) above shows an 
interesting correlation between dissociation from the CBA and the type of certifications 
they subscribe to. Unlike the other five farms which had an array of international 
certifications such as MPS, Fairtrade, FLP etc. which require that farms subscribe to 
or are affiliated with the CBA as a means of safeguarding against labour rights 
violations281, these two farms displayed mainly KFC Silver certification. This is the 
Kenyan industry certification which accommodates both farms which are signatory to 
or affiliated with the CBA, and those that are not in the CBA at all282. The two farms 
therefore have weak institutional checks and balances on their workers’ rights 
protections. From this, one may surmise that the greatest loss is to the enhancement 
of workers’ power that comes with representation through collective action.  
 
Flower farm hiring strategies were influenced by a gender bias in favour of women and 
a bias towards workers with lower levels of education. These strategies were 
concerned with achieving two main outputs - increased labour productivity and 
retention of farm labour with the outcome being higher overall farm productivity. Farm 
managers linked the two complaining that the retention of workers for many years has 
seen worker productivity decline or plateau. This relationship is visualised in figure 6.7. 
below and the tensions embodied in these strategies are later discussed.  
 
                                                 
281 For the most recent examples where flower farm workers in Naivasha go on strike to protest poor 




282 Referring to the Kenya Flower Council Ornamentals Sustainability Standard on unionisation 
(2015:29) “With regard to minimum industry standards; the producer has adopted the CBA which the 
farm is affiliated and/or signatory to, and where the farm has no CBA in place, then the current 
prevailing sector and or industry Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) wages and benefits shall 
prevail”  
  148 
Overall, productivity in flower farms growing roses is measured on the basis of number 
of stems produced per metre square, which translates into revenue per metre square. 
For those in packhouses, it is expressed as the number of bunches or stems handled 
per unit of time, depending on the management system in operation, and is highly 
variable per farm. Farms that produce for supermarkets tend to have more exacting 
targets for packhouse workers to meet due to demands for consistency, uniformity and 
scale. Farm managers outlined training, issuing financial incentives and cultivating 
passion for work as means of enhancing worker productivity. Though promotions 
either within departments or vertically towards management were discussed as being 
merit-based through accumulation of tacit knowledge, underlying gender dynamics 
emerged which are discussed later in this chapter.  
 
Linking farm hiring strategies to two desired outputs – worker productivity and 
retention and associated considerations 
 
Figure 6.7. 
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
One farm owner in Central Kenya explained that productivity gains were experienced 
in Kenya in the 1990s, when flower farms progressed from 30 workers per hectare to 
the current level of 18-20 workers per hectare283, primarily as a result of systematic 
worker training. Paying her workers above the minimum wage helped retain them for 
                                                 
283 Thoen et al. (1999:14) posit that at the end of the 1990s the Kenyan ‘industry standard’ for 
deployment of workers in rose production was 12 production workers per hectare, which however did 
not include sprayers, irrigation/fertigation workers or transporters. This figure would corroborate the 
farm managers’ complaint of decreasing worker productivity over time.  
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over 18 years although their productivity is also now either declining or has plateaued. 
She explained that in the next decade or so, “the machines are coming”. Conversely, 
another farm manager explained that challenges with increasing labour productivity 
were linked to the worker turn-over, even though he elaborated that this is not more 
than ten workers per year. Farm managers interviewed linked the declining or 
plateauing of labour productivity to the constant retraining of new workers with no 
guarantee of their performance. While it is a commonly held belief that flower farms 
constantly generate employment, jobs are generated at the creation of a farm. Due to 
the high levels of retention on average, not many new jobs are necessarily created 
thereafter. Future job creation is linked to farm expansion, which is only possible for 
those farms that are outcompeting others.   
 
Hiring strategies and retention of labour emerged as gendered phenomena on flower 
farms. Part of the rationale of hiring more women as general workers on the farm is 
linked to women’s perceived loyalty or more precisely, their risk aversion. They stay 
longer, because they have ‘more to lose’ as mothers and breadwinners, whereas men 
can entertain risk and readily move to more lucrative jobs. This mentality is captured 
in the quote below by a farm manager who ran the biggest farm in the sample with 
850 workers.  
“If I calculate what [female workers] are doing for me vis-a-vis maternity leave, 
sick leave and what have you, I would still want to stay with them. Because 
[look at] the precision of the cut-point they do for me, the loyalty.... The long-
term benefits for the company are more. A man is flexible, you know he leaves 
work here and goes to work in another place. But a woman, because she has 
children here, you wouldn't hear that she has left and gone to Naivasha to look 
for work. You get?” Farm Manager, Farm-S. 
 
Patriarchal stereotypes were firmly held by some male farm managers and this 
influenced their hiring decisions. Gendered stereotypes around women’s 
meticulousness, docility, nimble fingers, responsibility and obedience which influence 
women’s roles on flower farms have been previously widely explored in the 
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literature284. An excerpt of an interview of the same farm manager above is particularly 
telling of this perspective.  
 
“Ninety percent of [my workers] are women. Womens [sp] are tender. They 
nurture. When [women] are harvesting flowers vis a vis men, men are…what 
can I say… rough. But women are more tender, they don’t damage. The second 
thing. I don't know what happens with ladies and bending to work, they don't 
get tired like men. Naturally, I don’t know. A man needs hard work even if it's 
three or four hours, let him do it quickly and leave. But this other easy kind of 
work where you have to be bent over doing the same thing over and over. Men 
don't like that naturally…for women they get used, it's not a problem…. Mostly, 
these womens [sp], you find they have more responsibility than men. Womens 
[sp] don't lose hope. They just keep pushing. They just say, oh tomorrow God 
will come. You’ll hear this lady has a child waiting for her at home, she has a 
child she is educating. So, to tell her to go on strike, she will think twice. But a 
man! They don’t care… a woman before she takes action, she will have 
calculated all the repercussions of her actions. Most of the time, strikes are 
done by men, not women. Women have too much to lose. So, she cannot take 
risks.” – Flower Farm Manager, Farm-S. 
 
While the stereotypes described above privilege men by placing women in more 
menial roles, gendered hiring strategies have also been used to privilege hiring more 
men in other farms, as well as to inform promotion trajectories. One farm manager 
explained that he hired more men than women because men took fewer days off work 
whereas women asked for more days off in the year for sick leave and for care roles. 
It also emerged that there were informal, exclusive circles of mentorship between male 
managers and promising young male farm workers. The managers groomed the 
young male workers, lobbied for promotions and training opportunities, which enabled 
men to advance up the proverbial career ladder while their female counterparts spend 
decades working as pack house workers. Women who are promoted seem to hit a 
glass ceiling typically as managers of pack houses. The overwhelming lack of female 
                                                 
284 This is covered in the literature review chapter. See for example, (Barrientos 2001; Dolan & 
Opondo 2002; Barrientos et al. 2003; Opondo 2006). 
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farm managers seems to be not a question of lack of skill but rather the effect of being 
locked out of an intensely gendered skills development and promotional structure.  
 
Another emergent correlation on farm hiring preferences is between low levels of 
education and labour retention. A Human Resources manager in Naivasha explained 
that he preferred to hire workers with low levels of education because they were more 
likely to be retained than high school graduates who soon started seeking out more 
favourable employment elsewhere as elaborated in the quote by Farm-N below. 
Further, the bar for basic education as a farm worker appeared to be very low indeed 
as indicated by the second quote. 
“The minimum [requirement] is form four but we are not so strict on this because 
those who come in with form four qualifications cannot be retained for long. 
Within 5 months/ the first contract, most of them want to leave and go back to 
school. However, those with for example primary class 2 do not have any other 
future and so long as they are getting their salaries, they will work for over 20 
years. 34% of their workforce has been with them for over 10 years. 25% have 
been at the farm for over 5 years.” - HR Manager, Farm-N. 
 
“I had a certain lady who could not count when she first came in. She is very, 
very good. Now she can count to 10.  She understands the plants. And that's 
all what's needed.” - Farm Manager, Farm-G. 
 
These findings from two of seven farms on their preference for hiring lesser educated 
workers do not appear to be representative of the industry overall. Ksoll et. al (2011) 
established from figures by Kenyan flower farm managers in 2008, that an average of 
45.9 per cent of Kenyan cut flower workers across 74 farms had some level of 
secondary school as their last stage of education. Gibbon & Riisgaard (2014:121) also 
establish that educational qualifications are increasingly a requirement by human 
resources departments in flower farms though, “a large minority of the workforce has 
been recruited through relations with the existing workforce, and there is no evidence 
[italics mine] that educational qualifications have greater salience than cost in hiring 
decisions.” They suggest that this could mean that there is a greater abundance of 
educated, cheap labour that is altering the labour landscape, an issue worthy of more 
research.  
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A consideration of these practices elucidates two internal contradictions or tensions in 
farm hiring strategies which are linked to the two desired outputs – higher worker 
productivity and higher worker retention. They level of education is central to informing 
these two outputs, as is depicted in the diagram below (figure 6.8.)  
(i) The first tension links the level of education with labour retention (depicted 
on the right). It shows the contradiction in what farm managers say they 
require when hiring - which is secondary school educated workers - versus 
what they want - which is to hire the less educated because they are more 
easily retained in the long term. Farm managers have observed that workers 
hired with relatively high (secondary school certificate) education have low 
retention as flower farm workers.  This relation linking hiring of workers with 
low levels of education to high worker retention is shown in a solid red line 
in the diagram because the farm expectations of high retention of less 
educated workers matches the observed reality.  
 
(ii) The second tension links the level of education with worker productivity 
(depicted on the left). It shows the contradiction in what the farms do - that 
is actively hiring workers with lower education versus what they want, which 
is to observe high productivity in the long term. Farm managers complain 
that workers hired with high (secondary) school education still exhibit low 
productivity in the long term, which is the challenge that farm managers are 
trying to grapple with. This relation linking low level of education and high 
labour productivity is shown in a dotted red line in the diagram below 
because farm expectations of workers with low levels of education showing 
increased productivity in the long term do not match the observed reality. 
 
The farm preference of hiring the less educated in order to retain them for longer, 
overlooks the notion that educated workers are more likely to train better, add greater 
value, and make more informed decisions at work. More research is required to 
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Tensions emerging between farm strategies pertaining to increasing labour 
productivity and retention  
 
Figure 6.8.  
Source: Author’s analysis 
These two tensions reveal pressures that flower farms are under to become more 
competitive while maintaining a socially acceptable corporate image. They also reveal 
tensions in the transitory moment of production, as farms shift to supplying 
supermarkets and therefore growing varieties that require greater attention to detail 
year-round, as well as rigorous quality standards in order to meet certification 
requirements. Flower farms have to be managed as a long-term project that is 
increasingly requiring stable, long term workforces as opposed to seasonal, 
casualised labour. This situation presents new challenges in terms of motivating and 
retaining workers. Though over a decade of reforms, there has been a shift towards 
hiring labourers on permanent rather than seasonal contracts(Gibbon & Riisgaard 
2014). This has been driven by lobbying by KPAWU, labour rights advocates, 
compliance to stringent certification and codes of conduct and direct market pressures 
for consistency of production.  
 
Rather than rely on workers’ education, farm managers believed in the efficacy of their 
on-farm training to boost productivity and to address the shortage of supervisors and 
middle managers critical for the survival of the flower industry. Interviews revealed a 
range from three months of training for those working in greenhouses, to six to eight 
months of training for those in packhouses, to continuous on-the-job training to 
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facilitate promotion from greenhouse work to higher paid or incentivized pack-house 
work.  
 
Kenyan flower farms have historically privileged tacit knowledge gained from on-farm 
training than academic qualifications. This emerged from interviews with African flower 
farm managers who were often recruited through familial connections or informal 
references for entry level and managerial positions in flower farms in the 1990’s285. 
The practice then was to hide their academic qualifications such as university degrees 
in horticulture, for fear of being perceived as a threat. As expected, the more educated 
hires learnt quickly and proved proficient at technical tasks286. Tacit skill acquired 
through training rather than academic knowledge enabled steady though not quick 
progression into management. While acknowledging the importance of training, 
Rikken (2011) explains that training unskilled labour puts a major cost onto any flower 
farm. This observation points to another tension pitting the need and expense to train 
workers especially those with low education levels, against the need to keep costs low 
and to recoup the investment involved in their training.  
 
Beyond training, financial incentives are particularly common in the pack houses to 
stimulate worker productivity. Supermarkets have stringent demands stipulating exact 
volumes, varieties, stem lengths etc. which makes the packing process more intense. 
Packing targets ranged from 120 stems per hour for the auction, to 450 stems per hour 
per day for those exported to supermarkets abroad, meaning that workers can pack 
up to 3,500 stems a day. This is a form of worker exploitation by relative surplus value 
extraction287.  Each stem packed over this attracts a ‘bonus’ of Ksh 2.49.  
                                                 
285 Riisgaard & Gibbon (2014:12) explain that “virtually all farms, even the small ones, appointed 
professional growers to production management functions by 1995–9 – usually Kenyans with 
experience from the largest farms.” 
286 Mose’s (2017) study found that the worker training accounted for 14.7% of flower farm worker 
productivity, second to labour union participation (35.4%) and use of information and communication 
technology (19%). 
287 Selwyn (2016:9) speaks to this by elaborating on how within the capitalist structure, firms are able 
to extract surplus profit from workers by increasing relative surplus value extraction by managing the 
labour process so as to increase productivity within working hours, for example, through packhouse 
bonuses. 
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Figure 6.9. Women workers sorting roses according to stem length in a packhouse 
Figure 6.10. Motivational acknowledgement of target-achieving packhouse worker  
 
Thinking beyond the impact of level of education, training and financial incentives on 
boosting workers’ productivity, a British-Kenyan farm manager on a relatively small 
farm in Naivasha argued that perhaps lower labour productivity in Kenya was a result 
of ‘lack of passion’. He however acknowledged that it is difficult to motivate workers 
engaged in fairly menial and repetitive tasks. Furthermore, beyond the technical 
understanding, workers have little cultural appreciation of the value and meaning of 
the flower commodity they process every day.  
 
This section has discussed the findings on labour in the sample of seven mid-scale 
flower farms which revolve around two main issues – the productivity and retention of 
labour. It discusses farm hiring strategies as influenced by gender and level of 
education of workers, as well as training and the use of financial incentives to motivate 
higher productivity in the labour force. Indeed, all farms raised the challenge of 
declining or plateauing worker productivity over time. The chapter identifies two 
tensions in the farm hiring strategies. First, there is a tension in that while farms say 
they prefer to hire educated workers, in practice the preference is for workers with low 
levels of education who are also retained for longer. The second tension is the farm 
expectation of increased labour productivity over time, while hiring workers with low 
levels of education. Another finding in terms of labour management was that farms 
privilege tacit knowledge acquired through on-farm training over educational 
qualifications for career progression among farm workers. Intra-firm promotions 
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emerge as gendered practices that evolve out of informal male networks of mentorship 
and sponsorship.  These findings show that there is a history of employment in this 
sector that is influenced by hiring strategies that default to pre-capitalist forms of 
contracting which privilege familial referencing, tacit knowledge and gendered norms.  
 
Having outlined intra-firm strategies on variety selection and labour management, the 
section that follows discusses the critical inter-firm relationships between flower farms 
and consolidator-exporters.  
 
6.3 Inter-firm dynamics of mid-scale flower farm networks showcasing 
relationships between flower farms and consolidator-exporters  
This section hones in on the relationships between flower farms and the crucial ‘focal 
firms288’ which perform the twin roles of consolidation and export, thereby facilitating 
access to new and lucrative direct markets. Consolidation in the cut flower industry is 
a service offered by specialized firms and it provides an interface of export 
preparedness by converting cut flower produce harvested by farms into commodities 
ready for international export markets. Different markets have different 
requirements289 of consolidators. Consolidator-exporters form strategic relationships 
with buyers in export markets, consistently supplying them with specialized varieties 
depending on demand and seasonality with the goal of becoming preferred suppliers 
in the long term. The power of consolidator exporters therefore comes from their 
market and technical knowledge, and network embeddedness which enables them to 
connect a variety of producers to big buyers in direct markets. Their command of 
economies of scale enables them to smooth out supply and demand in global flower 
markets.  
 
                                                 
288 In chapters two and three, this thesis discusses the employment of Dembinski's (2009 :121) concept 
of ‘focal firms’. “A firm plays a focal role (and can be labeled a “focal firm”) when it consistently operates 
value adding processes on both sides of the focal point within a chain, i.e. both in production and in 
marketing/distribution.” He further explains that the power of these focal firms may come from their 
command of economies of scale (as in automakers) or in standard setting (software). 
289 For example, those selling at the Dutch auction normally export bunches of single varieties in boxes 
packed with anything from 150 to 500 stems. Those selling to direct markets engage consolidators or 
preparing bouquets that match specific, standardized orders when selling to direct markets.  
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I interviewed representatives from three different kinds of consolidator-exporters who 
source from mid-scale flower farms during my field work in Kenya as summarized in 
table 6.3.  
Profiles of three consolidator- exporters in field work sample 
 
Table 6.3. 
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
Dutch Flower Group  
The information on this case study is derived from an interview with a member of staff 
at the Dutch Flower Group (DFG) based in Nairobi290, as well as secondary sources. 
The DFG is a giant multi-national, family-owned firm with global networks, sourcing 
from over 30 countries, and supplies flowers to 60 countries the world over. It is a 
conglomerate comprised of thirty companies and is the world’s largest specialised 
flower trading firm291, and the biggest supplier to retailers in Europe. It is also the 
biggest trader at Aalsmeer Dutch flower auction. Its portfolio of buyers includes large 
scale, retail, importing wholesalers, wholesale businesses, retail chains and online 
businesses.  
 
                                                 
290 DFG has had offices in Nairobi since 2003 
291 DFG supplies 60 million stems of cut flowers, 5 million bouquets and 5 million plants a week and 
had an annual turnover of € 1.5 billion in 2017. Accessed at 
https://www.dutchnews.nl/news/2018/04/dutch-flower-group-posts-record-e1-5bn-in-sales-despite-
brexit/ 
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DFG provides customized orders of cut flowers and bouquets to clients and also 
coordinates logistics, information and R&D to introduce new flower varieties matched 
with consumers’ changing demands, as well as to innovate in cold chain management. 
It provides quality control by transmitting information on specificities required by the 
retailer to the growers. DFG ensures there is transparency and compliance to 
certifications among producers to facilitate retailers’ sustainable sourcing 
requirements. It also facilitates cold chain management to maintain the integrity of the 
cut flowers as it links grower to retailer. Panalpina Airflo292, the specialist air freight 
company is one of its portfolio companies which coordinates the time-sensitive cold 
chain logistics from Nairobi to various global export markets. DFG has also been 
responsible for successfully piloting sea freight of carnations from Kenya to the Dutch 
auction.  
 
Only farms with the required certifications in target markets can supply the firm. It has 
sourcing agreements (not formal contracts) with multiple large and mid-scale farms 
which allows it to be flexible but also consistent in its sourcing. By having a vast 
network of growers, the firm is able to maintain consistency of supply even when there 
are disruptions to supply due to natural causes, changes in seasonality or production 
challenges. It also ensures a steady market for producers thereby alleviating the stress 
of seeking market access.  
 
DFG also displays deep societal embeddedness (Hess 2004)293 within the Kenyan 
market in the close, capacity building relations it develops over time with producers. It 
also plays a critical role of transmitting information coded in sourcing agreements from 
buyers abroad to producers in Kenya as the quote below shows. 
“We shape the presentation of a bouquet and how quickly can it be delivered. 
What is the temperature of this bouquet? Is the presentation based on the 
customer specification? … for the ones going to the supermarket, we have to 
go to the farm and make sure that they follow the specifications. If there is a 
new customer that we have and they want this size of bouquet and not that 
                                                 
292 Airflo is part of the consolidator firm’s portfolio of companies. A majority share of Airflo was 
purchased by Panalpina World Transport Holding in 2015.  
293 Embeddedness is an analytical category from GPN 1.0 explaining the ways in which firms are 
anchored and is discussed in chapters 2 and 3 as territorial, network and societal embeddedness. 
See appendix A for the summary table operationalising the concept within the flower industry 
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size, we explain that to the farms. Some farms might not otherwise understand 
what the customer wants. But because we are experts in that field we will go to 
the farm and explain to them exactly what the customer wants. We will then 
send a sample box which will be sent to the market and then the market will 
say, we like this, or not.” - Quality Manager, DFG. 
 
These are all very knowledge-intensive capabilities that demand both technological 
proficiency and strong network embeddedness.  The firm places great emphasis on 
its family-ownership294 and societal embeddedness in a long Dutch tradition of flower 
trading. It is interesting to note that the diversity of its portfolios and large number of 
companies mirrors the great diversity of varieties in the flower industry. The 
conglomerate also exhibits remarkable network embeddedness as a result of its 
enormous market share and influence over the trading landscape.   
 
The Flower Hub 
The second case study emerging from field work is more locally grounded. This 
section is informed by an interview with a manager at Flower Hub and secondary 
sources online. The Flower Hub (FH) was set up as a marketing hub through the 
collective action of four mid-scale flower farms, three of which were in my field work 
sample. The three farms have European directors, which has ramifications for 
embeddedness to European flower trading networks, access to capital and 
management style.  FH was set up to strengthen the member farm’s sales in direct 
markets. However, flowers such as hypericum and eryngium are still sold through the 
auction because they are in low supply on the market and still fetch good prices. 
 
The Flower Hub set out by marketing hypericum, a filler, in Japan and then in Europe. 
In addition, the consolidator sources smaller quantities of summer flowers such as 
gypsophila from about ten smallholder outgrowers (on 2.5 hectares of land). FH farms 
cover 150 hectares collectively and supply 2.5 million stems per week to direct 
markets. They supply a wide range varieties including roses, hypericum, eryngium, 
                                                 
294 DFG was formed as a merger between the family Van Duijn (Van Duijn Group) from the Westlands 
area and family Van Zijverden (OZ Group) from Aalsmeer in The Netherlands. Van Duijn Group was 
founded in 1969, OZ Group started in 1959. Accessed from: 
http://www.florinews.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=72 
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molucella, solidago, alstroemeria, lilies, carnations and many others. As its networks 
and reputation grew, the consolidator began supplying roses to Europe, Ireland, 
France and the US. They also diversified from supplying wholesalers to the retail 
market, which is indicative of the flower industry marketing trend overall. The firm has 
a sales team and a marketing team in Nairobi as well as a logistics team, quality and 
technical teams which are based at the airport. Flower Hub partners with Kuehne + 
Nagel, the international logistics firm to manage the logistical coordination between 
grower and buyer.  
 
The firm capitalizes on four main capabilities - its powers of consolidation (internally 
and through select outgrowers) of a wide range and volumes of flower varieties, value-
addition in terms of bouquet creation295, an in-depth knowledge of niche markets and 
strong local and global inter-personal networks which attest to its societal 
embeddedness.  For example, the firm has come to understand the peculiarities of 
Japanese consumer tastes296 such as longer stems, bi-colour flowers and slower 
changing tastes. The Flower Hub grew based on the relationships its directors had in 
Japan and through organized farm visits, attending flower expos globally, and visits to 
new markets such as in the US.  On the producer end, the Flower Hub’s successes 
are testament to the power of informal personal networks in securing sourcing 
arrangements in the flower industry as the quote below illustrates.  
“We do not use contracts to secure sourcing deals. These are based purely on 
relationships. We have a team of people who travel the country to build strong 
relationships with flower farmers. I have not heard of people who break or 
renege on their agreements because they have found a better deal. People in 
the industry have that mutual understanding and respect for each other.” - 
Flower Hub manager. 
The Flower Hub has an informal agreement with the four member farms, to source a 
specified number and variety of stems per week. The informality of the agreement 
allows for the flexibility to source from external farms in case of a supply shock.  
 
                                                 
295 The firm’s specialized bouquet-making adds up to 20% on export value of its cut flowers 
296 The Flower Hub is now entering into the US market and they are finding that Americans are very 
interested in short stems (50 centimetres) and finished bouquets. Europe still prefers 50- 60 cm stems 
while in Japan, they like 60-70 cm stems 
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The Flower Hub’s strengths are to be found in “complete control of the supply chain – 
from the planting and harvesting to the packaging, delivery and distribution” (Flower 
Hub website). This is characteristic of the dynamic of consolidation and depicts a 
hierarchical mode of governance, for more efficient coordination of trade in the flower 
industry. The case study epitomizes collective power among mid-scale farms, which 
is harnessed to develop the Flower Hub as a ‘focal firm’, that creates that vital link 
between between production and marketing.  
 
Independent local consolidation enterprise 
Operating at a smaller, more local scale is the third case study of an independent local 
consolidator. This section details findings from an interview with the director of the 
firm, whose name has been anonymized due to the sensitivity of the information 
shared. The firm is a private enterprise set up by a former flower farm management 
official with two decades of experience in the sector. She sources a variety of flowers 
including roses and spray roses which account for about 80% of her portfolio, lilies, 
carnations, gypsophila and hypericum from about thirty-two mid-scale and eight large-
scale commercial farms in Kenya. She does not source flowers from smallholders 
because of challenges with consistency of volumes and quality and lack of the required 
certifications. She does not have formal sourcing agreements as such but sources 
about 1 million stems per month from certified farms. All the flowers sourced are sold 
to direct markets in Japan, Australia, Europe and West Africa. None are sold to the 
auction. The consolidator also engages in value addition in the form of dyed flowers 
and preparation of premium bouquets which fetch higher prices in target export 
markets.  
 
The main focus of the interview with this local consolidator was on the challenge of 
VAT297. Kenya’s Value Added Tax Act of 2013 (VAT) took effect and meant that cut 
flowers bought locally accrued a 16% VAT charge over their sales price. This bill has 
increased the price of flowers and effectively priced them out of international markets. 
The consolidator complained of losing her Australian customers to Colombian and 
Ecuadorian firms which have no such VAT costs attached to their flowers. Since local 
                                                 
297 Discussed in detail in chapter eight. According to the Kenya Flower Council, the Kenya Revenue 
Authorities owe Kenyan flower farmers KSh 2 billion (approximately $20 million) in VAT refunds which 
are years overdue. The consolidator has been lobbying the government for two years to repeal or revise 
the VAT law to encourage local consolidators who provide market access for flower growers. 
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sales of flowers are minimal, the government does not make much money from 
collecting the VAT. Flower farms which charge the consolidators the VAT also do not 
gain much because they put in VAT refund claims from the government.  
 
In order to deal with this challenge, the local consolidator has devised a way to 
circumvent paying the VAT with the possible collusion of foreign importers. Flowers 
for export are zero-rated and are exempted from VAT. The consolidator set up a 
parallel export firm which submits form C17298 to the government, which records for 
example that fifteen tons of cut flowers were exported to a customer in the UK. This 
transaction does not accrue VAT charge because the flowers are registered as export 
commodities. The importing company in the UK and the local consolidator who 
prepared the consignment then set up a separate line of communication that details 
100 boxes (each box weighing 10 kg) of flowers collected from 15 farms amounting to 
15 tons of flowers and the consolidator will get paid for the service rendered. This 
situation can be generalized to other local flower consolidators in Kenya who operate 
in a similar system and also devise means of evading VAT payment. This scenario is 
symptomatic of the invisibility of local flower consolidators in the eyes of regulators, 
and also shows that the industry bureaucracies filter out smaller players leaving larger, 
higher capitalized players who can absorb the costs of compliance without going 
under. This regulatory power is inadvertently pushing industry actors towards 
consolidation.  
 
This case study shows that in the consolidation business, size and collective power 
matters. Although smaller players can be nimble actors in direct markets by 
capitalizing on the strength of their inter-personal networks and professional 
reputations, they must deal with crippling hurdles in the regulatory context such as the 
VAT tax that limits their competitiveness and ability to capture value. Furthermore, as 
a smaller exporter, it is unlikely that the firm has the status of ‘focal firm’ to any one 
flower farm or retailer. Rather, the firm may be part of a diversification strategy of 
export by mid-scale farms, and a supplier of limited volumes of niche flowers to a 
variety of retailers abroad.  Similar to the other two case studies, this one also 
highlights the importance of societal embeddedness to a consolidator. Being the 
                                                 
298 C17 is the form submitted to customs authorities declaring goods for export in order to obtain 
export clearance 
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Kenyan owned firm in the sample of three, it matters that the director had over twenty 
years of experience in the sector, which provided her with the knowledge and critically 
the networks required for the coordinating role.  
 
6.4 Conclusion on inter-firm dynamics  
The three case studies of Kenyan consolidator-exporters in the cut flower production 
network shed light on the role of consolidator-exporters as “focal firms” (Dembinski 
2009)  of the flower trade linking producers in the global south to buyers located in the 
lucrative direct markets the global north.  As focal firms, they help producers navigate 
the shift from the auction to direct markets by managing the consistency of flower 
volumes and quality, cold chain logistics and the coordination costs of seeking market 
access. For buyers, they are responsible for smoothing out any inconsistencies in 
supply and reducing the coordination costs of seeking out reliable, high quality 
producers. Though operating at vastly different scales in terms of volume, geography 
and reach, and with varying capabilities, the three consolidator-exporters display deep 
societal embeddedness among growers, solid network embeddedness within export 
markets, and thorough knowledge of market specificities and the dynamics of 
production, logistics and trade in the flower industry.   
 
A key generalizable observation from these networks is the “cascade effect” (Nolan et 
al. 2008:43) which simulates a wave of consolidation in the industry. For the 
consolidator as the main point of contact for the lead firm therefore, size matters. Very 
large consolidators such as the Dutch Flower Group profiled have deeply integrated 
and vast networks of growers to source from, innovative technical and logistical 
capabilities that enable them to meet demands consistently and on time. Smaller 
consolidator firms appear better suited to non-traditional markets which demand 
smaller quantities of niche varieties, and which can also provide the personable 
relationships desired by smaller producers and buyers. As a path of least resistance, 
they might also do well supplying specialized wholesalers such as florists or garden 
centres who are not as demanding of certifications. Without government support or 
incentives, it is likely that local consolidators under the burden of high VAT, are likely 
to continue employing strategies of circumvention regulation in order to stay in 
business, or be relegated to marginal markets.  
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6.5 Emergent knowledge disjunctures in the cut flower production 
network sample 
This section discusses the cut flower production network as a knowledge intensive 
industry. It highlights existing and missing innovation and knowledge relationships 
between industry actors and various local centres of knowledge production such as 
universities and research centres. The perspectives illuminated are from interviews 
with farm managers and other industry ‘knowledge agents’ such as agronomists and 
researchers. One outstanding area of research is perspectives from within the Kenyan 
academy itself on its relationship to the flower sector, which I was unable to obtain due 
to challenges accessing local academics as explained in the methodology chapter. 
The academy position was alternatively deduced from documentary analysis299.  
Subsequent research done by Bolo et al. (2006) on research priorities for Kenya’s cut 
flower industry makes the case for farmer demand-led research in Kenyan floriculture. 
They however acknowledge challenges such as conflicting mandates between the 
private and public sectors. Private companies have an incentive to protect their trade 
secrets so as to enhance their competitiveness, while the public-sector shares 
knowledge for the public good, and was also found to be too slow, bureaucratic and 
poorly funded to respond to the urgent needs of the sector.  
 
The main way in which flower farms interact with Kenyan agricultural universities is 
through hosting interns who are studying for various B.A programs in horticulture300.  
The internships are not systematically designed and in some years, there are no 
interns put forward. One of the farms interviewed was in the process of setting up a 
management trainee program to better structure the interaction with universities. Farm 
managers critiqued the University horticulture curriculum for being ‘too theoretical’, 
‘not innovative enough’, ‘too general’ and for being ‘outdated’ and ‘irrelevant’ for 
industry needs. University students spent too little time working hands-on in the farms 
and were therefore not necessarily lucrative hires for the farms, with the only 
advantage being that they learned quickly. The common proposals in this regard were 
two-fold: university staff should spend time on flower farms developing the curriculum 
                                                 
299 The literature overall establishes, “weak linkages in interactions between Kenyan flower farmers 
and the local research system, causing the floriculture industry to rely on external knowledge to solve 
the industry’s problems” (ATPS & CTA 2004) The African Technology Policy Studies Network (ATPS) 
and the Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA) (2004) 
300 These include the Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (JKUAT), University of 
Nairobi College of Agricultural and Veterinary services (CAVS), Moi University and Egerton University 
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in line with the realities in the industry, and students should spend as much time 
learning theory as gaining practical knowledge in the flower farms. Flower farms also 
interact with Kenyan universities through targeted research initiatives301 typically 
structured abroad for the purposes of identifying production efficiencies on commercial 
farms.  
 
In terms of research collaboration, the main relationship for flower farms is with 
breeding302 and propagation companies for the development of new, more robust and 
longer lasting varieties. Public research bodies work on slower research pertaining to 
pests and diseases, or domestication and commercialisation of local varieties for 
smallholder farmers, rather than commercial farms that can afford to work with private 
labs for their commercial interests. For example, the Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate 
Services (KEPHIS) works closely with the flower industry mainly on researching pests 
and diseases. The Kenya Agriculture and Livestock Research Organisation (KALRO) 
had a donor-funded floriculture research program in the late 2000s to strengthen the 
participation of Kenyan smallholders in the production and marketing of summer 
flowers. This research program has no perceived linkages with the mid-scale cut 
flower sector. 
 
Two notable attempts at localizing R&D that emerged from field work among mid-scale 
flower farms are the Crop Nutrition Laboratory Services (CROP NUTS) which came 
up in various interviews as a good, local private laboratory that conducts high quality 
greenhouse soil sampling analysis, so that farms do not have to fly out their samples 
to Europe for analysis. The second example is Pure Water Solutions Limited, a water 
filtration recycling firm. Both these R&D firms are owned by directors of British origin, 
which is correlated with access to European capital and networks. While research 
partnerships clearly exist in isolated cases, the challenge appears to be a lack of 
systematic, strategic institutional collaboration.  
                                                 
301 In 2013, Wageningen UR Greenhouse Horticulture and DLV Plant in the Netherlands partnered 
with Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology and Van den Berg Roses in Kenya to 
evaluate coco-peat based hydroponics in rose production. They found that the cocopeat system 
performed better than soil in number and weight of stems produced (Ketter et al. 2015). 
302 Some of those mentioned which had bases in Kenya included Stokman Rozen, Olij, Kordes 
Roses, WAC international among others. The general relationship between breeders and growers is 
elaborated in chapter five which explains in sum that while Kenya has well trained plant scientists, 
they are mainly concerned with the mechanics of propagation and trialing rather than the science of 
innovation of new flower varieties which still takes place in Europe. 
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Besides building relationships with research institutions, flower farms are also sites of 
innovation and iterative research and design in production. Farm-R was outstanding 
in this regard and had been referred by the Kenya Flower Council as one of the most 
innovative pioneering flower farms in the country. Through trialing and adopting cutting 
edge technologies, the farm has tackled the challenge of water use, sub-soil pollution 
and energy inefficiencies in greenhouses. Farm-R pioneered303 hydroponic use in the 
mid-nineties so as to prevent sub-soil pollution, while also making it possible to 
produce cut flowers on murram soil. Lastly, the farm manager explained that the farm 
developed and pioneered a unique barcoding system that digitizes the traceability of 
each stem that is exported from the farm. To finance all these capital-intensive 
innovations, the French-owned firm sources for investment from a range of European 
sources notably long term, low interest (2-4%) agricultural loans from the Agence 
Française de Développement as well as the German Development Bank.  
 
The africanization of farm management over the last twenty years was noted as a 
means of transferring knowledge. In the nineties, only a small portion of farm 
managers were African but currently most flower farms are managed by Kenyan 
managers. Farms also share information amongst themselves primarily through 
exchange of technical staff which has contributed to raising the overall standard of 
production. Being well respected in the industry for their experiences with consistently 
delivering quality, Kenyan farm managers are also frequently hired to set up and 
manage flower farms in Ethiopia. In this sense, the flow of knowledge circulates not 
only in enclaves of production nationally, but also regionally. Overall, the knowledge 
that these farm managers have is not systematically institutionalized in the local 
economy, which undermines the efforts of endogenisation304 (Melese & Helmsing 
2010) of any potential gains over time. This reality points once again to the character 
of the industry that privileges tacit knowledge embedded in familial circles or 
gentlemen’s networks.  
                                                 
303 The farm was also the first to invest in and pioneer the water filtration and recycling system by an 
innovative start up known as Pure Water Solutions (mentioned above) thereby managing to save on 
post-harvest chemicals, water and time. 
304 Melese and Helmsing (2010) argue that endogenisation “depends both on the degree to which FDI 
has an interest to draw on domestic firms, enter into relationships and share technologies; and on the 
interest and ability of domestic firms to take up such opportunities, and on the creation of supporting 
institutions and infrastructures to make this take-up possible.” 
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Field work interviews among flower farm managers showed weak linkages between 
the industry and local businesses and a heavy reliance on imported inputs, technology 
and R&D. Chemicals and fertilizer are bought from local subsidiaries of giant multi-
national firms305 while the water infrastructure306 and greenhouses307  are generally 
imported from German and Israeli manufacturers. Attempts to source for basic inputs 
such as cocopeat308 have unfortunately failed due to challenges with quality 
management and with production at scale. As illustrated, in many ways, the industry 
remains an enclave of production that utilizes mostly local labour and natural 
resources while importing all the major technological inputs, and there are few 
systematic, institutionalised efforts to support the endogenisation of introduced 
technologies.  
 
In sum, the transfer of technology and the development of local R&D capacity are 
intricately linked to the question of finance and corporate ownership. In the sample of 
seven farms, ownership is split between directors of European origin and the Kenyan 
political class309. While the four decades of cut flower production in Kenya have led to 
the development of a body of technical experts in floriculture, and recently the 
localization of flower variety trialing by European breeding companies, the institutional 
delinking of the industry from local centres of knowledge production undermines 
endogenisation of industry R&D. Similar to the Ethiopian case, what we see are 
elements of ‘enclave formation’ where the industry generates knowledge and use of 
                                                 
305 Elgon Kenya Limited is a major input supplier including chemicals, fertilisers, greenhouse sheeting 
and packaging materials for the flower industry. It is the exclusive distributor for MNCs like BASF, 
Dupont, Sumitoma, Cheminova, Excel Crop Care Ltd, UPL, Chemtura, Russel IPM & Sinochem Ningbo 
while on Non-exclusive basis for Bayer E A Ltd, Syngneta E A Ltd, Arysta life Sc.,  
Smaller suppliers include Topserve East Africa which distributes products from Bayer Ltd.  
306 The FAO (Mendes & Paglietti 2015) identified the flower industry as providing excellent prospects 
for international companies interested in expanding irrigation investments in the near future. 
307 Amiran Kenya is responsible for setting up and maintaining 90% of the greenhouses for Kenya’s 
flower industry. It is part of the Balton CP group of companies headquartered in the United Kingdom 
and spread throughout Africa and Israel. 
308 Roses are propagated on a natural fibre made out of coconut husks known as cocopeat, which is 
imported from South East Asia. 
309 This ownership structure raises the issue of endogenisation which is the process of building local 
capacities,  as contrasted with enclave formation (outlined in the Ethiopian case in chapter one) (Melese 
& Helmsing (2010:2) This tension between industry and the territory in which it is embedded is 
synonymous with the concept of “strategic coupling” in Global Production Network Theory (Coe, Hess, 
Yeung, Dicken, et al. 2004) which explores the complex ways in which GPNs and regional development 
interact. Discussed in chapter three.  
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new technologies but circulates it only within its borders demarcated by familial ties or 
gentlemen’s networks, and bound by the constraints and interests of capital. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the empirical findings from field work among a sample of 
seven cut flower farms in Kenya. The findings are presented in three categories 
detailing: (1) inter-firm strategies of variety selection and dynamics of labour 
management (2) intra-firm relationships between flower farms and consolidator-
exporters as focal firms in the production network and (3) emergent disjunctures in the 
knowledge economy of the cut flower production network. 
 
The research identified three strategies of variety selection among mid-scale flower 
farms that pertain to the choice of market and these include diversification for those 
targeting the auction, a “triple s” strategy of specialization, standardization and scaling 
for those targeting supermarkets and a strategy of ‘going niche’ for those targeting 
specialized direct markets. The emergent labour dynamics that were identified include 
tensions in hiring strategies that centre the level of education of workers in relation to 
worker retention and worker productivity. Flower farm managers argued that they 
preferred highly educated (secondary school) workers however, in practice they prefer 
to hire less educated workers because they can be retained for longer. The second 
contradiction was that farm managers hired less educated workers and expected high 
work productivity in the long run. However, the observed reality and a cause for great 
concern among them was that worker productivity was either declining or plateauing 
over time.  The field work also showed the persistence of hiring strategies that default 
to pre-capitalist forms of contracting which privilege familial referencing, tacit 
knowledge over technical knowledge, and gendered norms.  
 
In the second category of findings on intra-firm strategies, the research showcased 
three case studies of consolidator-exporters including a multi-national firm, a joint 
venture among four mid-scale flower farms, and an independent consolidation 
enterprise. The findings characterized the firms as ‘focal firms’ (Dembinski 2009) due 
to critical role they play in linking producers to buyers. Their power is centred on their 
thorough knowledge of all nodes in the production network from production, quality 
checking, cold chain logistics, marketing and establishing export markets in direct 
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markets. They exhibit deep social embeddedness (Hess 2004), and network 
embeddedness in markets which enables them to coordinate a production network 
that privileges informal ties, familial and gentlemen’s networks. Lastly, the research 
establishes that size and economies of scale matter for consolidator-exporters.  As 
the sector exhibits the ‘cascade effect’ (Nolan et al. 2008) due to consolidating 
pressure from supermarkets, large players such as the Dutch Flower Group stand a 
better chance of becoming preferred suppliers. Smaller players have to rely on 
strategies of circumvention to supply niche markets and capture some value.  
 
The field work shows that the cut flower sector is a knowledge intensive industry. 
However, while there are isolated cases where knowledge is transferred, there are 
overall prevalent institutional disjunctures between the sector and local research 
centres. This undermines the possible endogenisation of industry R&D. Knowledge 
from the flower industry circulates within seemingly impervious confines of informal, 
familial trust networks, and is bound to the interests of capital, which is 
characteristically foreign, and political in origin. The chapter that follows leads us to 
the smallholder flower farmers’ narratives of navigating an industry dominated by 
giants.  
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7. Survival amidst giants: The strategies and networks of 
small scale flower farmers in Kenya 
 
7.1. Introduction 
The existence of smallholder farmers in the flower industry outside of the global North 
is rare. Indeed, in Africa only Kenya has smallholders actively exporting cut flowers. 
As noted by Mather (2008:44): “in other African countries, including Uganda and 
Tanzania, there are no smallholder cut flower farmers”. Kirigia, Betsema et al (2016) 
also found smallholders growing flowers only in Kenya. Amongst Kenya’s global 
competitors in Latin America, Mytelka (2009)310 established that in Colombia for 
example, smallholders have been absorbed as labourers in large scale farms. In 
Ecuador, Korovkin (2003) noted that flower production is entirely dominated by large 
scale farmers leaving smallholders with little opportunity. 
 
Smallholders differ dramatically from large scale farmers in limitation of capital, 
technology and scale. They grow summer flowers or ‘fillers’ (so named because they 
are used to fill out bouquets of roses) outdoors, with minimal technology except 
perhaps basic drip irrigation on an average of a quarter acre of family owned land. 
Smallholders in the flower industry exist in a sector dominated by giants of industry – 
technologically sophisticated, vertically integrated entities growing mostly roses in high 
tech greenhouses on plantations that are hundreds of hectares in size, and that 
employ thousands of workers. These differences set smallholders apart from large 
scale farms in what is a bifurcated flower production network. This research found no 
systematic evidence of partnerships between small and mid-scale farmers beyond 
small orders made for summer flowers required to complete special order bouquets 
for supermarkets311. This is attributed to the unstandardized quality of their processes 
of production and post-harvest care which compromises the quality of the flowers as 
the quote below shows: 
“Smallholders have very many crop husbandry issues. For example, their farms 
are full of weeds and they do not grow their flowers on raised beds. These 
                                                 
310 Mytelka (2009:10) noted the proletarianization of smallholders in Colombia. He explains, “As roses 
came to dominate flower exports, traditional micro-farmers (campesinos) with farms of only 0.5 to 1.5 
hectares, turned to supplying labour as their main activity.” 
311 The Flower Hub mentioned in chapter six works with a few select smallholder outgrowers to source 
summer flowers for special order bouquets. 
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simple practices have big effects on the overall quality of the flowers produced. 
Smallholders also have issues with packaging. They use the cheapest and 
poorest quality of boxes to pack their flowers.  Sometimes the boxes arrive 
upside down and the flowers are damaged because they are not secured within 
the boxes.” – Local independent consolidator-exporter. 
 
Not only are smallholders in this industry marginalised, they are also few in number. 
The last overall estimation of smallholder flower farmers placed them at between 5 
and 10,000 farmers (Muthoka & Muriithi 2008) and their contribution was only 5-13% 
of cut flower exports, last estimated as amounting to between $7 and 10 million 
between 2006 and 2009 (Fintrac 2010:2). Further, in the 2000s, as the mid and large 
scale flower sector grew, smallholder flower production was in decline312. Despite the 
odds, smallholders in Kenya persist. This chapter argues that Kenyan smallholders 
have survived and maintained their agency through a diversity of infrastructures of 
inclusion.  
 
Smallholder farmers are excluded from direct markets by a fundamental challenge of 
collective action. Other major challenges are derived from this, including high costs of 
accessing information and technology, and high costs of compliance to certifications 
which is linked to the fact that few certification requirements cater to the realities of 
smallholder production. Even in areas where flower farmers cluster due to agro-
ecological advantages, they are nevertheless fragmented in terms of association and 
proximity of farm parcels. Smallholder flower farmers lack systematic and visible 
national collective representation, even though this is technically handled by the Fresh 
Produce Exporters Association of Kenya (FPEAK)313.  
 
This chapter highlights a diversity of farmers’ groups characterised as ‘contractual 
collectives’ or outgrower groups and more loosely structured ‘collectives of 
convenience’. Research yielded no contemporary example of cooperative structures 
for smallholder flower farmers. Farmers expressed a general aversion towards the 
                                                 
312 A government policy was implemented to improve their participation in exports through enhancing 
farmer-exporter relationships (Bolo 2012). 
313 Doubts were expressed about FPEAK’s genuine representation of smallholders’ interests when its 
leadership is comprised of large outgrower firms such as Sunripe Limited and flower plantations such 
as Karen Roses.  FPEAK’s role is discussed in detail in chapter eight.  
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idea of cooperatives being all too familiar with the mode of organisation from their 
experiences with tea, coffee, dairy and vegetable exports. They associate 
cooperatives with bureaucracy, lack of transparency, exploitative financial 
management by elites, poor time management and endless meetings. They also 
highlighted that the extreme perishability of cut flowers and quick turn-around required 
from field to vase as being incompatible with cooperatives’ inefficiencies in time 
management.  Further, the sheer range of varieties of cut flowers would make it very 
difficult to standardise supply as they do with coffee, which can be milled and stored 
awaiting sale.   
 
The challenges with cooperatives as a form of collective action for flower farmers in 
the Kenyan context are more failures of function and the institutional environment than 
of form. For example, grower-led cooperative auctions have served Dutch smallholder 
interests well. Supportive policies314 of the welfare state advanced smallholders’ 
collective interests315 and helped to transform the governance of the flower industry 
from buyer-driven to grower-driven (Patel-Campillo 2011:2520). Looking at 
smallholder production in the Netherlands, Colombia316 and Kenya, it is possible to 
surmise that the game-changer in terms of increasing the competitive power and 
prosperity of smallholders in the flower sector is regulatory and institutional support.  
 
My field work in Kenya showed that government representatives at the national level 
were dismissive of the contribution of smallholder flower farmers. This view was 
bolstered by the fact that there were no records of smallholders’ exports kept by the 
national Horticultural Crops Directorate (HCD). However, at the county level, 
agriculture officials with knowledge of floriculture though few and far between, are 
                                                 
314 Patel-Campillo (2011:88) explains that, “… [the] producer-led [flower production] system was 
consolidated by the Dutch government in 1916 through the enactment of the mandatory use of grower 
cooperatives. The government mandate legitimated the role of grower cooperatives as the main 
purveyors of cut flowers and enabled growers to secure their role within the sector and their position 
vis-à-vis buyers, illustrating the importance of the state in shaping power relations within the Dutch cut 
flower commodity chain.” 
315 Dutch flower production is done by a large number of small family growers estimated to be 6000, 
who operate on small, evenly distributed 1-2 hectare parcels of land. These growers organised 
themselves into grower-led cooperatives so as to gain leverage over buyers in auction (Patel-
Campillo 2011:2520). 
316 As summarised in chapter one, the Kenyan flower industry is much more akin to the Colombian 
industry, which is dominated by a handful of large growers and exporters who are also members of 
the landed elite.  They are organised under a powerful lobby body known as Asocoflores, which has 
secured tax-free status for the growers (Patel-Campillo 2011). 
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much more engaged in advocating for smallholder flower farmers’ interests. Although 
invisibility to national policy makers is overall problematic, smallholders capitalise on 
their marginality in the political sphere to exercise non-decisional bargaining power317.  
 
The smallholder production network illustrated in figure 7.1. below shows the web of 
institutional relationships that shape the small-scale flower sector. Kenyan smallholder 
flower farmers’ interaction with the state institutions is limited to regulatory institutions 
such as Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Services (KEPHIS) which provides 
phytosanitary certifications and the Horticultural Crops Directorate (HCD) which 
provides export licences. County governments provide public infrastructure such as 
grading sheds and refrigerated stores, as well as access to agricultural officers who 
are meant to advise farmers on technical aspects of production. However, in most 
cases, it is consolidator-exporters or outgrower firms which provide capacity building 
support to smallholders. From an interview with the county agricultural officer in 
Nyandarua county, who heads a team of 25 extension workers, it emerged that most 
county agricultural officers and extension workers though knowledgeable in agronomy 
generally, were ignorant of the technicalities of floriculture.  Additionally, transfers of 
agricultural officers happen often which disrupt relationships, and the continuity of 
knowledge which is required to institutionalise new initiatives. Smallholders receive 
new planting material from the Kenya Agricultural and Livestock Research 
Organisation (KALRO) formerly Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI)318. Since 
the eighties, KALRO has introduced, domesticated and evaluated flower varieties of 
various flower crops including but not limited to Moby Dick, Anthurium, Gladiolus, Lily, 
Gerbera for smallholder production319. Fieldwork320 did not establish a direct link 
between smallholders and Kenyan agricultural universities. 
  
                                                 
317 Two forms of bargaining power - Non-decisional and episodic - are introduced in chapter two and 
operationalised in chapter three in a discussion of GPN 2.0’s analysis of power. Here, non-decisional 
bargaining power is seen in smallholders’ use of their marginality to circumvent regulatory “barriers” 
such as payment of cess tax. 
318 Smallholder interventions in floriculture commenced at the National Potato Research Centre 
(KARI-Tigoni) in 1978 and the National Horticultural Research Centre (KARI-Thika) in 1981 
319 KARI also established Farmer Field Schools to disseminate flower knowledge and technology 
among smallholders (Muriithi & Wasilwa 2008) 
320 Bolo et al. (2006) outlined research priorities for the cut flower industry which incorporate smallholder 
farmers’ perspectives. 
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Kenyan smallholder cut flower production network 
 
Figure 7.1. 
Source: Author’s analysis321 
 
The following section discusses findings from field research interviews primarily with 
a sample of seven322 smallholder farmers whose profiles are summarised in table 7.1. 
below. The interviews took place in central Kenya in Thika, Murang’a, Nyeri, 
Nyahururu and Nyandarua as shown in map 7.1. Smallholders are defined as farmers 
with between 0.125 to 3 hectares (7.5 acres) of land (Fintrac, 2005; Bolo, 2006) as 
laid out in chapter one. The chapter showcases the diversity of relationships 
smallholders have with their production networks by outlining what I term as 
“contractual collectives” consisting of outgrower groups, and “collectives of 
convenience”, as well as one case of an individual farmer entrepreneur who navigates 
domestic and international export markets.  
 
                                                 
321 Since the field work was conducted in 2016, the KFC and FPEAK have come together to form an 
umbrella body known as the Kenya Horticultural Council to bolster lobbying efforts for enhanced 
export market access. Accessed at http://www.kenyaflowercouncil.org/blog/?p=6299. This is 
summarised in chapter 8.   
322 The table contains a list of eight smallholder farmers although this thesis focusses on findings from 
seven. Farmer Joseph Wamburu Maina was away when I visited his farm therefore I received a 
description of his production from an accompanying agronomist from Wilmar Agro Ltd.  
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The data discussed in this chapter was derived from farm visits323 and semi-structured 
interviews with smallholder farmers and their immediate networks324. The number of 
farmers interviewed was limited because although meetings were organised over the 
phone with the intention of meeting a farmers’ group and having a focus group 
discussion, on arrival at the farm site only one farmers’ representative was present for 
the interview. For these reasons325, the findings presented herein are more illustrative 
than representative of the Kenyan smallholder flower farmer sub-sector.  
 




Source:  Kenya Flower Council; author’s analysis (in red)
                                                 
323 All pictures shown are author’s own and were taken with permissions for academic use. 
324 See appendix C for full list of people interviewed in relation to smallholders listed in table 7.1 
325 See full discussion on interviews in methodology. Only one of the smallholder farmers interviewed 
kept financial records and therefore the revenue and cost data obtained on specific varieties was 
obtained from conversations with agronomists.  
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7.2. Discussion of empirical findings on smallholder production 
strategies and relationships with exporters 
Farmers’ profiles 
Six of the seven farmers in the sample were male and middle aged, with two-thirds of 
the farmers being above the age of 40.  They were located in Thika, Nyeri and 
Nyandarua. These are cool areas in the central highlands with an abundance of rainfall 
or alternatively located next to rivers, with fertile soils. Tea and potato growing areas 
such as Nyeri326 seem particularly inclined towards flower production. With the 
exception of the two larger farms, the average flower farm size was 1.15 acres and 
part of a larger parcel of farm land dedicated to growing vegetables, as well as cash 
crops such as tea for export. This farm size is larger than the average flower farm 
which is typically quarter of an acre. This could be because the sample smallholders 
were all considered “model farmers”, which is they were put forward for interviews by 
the Kenya Flower Council and by the exporting agent – Wilmar Agro Ltd.  The seven 
farmers represented were all members of contractual collectives or collectives of 
convenience aimed at delivering economies of scale for export of varieties for sale at 
the Dutch auctions.  
 
Smallholders grow flowers as part of a strategy of risk reduction through diversification. 
All of the farmers interviewed had uprooted a portion of their tea bushes, potato crop 
or vegetables to create the flower farm parcels. They explained that this enhanced 
their food security because they could afford to purchase what they do not grow. An 
example of the diversification of farm land to incorporate flowers is shown in image 
7.2 below. The flowers were grown on family land with the exception of one farmer 
who had leased additional land for flower farming. With an average of 6.2 years in 
flower farming327, the farmers were experienced, relatively sophisticated 
horticulturalists who are confident in the adaptability of their skills, and diversified into 





                                                 
326 A baseline value chain study by Fintrac (2010:14) on the demographics of Kenyan smallholder cut 
flower farmers found that only 3% of the land by Nyeri farmers was used for summer flower production. 
327 Excluding the outlier with 34 years of experience in cut flower farming.  
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Smallholder’s farm showing cut flower production as a diversification strategy 
 
Figure 7.2. Left – maize, middle strip cultivated to plant Arabicum, far right – tea bushes 
Source: Author’s own. Joseph Baaro Mahianyu’s farm. 
 
 
Smallholders’ summer flowers are grown outdoors and do not require high capital 
investments required for greenhouse varieties such as roses. There are twelve 
summerflower varieties grown by 
smallholder farmers in my research 
sample including Arabicum, 
Alstroemeria, Agapanthus, Ammi 
Visnaga, Craspedia, Lilies, Eryngium, 
Moby Dick, Tuberose, Crocosmia, 
Molucella, and trials of Hydrangea, the 
most popular of which are displayed in 
image 7.3. All the farmers in the 
sample grew more than two varieties. 
The most popular flower among the 
farmers was Arabicum (Ornithogalum 
saundersiae), due to its profitability, 
which is discussed further in the 
section that follows.   
Figure 7.3: From top left to right - Tuberose, Arabicum, 
Yellow Craspedia and Eryngium summer flower varieties 
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The smallholders’ points of entry into flower farming were twofold. The first was contact 
with European exporters who were farming in central Kenya in the eighties and early 
nineties328, who provided the initial plant material, invited the farmers to cultivate 
varieties such as Alstroemeria, and bought the flowers at farm gate for export. Once 
these Europeans left or transitioned into rose cultivation, the local farmers stopped 
growing summer flowers for lack of market.  The second entry point is through 
references from family and neighbours who are doing well with earnings from cut 
flowers, and who provide planting material to initiate production.  
 
It was however puzzling to see that flower farm parcels were not clustered together as 
one might expect but were geographically scattered. The reasons put forward for the 
lack of widespread uptake of flower farming despite its proven profitability centred 
around incompatibility with existing agricultural practices. Some flowers such as 
Arabicum are poisonous to cattle and so some farmers experienced casualties among 
their open grazing dairy cows, which are a vital source of food and income in central 
Kenya.  Cut flowers are also purely aesthetic and easily prone to waste when the 
harvest does not meet market standards. This is unlike food crops which if not market-
worthy, can either be consumed within the household or used as animal feed thereby 
minimising waste. Secondly, summer flower production requires long term planning 
and investment since some crops such as the popular Arabicum only provide two 
harvests per year. Farmers tend to go into flower farming with the expectation of quick 
returns and therefore are disappointed with the wait. Similarly, some farmers go into 
flower farming with no knowledge of how to align production to the seasonality of 
demand in export markets, and therefore end up without a market. Discouraged with 
the minimal returns, they are dissuaded from the crop. Lastly, unlike vegetables there 
is great variety in summer flowers and careful, patient research is required in order to 
understand which varieties would do well in one’s farm, and what is required to 
produce and correctly harvest the different varieties. This kind of demanding attention 
to detail is often discouraging for new farmers who also do not have access to 
knowledgeable extension workers who can provide technical advice.  
                                                 
328 Prior to this they were growing vegetables (kale, cabbages, potatoes) and cereals such as maize. 
Some were in commercial employment.  
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Livelihoods impact of flower production for smallholders 
The livelihoods impact from cut flower production is significant. When asked about the 
financial impact of flower production on their livelihoods, farmers interviewed 
explained that they were able to feed and educate their children from the proceeds of 
flower sales, lease more land to expand their production and set up side business 
such as hardware and photography. The perceived profitability329 of flower production 
is explained by two farmers in the quotes below. 
“I have also farmed tomatoes, other vegetables and green beans. I started with 
the one sack of [Arabicum] bulbs. When [the broker] came to buy the flowers 
from me, they offered a flat rate of KSh 8 per stem. So, in total I was to earn 
KSh 800 ($8) [for only 100 stems] the first time! I then saw that maybe there is 
money in flowers after all.” – Julius Kimani, Muranga. 
 
 “One eighth of an acre of flowers will give greater profits than 10 acres of 
potatoes. If I sell Agapanthus from this one piece of land from December to 
February, I can even wait and sell the following year comfortably.” - Felista 
Thuo, Phinna Flowers, Njabini. 
 
Farmers who are in the process of experimenting with flower production decide to take 
it up seriously when they experience that flowers are on average more productive and 
earn more revenue per square metre compared to vegetables. This is very significant 
because of the increased fragmentation of family-owned land in central Kenya based 
on inheritance claims.  
“The maximum I can sell a cabbage for is KSh 50 ($0.50). I can only plant four 
per square metre, so that comes to a total of KSh 200 ($2). Now, when it comes 
to flowers for the same square metre, you can plant 36 Arabicum bulbs and sell 
each stem at between KSh 10 and 20 depending on the season.” - Joseph 
Baaro, Nyeri. 
 
The only significant input costs are for fertiliser (and where necessary chemicals). 
Smallholders affiliated with Wilmar have soil tests carried out that determine fertiliser 
                                                 
329 Flower production is considered very lucrative compared to other crops because for example, 
smallholders reap from a quarter of an acre of flowers, the same value as they do from two acres of tea 
(Buxton 2012). 
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use, and the firm supplies them with the necessary fertiliser330 which is used often only 
as top dressing. Based on the Wilmar agronomists’ experience with Arabicum 
production, it costs KSh 0.60 cents to produce one stem of Arabicum. This is 
summarised in table 7.1.3 below. In one harvest season, seasoned farmers can supply 
up to 6000 stems per week for three months. Most farmers have on average 2 harvests 
a year331. 
 
Estimated cost of production for a quarter acre of Arabicum 
 
Table 7.2. 
Source: Farmers’ data; author’s analysis 
 
Wilmar agronomists also provided sales information on Arabicum as shown in the 
quote below:  
“You can get a good sales price of KSh 10 ($0/10) per Arabicum stem. That is 
KSh 360 ($3.60) per m2.  And sometimes the price can go higher than KSh 
10.”– Wilmar Agronomist, Mr. Kariuki, Nyeri. 
 
Estimated revenue earned from quarter acre of Arabicum production 
 
Table 7.3. 
Source: Farmers’ data; author’s analysis332 
 
As the tables above illustrate, smallholder farmers who grow Arabicum can earn 
approximately $3400333 from a quarter acre which is a significant, even transformative 
boost to their annual incomes from vegetable sales for the local market. Farmers stand 
to earn even more when they grow different varieties as they often do, and can stagger 
                                                 
330 Fertiliser for cut flowers is normally sold in five kilogram packs and amounts to KSh 70 ($0.70) 
each (2016 prices) 
331 Tuberose takes about 4-5 months to maturity at harvest. This does not include the dormancy 
phases of the tuberose bulbs which is normally about 2 months or less 
332 Prices fluctuate heavily depending on the season and can be as low as KSh 2 or as high as KSh 
20 per stem. Wilmar’s farm gate prices for the season (2016) were KSh 5 per stem of Arabicum. 
333 Calculated as revenue – costs for 0.25 acres and converted into dollars using the exchange rate 
KSh 100 = $1 
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their earnings depending on the seasonality of demand for each variety. For those in 
tea-growing economies, the income from flowers complements334 the annual bonus 
tea farmers receive in October.  
 
The distribution of profits between farmers and exporting firms was a bone of 
contention.  Overall, the farmers were concerned only with farm-gate prices and were 
not aware of the prices at the auction. The lamentation of one of Wilmar’s outgrowers 
concerning the perceived unfair distribution of profits is captured in the quote below 
and image 7.4. that follows. It shows an understanding of the disproportionately high 
cost of freight, the expense of selling flowers at the auction, and the split with the 
exporter. 
 
“You see, if the auction handler is receiving about 20%, the farmer and the 
company is left with 40%. This is because freight takes up 40% and handling 
takes up 20% so the remainder is 40%, which is split between the Farmer and 
the company. 60% is gone. That is why you see I'm farming and I speak very 
well of flowers but I am not able to buy a car for instance.” - Farmer Robert 
Mwangi, Wilmar Agro Ltd., Thika. 
 
While a farmer receives 0.042 to 0.085 euro cents (KSh 5 - 10 for stem) per stem at 
farm-gate, the whole sale price at the auction ranges from 0.40 to 0.60 Euro cents 
meaning that Kenyan smallholder farmers receive between 15-20% of the wholesale 
cost of a stem of Arabicum. This breakdown of value distributed between farm and 








                                                 
334 While the guaranteed lump sum received from tea sales is useful in terms of providing security for 
bank loans, farmers growing Arabicum for export are paid weekly at harvest time.  
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From farm-gate to auction bid: Who gets what when a stem of Arabicum is sold 
 
Figure 7.4. 
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
7.3. Smallholder selection strategies for summer flower varieties 
The varieties which smallholder flower farmers grow are delimited by suitability to the 
agro-ecological conditions, the technical complexity of growing a variety, relative 
profitability and access to planting material. The information costs of conducting one’s 
own research are enormous and therefore smallholders tend to rely on locally 
accessible varieties availed via personal references.  They obtain their plant material 
from three main sources – fellow farmers, contractual collectives (or outgrower 
exporter firms) they may be contracted to supply or government research institutes335.  
Many smallholder flower farmers first learn about viable varieties from observing their 
neighbours’ successes and they then obtain plant material from the first-movers. For 
example, the experienced farmers interviewed converged on the relative ease of 
growing Craspedia for first-timers and they offer the planting material to neighbours 
and friends.  
 
The main disadvantages of obtaining plant material from fellow farmers are that since 
no royalties have been paid to breeders for access, the flowers produced thereof 
cannot be accepted for sale in regulated export markets such as the Dutch auctions. 
Flowers grown this way are therefore often destined for local sale at the Nairobi Flower 
                                                 
335 These findings are similar to research done by Muriithi (2011) on Tuberose production. 
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Market or other regional markets. Secondly, farm-saved flower planting material tends 
to lose its robustness over time and therefore is more susceptible to pests and 
diseases and might also have a shorter shelf life. Furthermore, the uniformity of the 
produce is also often compromised and this is a critical consideration in the 
exportability of the flowers. Deficiencies in quality can also be transferred from one 
farm to another in close proximity and farmers deal with this issue by sourcing for plant 
material in a different county which has different agro-ecological conditions. It is 
however important to note that in as much as farmers cannot afford the royalties for 
access to protected varieties of flowers, farmers are constantly coming up with new 
varieties. However, they lack the knowledge of how to institutionalise, protect and 
commercialise this knowledge as intellectual property. A KEPHIS official explained 
that one smallholder in Nyeri obtained Plant Variety Protection for a new variety of 
Alstroemeria that passed the DUS (Distinct, Sufficiently Uniform and Stable) test.  
 
The second way in which 
farmers obtain plant material is 
through contractual collectives 
or outgrower schemes, such as 
Wilmar. A commercial flower 
export firm will have paid the 
royalties due to breeders for the 
plant material in order to ensure 
the viability of the cut flowers at 
the auction and other export 
markets.  
 
Local outgrower export firms also engage agricultural research institutes that may be 
developing more robust varieties of summer flowers, domesticating and 
commercialising indigenous varieties such as Moby Dick shown in the image on the 
left. These ventures have historically been carried out often under donor funded 
programs and therefore their continuity over time is seldom guaranteed. For the 
smallholder, obtaining plant material from an exporter firm means that they can trust 
that the variety provided is robust and is in demand in that season. The quote below 
from Wilmar’s director highlighted the lack of sustained institutional efforts to develop 
Figure 7.5. Foreground - Harvested Moby Dick flowers in Wilmar's 
cold store.  
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summer local flower varieties and the resultant dependency on imported plant 
material. It is indeed ironic that to be commercially viable, the plant material for Moby 
Dick, a domesticated local wild flower, must be imported.  
“For a variety like Moby Dick, we would send some farmers to fetch the plant 
material from Kinangop and Aberdares and bring it to their home areas for sale. 
With time this stopped working because the seeds have been so thoroughly 
recycled in farms, that when there is too much rainfall, the plant quickly turns 
brown. So now Wilmar begun importing the seeds from Holland. The company 
there sources the seeds from Japan. This reinforces the huge gap that exists 
when it comes to sourcing for plant material for summer flowers locally. There 
is nobody working on these products locally.” – Ruth Muiruri, Director, Wilmar 
Agro. Ltd.  
 
Third, enterprising farmers can obtain plant material directly from government 
research institutes such as KALRO in Thika which specialises in Horticulture research. 
The availability of plant material cannot always be ascertained due to general lack of 
funding for the floriculture research portfolio, which is considered lower priority to food 
crop research.  
 
The main challenge for smallholder summer flower farmers is not only accessing 
suitable varieties but also balancing the planting and crop cycles with the seasonal 
cycles of demand at the auction. From the interview with Wilmar Agro Ltd. it emerged 
that for example, the prices at the auction in January are low but improve in February 
and March with Valentines’ Day and Easter. The colour and variety of summer flowers 
in demand also changes with the seasons336. Independent farmers who are not linked 
to exporting firms have a more difficult time accessing information about these trends 
and many have abandoned cut flower production due to lack of this information. 
Additionally, access to this market information without practical support, does not 
necessarily translate into adaptable production patterns. The section that follows 
elaborates how smallholders use their networks to access not only production inputs 
but also crucially, export markets.  
                                                 
336 For example, in December blue flowers such as Eryngium are in demand for the Christmas 
season. In February, customers seek out red flowers such as Alstroemeria while in March, yellow and 
white flowers such as Craspedia, Agapanthus and Lilies are in demand. 
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7.4. “Contractual collectives vs. Collectives of Convenience”: The 
diversity of smallholder farmer-exporter relationships  
For smallholders, the most crucial relationship in the production network to facilitate 
access to export markets is with the outgrower firm that doubles up as a consolidator 
and exporter. In chapter six, the consolidator-exporter was defined as the “focal firm” 
(Dembinski 2009) which adds value in both production and marketing. This chapter 
expands Dembinski’s view to argue that their power comes not only from command in 
economies of scale and standard setting, but more specifically from their deep 
embeddedness and knowledge.  
 
Three categories of farmer-exporter relationships are identified from an analysis of 
field work data including contractual collectives, collectives of convenience and the 
farmer-entrepreneur. These are depicted below in figure 7.6. below. The only 
contractual collective identified is Wilmar Agro Ltd., while Munyu Flower Growers 
group which is now defunct, Tegmak Blooms and Mult Grow Ltd are categorised as 
collectives of convenience. In the third category, Phinna Farm is discussed as an 
exporting farm enterprise. Though too few to be representative of organisation 
amongst smallholders, the four examples are illustrative of farmer agency in 
addressing the challenge of collective action to enhance export market access. 
Sample smallholders’ main exporting networks 
 
Figure 7.6. 
Source: Author’s analysis 
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Contractual collective 
Wilmar Agro Ltd. Case Study (Out-grower farmers’ group) 
The data feeding into this section was obtained from in-depth semi-structured 
interviews with the managing director of Wilmar, three agronomists employed by 
Wilmar to provide on farm capacity building support for its smallholders, four farmers 
who are Wilmar’s outgrowers (outlined in table 7.1. above), Vrolijk Bloemen and IQ 
flowers which are importing agents at the Dutch auction.  
 
Wilmar is probably the best-known smallholder flower farmers’ contractual collective 
in Kenya. Set up as an outgrower firm in 1998337 by Wilmar Kamami, an experienced 
flower farmer, it exports summer flowers primarily to the Dutch auction. The firm is 
characterised as a contractual collective because it has enforced contracts338 with 
2000 active outgrowers339 organised into farmer groups for ease of collection. For 
economic viability of collection, logistics and training, each group must have a 
minimum of seven farmers. The contracts are signed both by the farmer and by the 
Horticultural Crops Directorate, which arbitrates in case there is a breach of contract. 
Wilmar keeps detailed records of individual farmers’ production and through calculated 
projections can estimate each farmer’s harvest and thereby detect any side-selling. If 
a farmer is caught side-selling contracted flowers to independent brokers, Wilmar may 
suspend sourcing for a time or permanently. Over five years, Wilmar has retained 
about 80%340 of the farmers they have worked with under these terms. Approximately 
nine varieties of summer flowers341 grown by Wilmar’s smallholders are consolidated 
and packaged in the refrigerated godown in Thika, and transported to the airport within 
48 hours. Wilmar works with Panalpina Airflo (discussed in the technical chapter) for 
freight forwarding to the Dutch auctions. At 40% of total costs, freight charges342 are 
the highest fraction of costs of getting the flowers to market for the outgrower.  
                                                 
337 The Kamami family had a private flower farm in the Masinga Dam area and were exporting flowers 
from 1995. However, it was in 1998 that a group of 20 smallholders approached him and asked him to 
help them export their flowers as well, that firm developed into an outgrower.  
338 A sample contract is shown in appendix D. 
339 Previously, the number of smallholders they worked with was 4-5000. Since 2015 Wilmar realised 
that many of these farmers were not relying on flowers for a living and were not as active. Wilmar then 
decided to streamline their contracts and work only with the farmers who were actively exporting.  
340 Farmers will mostly stop growing flowers when the soil is depleted or when they experience a 
change in family circumstances. 
341 Ornithogalum saundersiae (Arabicum), Ornis, Ammi Visnaga, Moby Dick, Tuberose, Molucella, 
Craspedia, Alstroemeria, Eryngium. 
342 $ 1.93 per kilogram. 
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Income for the average Wilmar outgrower growing flowers on a quarter acre of land 
ranges about KSh 20-30,000 per month ($200-$300), well above the living wage343. 
The farm-gate prices Wilmar offered its farmers in 2016 for the three most popular 
varieties are shown in table 7.3.2. Farmers are paid at farm-gate through vouchers 
and payment is remitted through bank transfer. What farmers value most about the 
Wilmar model is the regularity of payment which secures a steady monthly income 
despite seasonality of prices. Wilmar maintains steady payments by tapping into 
profits earned during high season to cover possible losses off-season. Independent 
brokers take advantage of this price buffering by appealing to farmers’ desire for short 
term gain by offering them a slightly higher farm gate price than Wilmar’s offer in the 
low season. However, unlike Wilmar, they do not offer a steady market.  
 
Sample of Wilmar’s farm gate prices for three popular varieties 
 
Table 7.4.  
Source: Wilmar Agro. Ltd. 
 
An exemplar of collective action in this sector, Wilmar provides capacity building 
support for its farmers in various ways. Hired agronomists act as extension agents 
who provide on-farm technical support to farmers for crop husbandry, variety 
selection, soil testing, production planning and quality assurance. They also hold 
policy meetings to share systems and marketing information with the farmers 
particularly around planning for seasonal dynamics. Farmers value these contractual 
collectives for their payment stability, capacity building support, provision of inputs and 
market access.  
 
                                                 
343 Anker and Anker (2017:7) estimated that the living wage for rural Mount Kenya is KSh 13,943 
($140) gross living wage for October 2016 
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The organisation and stability of the ‘Wilmar model’ has also attracted donor support 
seeking to catalyse the inclusion of smallholder flower farmers into direct markets as 
elaborated in the case study box below (Buxton 2012). The role of the “ethical agents” 
stands out in advocating for Wilmar’s position in the bargaining process with Rainforest 
Alliance certification and the supermarket. They exhibit capabilities similar to the 
capabilities that consolidator-exporter firms as focal firms exhibit in terms of having 
deep knowledge of production and marketing, and export trading networks. Secondly, 
while the certification constitutes the rules, they are malleable to the combined 
influence of smallholders’ collective power and the institutional power of influential 
INGOs under the banner of ethical trade. The episodic bargaining344 process here 
points to the adaptive power of integration into institutional, philanthropic and financial 




The strengths of contractual collectives such as Wilmar lie in the ability to reduce 
coordination costs by organising and training farmers, reduce information costs by 
                                                 
344 Outlined in chapters 2 and 3 as the moment an actor makes use of their strategic resources (in this 
case funding from the Gates Foundation, and an alliance of influential INGOs) in order to compel the 
other (namely the certification agency and the supermarkets) do something they would otherwise not 
do. 
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managing and disseminating production and market knowledge and the ability to 
address challenges of scale by consolidating production. Their stability enables them 
to invest in innovating around new varieties and deepening export trade networks. 
However, under this arrangement which harks back to captive forms of governance 
(Gereffi et al. 2005b) farmers are ‘locked in’ to production since there is little incentive 
to develop farmers’ capabilities in say marketing or value addition which are the 
exporting agent’s terrain (Bolo, 2012).  This situation effectively renders smallholders 
into what Lenin once described as “propertied proletarians, workers cultivating 
company crops on private allotments” (Little & Watts 1994:64). Despite the market 
access and stability Wilmar provides, some farmers are disgruntled with the 
distribution of profits and, break away to form independent collectives with mixed 
success as is illustrated in the next case study.   
 
Collectives of Convenience 
Munyu flower farmers group  
When a number of outgrower farmers’ produce was rejected for poor quality by Wilmar 
in 2014, they broke away and set up Munyu flower farmers group. There was no 
mention of contracts binding the group. Rather, they banded together under a mutual 
frustration and for the convenience of managing themselves – hence becoming what 
I describe as a ‘collective of convenience’. The group of fifty farmers sought to 
independently export their summer flowers to the auction which included Ammi 
Visnaga, Craspedia, Tuberose, Eryngium and Moby Dick. To do so, they obtained an 
export licence and an auction number from FloraHolland.  
 
When they began exporting they had little knowledge of market requirements in terms 
of grading, quality, post-harvest treatment, packaging and certifications. They also 
lacked an understanding of seasonality of demand for summer flowers at the auction. 
Much of the produce came to waste as the chair of the group, Boniface Musyoka 
explained:  
“At harvest [in June], we then found the market at off season period from July 
to September. Our hearts were broken".   
They also faced challenges with pests and diseases and meeting the minimum 
chemical residue levels and therefore could not obtain the phytosanitary certificate 
from KEPHIS that is required for all exported fresh produce to the EU. Another 
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crippling hindrance was the enormous cost of freight to the Dutch auctions which was 
priced at KSh 6 per stem. Auction handling costs are also calculated in tens of euro 
cents per stem, meaning that exporters need to meet economies of scale in order to 
meet the costs of getting to market. Compounded with the very low demand and low 
prices at the auction, the group was quickly going at a loss.  
 
The other major challenge was with group governance and financial management. 
The management of the group failed to anticipate the costs of getting their produce to 
the auction. In trying to increase volumes, the group managers suggested purchasing 
summer flowers from a different locality but this was met with suspicion by the group.  
Further, as they registered losses, the group began to suspect foul play in financial 
management and disintegrated due to poor group governance. The misadventures of 
Munyu flower farmers group are illustrative of the critical need for market knowledge 
to allow for production planning, and strategic integration into export networks to 
complement production knowledge, which is the farmers’ forte. Without this, 
smallholders will have to rely on savvy intermediaries who possess the knowledge, 
networks, and business acumen, and disproportionately split profits with them for their 
services.  
 
Mult Grow Investments 
Mult Grow is a flower farmers’ exporting group in Njabini which was set up in 2008. It 
currently has 15 active members with a collective 50 acres (20 hectares) of land under 
summer flower production mostly Arabicum, Craspedia, Eryngium and Alstroemeria. 
Five of the farmers, who are also the directors have larger tracts of land than the other 
ten farmers, who also have substantial experience in horticulture production. Having 
come together as experienced, landed flower farmers and yet operating outside the 
bounds of formal contracts, this group qualified as another collective of convenience. 
The chair of the group was formerly an IT professional in a Dutch travel firm, and was 
introduced to floriculture by a Greek colleague. He therefore had the societal 
embeddedness (Hess 2004) exposing him to the sector, the business acumen and the 
trade networks but none of the agricultural experience, which he had to quickly learn. 
His experience is illustrative of the hierarchy of knowledge and experience required 
for successful integration into cut flower export markets. Mult Grow exports 100 boxes 
of cut flowers per week earning an estimated KSh 500,000 ($5000).  
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Unlike Munyu flower farmers, Mult Grow’s chairman also showed a deep 
understanding of the aesthetic value of summer flowers, as well as strong capabilities 
in meeting the grading and certification requirements required for export. The group’s 
sophistication was also evident in that it is one of the national pioneers of the 
government’s horticulture traceability program (discussed in chapter eight) and is 
undergoing training with 12 other cut flower exporting firms. The significant land area 
that Mult Grow has collectively amassed under cut flower production is also critical for 
achieving economies of scale. Further, the management has cultivated the required 
networks at the auction for ease of information as the quote below from the group 
chairman shows: 
“We are in touch with the auction. I am working with the smallholder department 
at Royal FloraHolland here in Kenya and I ask them questions… we know 
exactly when the variety is selling well. We have a calendar of four, five years 
so we know what went around will come around at a certain time.” - Peter 
Murimi, chairman, Mult Grow. 
 
The epitome of this group’s sophistication is in their ability to diversify from auction 
sales to direct markets in the UK and Russia, where they sell to florists and garden 
centres. However, the risk of operating in these markets (described as FOB below) as 
smallholders and without contracts is quite high financially as the quote illustrates: 
“The challenge with the auction is the fluctuation of prices. The challenge with 
the FOB [Free on Board] is lack of payment surety. There is a very high risk of 
not getting paid. Like in the last four years, we have lost KSh 6 million. 
($60,000)” - Peter Murimi, chairman, Mult Grow. 
The second risk that Mult Grow articulated was the risk of the proletarianization of 
smallholder flower farmers, who are up against giant flower firms from the UAE345 
(such as Black Tulip346) which are establishing flower farms in rural Kenya. The quote 
below explains this new phenomenon and the future risk smallholders feel they 
encounter. 
                                                 
345 KFC (2017) reported that 2% of Kenya’s cut flowers were exported to the UAE, which signalled to 
them that the region could be emerging as a flower market frontier (Ifedapo& Esposito 2018: 335) 
346 This is a vertically integrated firm which controls production of roses and summer flowers and also 
controls marketing and trade in its home market, the UAE, a non-traditional export market. 
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“At the end of the day, what [Black Tulip] requires from us is labour. So, that 
way, they put us away from the Arab market. And I know that next, the Russians 
are coming. They will do the same. Give them three, four, five years.” – Peter 
Murimi, farmer and chair, Mult Grow. 
The third risk of smallholder flower farming as raised by Mult Grow is the management 
of Plant Variety Protection (PVP) rights. He explained that they had been working on 
developing three new varieties of Agapanthus but before they could obtain the plant 
variety protection rights, the varieties were locally disseminated amongst the farmers 
and could no longer be protected. The group has only managed to get one locally 
developed variety of Eryngium protected. This experience raises the question of the 
protection and commercialisation of indigenous knowledge and innovation, a process 
which requires institutional support and farmer education.  
 
As a more sophisticated collective of convenience, the Mult Grow example highlights 
the overarching importance of market knowledge and export networks to complement 
smallholders’ high quality production. Starting off with deep social embeddedness and 
an abundance of land gave them a much higher chance of success than Munyu flower 
growers’ group had.  The model highlights the importance of being strategic around 
variety selection, long term planning around the seasonality of demand in the Dutch 
auctions, conducting a risk assessment of financial liability when seeking to diversify 
to direct markets, and the power of collective action in achieving economies of scale. 
However, as the next collective of convenience shows, transparency in distribution of 
profits and good group governance remain elusive practices for exporting small-holder 
groups, and undermine the cohesion and longevity of the collective. 
 
Tegmak Blooms 
This section is derived from an interview with John Mahia, one of the seven 
smallholder farmers in the sample and chairman of the flower farmers’ group, Tegmak 
Blooms (henceforth referred to as Tegmak). Tegmak was part of an earlier larger 
group347 of flower farmers in the Njabini area established in 1997 and that later 
balkanized into Phinna farm, Mult Grow (both previously discussed). Mult Grow was 
                                                 
347 This larger group was organized as outgrowers who supplied summer flowers such as Molucella 
for export by a European agent who also grew roses in Naivasha. Before the agent left Kenya, he 
supported the smallholders with obtaining export licences and Mult Grow was the first among these. 
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managed by five dominant farmers who manged the export process but failed to 
effectively communicate auction prices and other market information amongst the 
wider group, which created tension and mistrust. As an act of resistance to perceived 
exploitation by the group of five, some farmers broke away to form a collective of 
convenience - Tegmak Blooms - in 2012.  
 
Seeking out a form of organization that was adaptable to farmers’ lifestyles, Tegmak’s 
first initiative was to organize the flower farmers who were growing collectively in six 
small schemes in neighbouring areas348. Membership to the group is not binding and 
does not exclude farmers from exporting with other agents exporting firms particularly 
in the off-season. The group is made up of 42 farmers, each with on average a quarter 
or an eigth of an acre, which makes up a total of 60 acres (24 hectares) of land. The 
varieties they grow include Craspedia, Eryngium, Agapanthus, Scabiosa and 
Alstroemeria. Tegmak emphasized individual farmer responsibility and traceability for 
the quality of exportable flowers, which is enhanced through a bar coding system. 
Each farmer is assigned an alpha-numeric code which is displayed after the flowers 
have been inspected and graded. Having the individual codes facilitates traceability 
so that farmers can market their flowers with other collectives of convenience such as 
Mult Grow, or with Phinna flowers (discussed in the next section). The exporting agent 
usually takes a cut which is calculated per stem exported. In the peak season however, 
Tegmak rallies up its member farmers’ collective energies so that they can capitalize 
on economies of scale for export to the Dutch auction.  
 
Tegmak is also working to deepen its societal embeddedness in trade networks 
globally and with local government and with large scale farms. The group develops its 
export networks by participating in the annual International Flower Trade Expo 
(IFTEX) in Nairobi, which brings together prospective buyers from a range of global 
markets and growers.  Having realized that the power of being in a farmers’ collective 
under the newly established county government rests in being a cooperative rather 
than a limited company, the group is thinking of opportunistically rebranding as such. 
The cooperative status might strengthen their position in the case of an episodic 
                                                 
348 These include villages in Nyandarua county such as such as Kagongo, Buchi, Mukungi, Tulaga 
and Kipipiri 
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bargaining process with the county government. The collective’s current priorities 
include lobbying the county for a refrigerated store and a grading shed. Uniquely, 
Tegmak supplies a large-scale farm349 by delivering 10,000 stems of Eryngium per 
week to a collection point350 and are then transported and packaged into mixed 
bouquets for export at the large-scale farm in Athi River. There was no mention of a 
contract for this transaction. Supplying a large-scale farm raises an outstanding 
concern for all smallholders seeking entry into direct markets, which is obtaining the 
necessary certification (discussed in section 7.5.). The partnership between the large-
scale farm and Tegmak’s farmers works because of the proximity of the collection 
point to the smallholders’ farms which relieves the farmers of the cost and risk of 
organizing refrigerated transportation.  
 
In addition to exporting collectives, it is also possible for experienced smallholder 
farmers with access to land to thrive as an entrepreneur exporter to the Dutch 
auctions. One such outlier is discussed below.   
 
The Farmer- entrepreneur model 
Phinna Flowers 
Introduced to flower farming by contact with European flower farmers and exporters 
from Limuru in 1982, Felista Thuo has established a well-respected flower producing 
and exporting enterprise known as Phinna Flowers. She has seven acres of land in 
total (four of which are leased) for the production of Agapanthus, Alstroemeria, Lilies, 
Craspedia and Eryngium. Producing at this scale enables her to operate as an 
individual enterprise. Phinna farm is also registered as a producer member by the 
Kenya Flower Council, which enables her to confidently export her flowers. She has 
twelve workers on the farm who are paid a daily wage of KSh 250 ($2.50) though she 
also works the farm herself and with her children. Her successes in flower farming 
have seen her transition from relying on dairy and vegetable sales locally and for 
export, to relying on flower earnings as the main source of livelihood. This is contrary 
to most other smallholders who diversify into flower production to boost incomes from 
                                                 
349 Tegmak’s initial contact with the large-scale farm was developed at IFTEX, which underscores the 
importance of the trade forum in providing exposure to new markets, and forging the export networks 
that are so critical for smallholders’ survival. 
350 The collection point is located in Murungaru which is a short distance from the six groups and 
enables them to avoid the costs and complexity of managing the cold chain 160 kilometres to the 
large-scale farm in Athi River.  
  196 
vegetable trade. Phinna flowers has over time invested in farm infrastructure such as 
a charcoal cooler and a grading shed as shown in image 7.7. which enables her to 
process the harvested cut flowers for export.  
 
One of the keys to her success as 
smallholder flower farmer is the 
diversity of markets she is engaged 
in as illustrated below in figure 7.8. A 
Dutch-owned, Limuru-based flower 
farm known as Tropiflora purchases 
her Alstroemeria variety from the 
farm-gate. She also has an exporting 
license and works with IQ flowers, an 
importing agent at the Dutch auction 
that sources summer flowers from 
smallholders. The export licence and 
auction trading number allows Phinna flowers to act as a consolidator and exporter for 
other local smallholders who would like to export their flowers to the auction.  
 
She has partnered with many European growers and exporters over the years who in 
addition to facilitating export market access, have also imparted knowledge on flower 
grading, quality assessments, certifications required, seasonality and post-harvest 
treatments. She transports the stems she does not export to the local Nairobi flower 
market, where her daughter has a flower stand, as well as to a florist at the Sarit 
Centre, a local mall in Nairobi. Phinna grows Molucella variety specifically for local 
sale. Access to the local market provides daily income for her daughter and also 
absorbs produce that might otherwise be classified as waste.  As an enterprise, 
Phinna’s successes come from her wide and deep social embeddedness into local 
and international trade networks, and her deep knowledge from three decades of 
exposure to the flower trade. By institutionalizing herself through acquiring the 




Figure 7.7. Phinna Farm’s grading shed 
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Diversity of market options explored by smallholder flower farmer-entrepreneur 
 
 
Figure 7.8.  
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
The three categories of organisation discussed in this section present evidence 
towards the diversity of smallholder farmers’ collective action as they seek out export 
markets. Two main forms of collective action emerge – contractual collectives and 
‘collectives of convenience’. Larger outgrower collectives balkanize over time into 
smaller collectives of convenience whose initial collective energy emerges from an act 
of resistance to perceived exploitation by outgrowers. The collectives of convenience 
persist by allowing side-selling in the low season, while banding back together at peak 
season to capitalize on economies of scale required for successful auction sales. The 
fluidity of these ‘collectives of convenience’ is also seen in the opportunistic readiness 
to rebrand from a limited company into a cooperative in order strengthen their position 
in the case of an episodic bargaining process with the county. The outstanding 
capabilities required for the success of the collectives emerges as deep social 
embeddedness, at least among the group managers. This comes from exposure to 
and long term relationships with European flower trading networks, which is once 
again testament to the fact that knowledge flows in the flower industry are 
predominantly through informal kinship ties and gentlemen’s networks. The second 
factor linked to social embeddedness is deep market knowledge to enable production 
planning in line with market demands.  
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Collectives of convenience should be seen as powerful expressions of farmers’ 
agency and critical short-term life-lines for market access but they do not qualify as 
‘focal firms’. This is because they seldom successfully link production and marketing 
because they lack the social embeddedness necessary, and only opportunistically 
harness economies of scale required for market access.  On the other hand, 
contractual collectives may be considered ‘focal firms’ in the sense that they 
successfully link producers to the market and offer payment stability required for 
security of livelihoods in the long-term. Their stability of organization, which 
unfortunately necessitates the locked in effect discussed by Bolo (2012), consolidates 
their collective power and enables them to attract and form innovative partnerships, 
another testament to the importance of social embeddedness. As the NBMSTR case 
study showed, these multi-stakeholder partnerships are critical for advocating for the 
smallholders’ position in episodic bargaining scenarios for access to direct markets.  
 
Nairobi Flower Market 
One of the most underexplored351 aspects of smallholder flower farmers’ survival is 
their engagement in the Nairobi Flower Market (NFM). The smallholders in my sample 
were all active in the NFM, either selling summer flowers that did not make the cut for 
export or flowers specially grown for local sale. Smallholders352 typically send the 
overflow of their high-quality harvests to the local market rather than compost them. 
Although the local market is often regarded as the market of last resort and of much 
less value per stem353 than exports, local sales provide an important source of income 
flow for smallholders. A semi-ethnographic study354 conducted at the Nairobi Flower 
Market showed that smallholder farmers described cut flowers as “gold” and had 
bolstered their financial and food security by diversifying to lucrative varieties of cut 
flowers specifically leather-leaf ferns. Nairobi flower market is also the hub from which 
regional sales to Tanzania and Uganda are made, which sheds light on the 
opportunities for growth in the regional market. Export markets are inaccessible to 
                                                 
351 Bolo (2012:25) provides a short descriptive paragraph on the Nairobi flower market 
352 Greenhouse varieties such as roses are sourced as export “rejects” at throw-away prices by local 
traders from mid and large scale flower farms in Naivasha. 
353 A bunch of ten rose stems costs approximately $1. 
354 Open six days a week between 4 am and 7 am, hundreds of traders some of whom are also growers 
lay bunches of hundreds of varieties of summer flowers out for sale. The city council charges KSh 50 
($0.50) for a trading permit per day. A floriculture researcher from KALRO estimated that the total 
amount traded daily was KSh 5 million ($ 50,000). 
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many smallholders because they are not institutionally incorporated in terms of 
certifications, royalty payments and managing freight and auction costs to participate 
in global flower trading networks. 
 
7.5. Following the path of least resistance: Smallholder farmers’ 
experiences with navigating industry certifications 
Access to certifications has been an enormous challenge to smallholder flower 
farmers. This is generally because the certifications address issues for large scale 
commercial flower plantations, rather than the realities of smallholder production. The 
cost355 and complexity of implementation (Ouma 2010) also hinders access to 
certification. Conversely, even if concessions for smallholders are made by certifying 
agencies, smallholder farmers generally lack the technical proficiency to consistently 
streamline their production processes356 as certifications might demand, which is 
illustrated in the discussion on Fairtrade and RainForest Alliance below. Indeed, part 
of smallholders’ agency in navigating complex global markets is derived from their 
invisibility from certifications, which also strengthens their power in the case of non-
decisional bargaining with regulatory institutions. This both compels and enables them 
to find alternative paths of least resistance to the market. Smallholders’ summer 
flowers are still predominantly exported to the Dutch auctions where the gate-pass is 
the phytosanitary certificate from the Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Services. 
KEPHIS provides each flower farmer whose farm is successfully audited with a 
number that ensures that the produce is traceable in case of any issues in the market.  
 
The Kenya Flower Council (KFC) recognizes the unique conditions of production for 
smallholders and began developing a smallholder code of conduct in 2015. The 
farmers interviewed appeared to confuse registration under the KFC as an exporter, 
with certification which requires detailed farm audits. The KFC has over 2,500 
smallholders registered as affiliates, who are eligible for group certification where 
                                                 
355 Ouma (2010: 203) explains that in the case of GlobalGAP these costs can be separated into 
nonrecurring costs (one-off or time-limited investments in farm infrastructure, training, and certification 
to be able to achieve compliance) and recurrent costs (recertification, monitoring, training, labor, 
equipment, and analysis of pesticide residue) to maintain the system. 
356 For example, MPS-ABC requires farmers to adhere to specific rules to ensure environmentally sound 
production including regulating use of fertilisers, chemicals, waste management and water use. Audits 
are carried out four times a year.  
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organized as such. Farmers organized under outgrower groups are more likely to 
receive market access support through government or donor initiatives357.   
 
In the meantime, smallholders remain generally locked out of supplying supermarkets 
which have private voluntary codes of conduct that are consumer-facing such as 
Fairtrade or supermarket sustainability standards. The global sourcing manager for 
ASDA’s procurement firm, IPL, explained the difficulties of sourcing summer flowers 
from smallholders: 
“It would have been tricky for us to start with small holders. Because we look 
into things like certifications and small growers don't have them, and it is 
expensive for them so they mostly will not to go for them. For instance, all of 
our suppliers have to be Global GAP certified 358.”  - Global Flower Sourcing 
manager, IPL/ASDA. 
 
Specialized direct markets such as florists and garden centres are less stringent on 
certifications and tend to make more specialized mixed bouquets that require summer 
flowers. These may prove to be the path of least resistance into direct markets for 
capable, enterprising and organised smallholders seeking to diversify exports from the 
Dutch auctions.  
 
Notably, smallholder flower farmers are excluded from the Fairtrade flower portfolio. 
As Fairtrade was rapidly expanding its portfolio of commodities for certification in the 
early 2000s, so was its producer profile changing from predominantly smallholders359 
(as in coffee, tea, bananas) to plantations specifically in flowers, fresh fruits, wine 
grapes and processed juices (Raynolds 2017). The Fairtrade flowers regional 
manager for Africa explained that 90% of Fairtrade flowers360 are roses, which can 
only be grown under greenhouses by large commercial operations. The Fairtrade 
                                                 
357 Refer to the previously showcased NBMSTR case study with Wilmar’s farmers. 
358 FPEAK led the development of KenyaGAP which was benchmarked to GlobalGAP certification in 
2007. It was a localised certification to standardise the quality of mid and small scale horticulture 
farmers. However, it was deemed ineffective in assuring market access for local farmers (Ouma 2010: 
218). 
359 Coffee, cocoa, sugar, honey, rice and cotton are the only Fairtrade products which remain closed 
to large producers. 
360 Until 2013, Fairtrade flowers were mostly single rose stems or bunches of only roses. In an effort 
to increase the sales of Fairtrade flowers, the organization began dealing in Fairtrade bouquets which 
require summer flowers. 
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standard previously demanded that 100% of the flowers in bouquets had to be 
Fairtrade. However, given the production patterns of commercial flower farms that 
specialize in one variety such as roses, it was difficult to source Fairtrade fillers. 
Realizing the need for flexibility, in 2017 Fairtrade introduced a new rule which allows 
up to 50% non-certified flowers and fillers in Fairtrade bouquets so as to increase the 
variety of Fairtrade flowers and increase sales among consumers, especially given 
the competition that Fairtrade is facing from supermarket certifications. A positive 
effect of this concession was that since non-Fairtrade fillers can be sourced from any 
origin, fillers grown by Kenyan smallholders can be considered for inclusion, though a 
smallholder-specific code for Fairtrade flowers is yet to be developed. Even then, given 
smallholders’ inability to adhere to the requirements of existing codes, achieving 
compliance to Fairtrade certification is also likely to be elusive.  
 
7.6. Conclusion 
Analysing data from seven smallholder farmers and their production networks, this 
chapter first outlined the context and condition in which smallholder flower farmers 
operate, detailed their intra-firm strategies in terms of variety selection, the dynamics 
of their exporting networks and their interaction with the certifications that govern the 
industry. The contextual findings are that as a marginal segment in a bifurcated and 
tightly regulated export market, Kenyan smallholder flower farmers engage in flower 
production first as a diversification strategy from tea, coffee and other horticultural 
crops, and to enhance their food security through diversifying income streams.  
 
Smallholder farmers’ intra-firm strategies were observed in terms of variety selection.  
Variety selection is a highly knowledge intensive strategy. There are high information 
costs of researching what varieties to grow and therefore farmers tend to rely on 
personal networks, government research institutions and their outgrower-exporting 
firms. Secondly, farmers are excluded from the accessing varieties due to the costs of 
adherence to PVP (Plant Variety Protection) laws. However, farmers continue to 
innovate varieties though these are weakly institutionalized, protected and 
commercialized.  
 
Smallholder farmers’ extra-firm networks include contractual relationships, as in an 
outgrower scheme, and the loosely structured ‘collectives of convenience’ which are 
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independent farmers’ groups. The contractual form (presented by the Wilmar case 
study) creates organized, stable, capacity-building collectives.  Although farmers are 
mostly “locked-in” to production functions with little advancement in market 
knowledge, it is probably the only observed organizational form offering smallholders 
a stable route to direct markets. Contractual collectives can therefore be considered 
as focal firms for smallholders.  
 
 ‘Collectives of convenience’ generally emerge as an act of resistance to perceived 
unfair distribution of profits by the exporter. These groups are therefore reactionary, 
rather than strategic, porous in terms of non-binding membership, opportunistic in that 
group members may sell via other exporters in the low season but re-assemble in the 
peak season to capitalize on economies of scale, and short-term because they are 
constantly in flux, disbanding and rebranding as convenient. The inability of these 
collectives of convenience to successfully and consistently link producers to export 
markets means they cannot be considered as ‘focal firms’ in the smallholder 
production network. From the one entrepreneurial case study, smallholder farmer 
entrepreneurs in this sector are likely to be highly experienced in floriculture, landed, 
deeply socially embedded into export networks, widely diversified in terms of varieties 
and access to local and global markets, and well institutionalized in terms of export 
certifications and regulatory performance.  
 
This chapter’s findings imply that for Kenyan smallholder flower farmers’ survival and 
success, integration under globalisation is not necessarily about deeper inclusion into 
increasingly tightly regulated export markets, but rather a more strategic integration 
into a wider variety of markets. This entails forming strategic partnerships (as in the 
NBMSTR case study), capitalizing on their marginality in the political sphere to 
navigate possible market access barriers and innovatively seeking paths of least 
resistance such as specialized or local export markets that are less stringent on 
certification. Until the intertwined challenges of collective action and institutionalisation 
of knowledge among smallholders are addressed, any trade initiatives aimed at 
‘including’ smallholders will only achieve aesthetic rather than transformative results. 
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8. Navigating the web of governance: Extra-firm 
contestations in the Kenyan cut flower industry 
8.1. Introduction 
The previous two chapters have discussed the empirical findings from research done 
among mid and small scale cut flower farms and their producer networks in Kenya and 
the Netherlands. They have highlighted intra-firm strategies revolving around 
managing production – how and why farms select the cut flower varieties they grow 
for export, as well as how they manage labour. They have also discussed inter-firm 
strategies that have to do with the relationships between farms and exporters, and the 
different forms of organisation deemed advantageous for entry into diverse markets. 
These relations of production are knowledge intensive and production networks act as 
centres of knowledge production, around which knowledge linkages along the chain 
and in the local economy are created or found missing. The politics of these knowledge 
linkages in Kenyan cut flower production networks have implications for the bargaining 
power of the players involved, as they navigate a web of certifications which police 
access to the lucrative direct markets that producers seek.  
 
This chapter paints the landscape of certifications that the Kenyan producers in the 
research sample encounter, and discusses the various ways in which they negotiate 
these ‘rules of the game’(North 1992). A general sentiment expressed within the 
industry is that the Kenyan flower industry has thrived because ‘the government has 
stayed out of the sector’ and that what is required for the industry to continue blooming 
is even less interaction with the state361. This chapter shows that contrary to this belief, 
the success of the flower sector is underpinned by government support in terms of 
export regulation and traceability systems that build trust and confidence in European 
markets.  
 
This chapter hones in on two of the three key variables in an analysis of value chain 
governance in GVC theory (Gereffi et al. 2005b) highlighted in chapter three of this 
thesis - the complexity of transactions and the codifiability of information in 
certifications362. It elaborates how modular forms of governance are exhibited 
                                                 
361 See for example Dolan and Humphrey 2000; English et al. 2004.   
362 See table 2.2. in chapter three for an overview of the five modes of governance in GVC analysis. 
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particularly in regard to the partnerships between capable mid-scale producers and 
consolidator-exporters, and captive governance in regards to the limited supply 
capabilities of small-scale farms. This chapter also crystallises the discussion on the 
various ways in which producers exercise their bargaining power to navigate the 
shifting landscape of regulation from the multi-scalar perspective adopted from GPN 
2.0 analysis. Lastly, the chapter highlights various forms of institutional power363 
Henderson et al. (2002:450), and the “nested” nature (Aggarwal 2005) of that power 
through the interplay of the public and private forms of governance.  
 
8.2. The dynamics of certification on the sample of seven mid-scale cut 
flower farms 
This section discusses the empirical findings from field work on the sample of seven 
mid-scale flower farms and their production networks364 and elucidates their 
perspectives on certification. It includes perspectives from an interview with the Kenya 
Flower Council (henceforth, KFC) CEO, the Fairtrade Global Sourcing Manager in 
Kenya, ASDA’s global flower sourcing manager and various flower trade 
representatives at the Dutch flower auctions.  
 
Beyond obtaining the mandatory phyto-sanitary certificate from the Kenya Plant 
Health Inspectorate Services (KEPHIS), the seven farms in my field work sample 
displayed certification365 from MPS (Milieu Programma Sierteelt translated as 
'Environmental Programme Floriculture') which is necessary for access to the Dutch 
market. The farms also displayed Max Havelaar366 the Fairtrade certification specific 
to Switzerland, Fairtrade certification and the KFC Silver Certification which is pegged 
to Global GAP standards. Beyond its acceptance broadly in traditional flower markets, 
the KFC certification was also considered by farm managers as a way of ensuring a 
healthy working relationship with the industry body representative. Other certifications 
mentioned in interviews with farm managers included FFP (Fair Flower Fair Plants), 
the Flower Label Program, The British Ornamental Plant Producers (BOPP) 
Certification Scheme and the Ethical Trade Initiative (ETI) base code. One of the farms 
                                                 
363 Previously outlined in table 4.2. in chapter four. 
364 See appendix E for the list of people interviewed among regulatory actors. 
365 Refer to table 6.1 for the summary of certifications for each farm in the field work sample. 
366 The Max Havelaar Foundation is a non-profit which promotes the sale of Fairtrade products from 
developing countries in Switzerland. It is the Swiss member of Fairtrade Labelling Organisations (FLO) 
International. 
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in the central Kenyan highlands pointed out the Sedex367 Members Ethical Trade Audit 
or SMETA. This is an audit procedure which is a compilation of good practices in 
ethical audit technique which makes use of the ETI base code and local laws, but is 
not a code of conduct or a certification. SMETA deals with the operational struggle of 
audit fatigue among flower farms targeting a variety of markets each with its own 
certification by enabling farms to conduct one audit and share it with multiple 
customers, rather than having a new audit taken for each different customer. Lastly, 
supermarket certifications for UK supermarkets were implied but not explicitly 
mentioned in interviews. These certifications368 can be classified as cutting across 
northern and southern codes of conduct, multi-stakeholder initiatives, supermarket 
codes as shown below in table 8.1.   
 
Compilation of certifications and codes of conduct in the sample of seven mid-
scale flower farms  
 
Table 8.1. 
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
For mid-scale flower farms, certifications do not appear to be a deterrent to entering 
new markets. The case for market entry is made largely on how lucrative and stable 
the potential market is. Once a new market and client has been established, mid-scale 
farms generally are able to make the necessary investments to meet the requirements 
for certification. Ultimately, compliance to the requirements is seen as a means to an 
end, which is to provide access to a variety of export markets.  
                                                 
367 Sedex is a collaborative platform for sharing responsible sourcing data on supply chains. (Sedex 
website https://www.sedexglobal.com/ ). 
368 A literature review analyzing the origins, practice, politics and impact of the certifications is outlined 
in the literature review in chapter two. 
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Labour conditions on flower farms are a key focus for industry certifications. While 
membership to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) is not necessarily required 
by many certifications, Max Haavelaar Fair Trade certification requires membership. 
This corroborates findings by Riisgaard (2009:331) that only the Max Havelaar 
certification calls for certified farms to join the CBA where it exists. The cost of 
compliance regarding improvements of labour conditions was deemed high because 
of the recurrent nature of the expenses involved. The two quotes below exemplifies 
the centrality of working conditions to compliance.  
“We subscribe to MPS, KFC, Fairtrade. All of them will consider working 
conditions and how well you are taking care of the workers. This makes your 
product more marketable. They put pressure since if you are not able to meet 
the bare minimum you cannot sell to those markets. If it is Holland, for example, 
you cannot sell if you do not have MPS.” – Human resources manager at 
Naivasha Flower Farm 
 
“For you to comply, you need to meet extra costs because… at the farm level 
all the employees should have proper protective equipment. For sprayers, you 
have to perform the cholinesterase test. You have to check the level of chemical 
in their blood every three months. You need to change their cartilages and their 
respirators because after every three months the respirators are worn out. So, 
you have to incur a great cost. Sometimes like me, I even budget for Ksh 1.5 
Million [$150,000].” – Farm Manager, Farm-S.  
 
While the business-as-usual tone cannot be conveyed in writing, the quotes illustrate 
the associated cost and the sense of fatigue expressed by farm managers. This 
implies that compliance is not seen as a tool to transform or improve labour relations 
and conditions but rather more aesthetically as instrumental to accessing export 
markets.   
 
Certifications animate competition by differentiating between the quality of the 
production capabilities of farms producing flowers in Kenya. Through certification, 
farms are able to make their roses (such as the popular intermediates) stand out from 
a rival company’s roses when they compete in similar markets. They provide checks 
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that the processes of production meet set standards particularly for labour and 
environmental protection.  
“An intermediate rose is an intermediate rose. So, it's the way you produce it 
that matters. It is no longer a question of if you can produce, but how you 
produce.” - Farm manager, Farm-W. 
 
While various codes ascertain the quality of the production processes, they do not 
necessarily say much about the actual quality of the flowers. For example, in answer 
to whether codes help to standardize quality in the industry, one well respected flower 
farm manager responded by saying: 
“No, not for the product quality. For the procedures related to the environment 
and social rights, yes. You have quality standards for French beans and 
tomatoes calibrating residue levels etc. For flowers, you have some quality 
standards for product quality but generally, no. There is not yet a good quality 
chart and that's what we don't want to hear so much about because that [quality] 
is our edge.” Flower Farm Manager, Farm-R. 
 
From this quote, it appears that producers use the lack of a standardized product 
quality chart to differentiate their flowers in a highly competitive market. It allows for 
creativity and an opportunity to develop a brand. At the two Dutch flower auctions in 
Aalsmeer and Naaldwijk, the wholesale buyers I interviewed did not mention 
certifications as one of their key considerations in bidding for flowers. Rather, they 
consider the product’s Quality Index369.  Cut flowers that do not meet the B1 criteria370 
are not traded while growers who consistently supply high quality and reliable product 
information are rewarded with higher prices per stem.  
 
Though certifications are very much in demand among wholesalers and supermarkets, 
they are much less demanded by specialized sales channels such as florists and 
market stalls in Europe (CBI 2016). Interviews revealed that younger, non-traditional 
export markets such as Japan and the Middle East place much less emphasis on 
                                                 
369 CBI (2016) For example, “A1 roses must meet all the minimum requirements on internal quality, 
freshness, freedom from parasites, damage, deficiencies, deviations, contamination, absence of 
leaves on the lower 10 cm of the stem, stems that are straight and sturdy enough to bear the flower, 
uniformity of colour, thickness, sturdiness and bouquet volume, and proper packaging.” 
370 Criteria include either A1, A2 and B1 displayed on the auction clock, and are determined by the 
number of customer refund claims or complaints over the previous eight weeks (CBI 2016). 
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certifications for entry of cut flower exports. Many growers diversifying from the auction 
are circumventing traditional European markets and targeting these markets due to 
less stringent barriers to entry, and also so as to have a more diverse foreign currency 
base beyond the volatile Euro. This knowledge on the heterogeneity of export markets 
and their requirements is critical particularly for smaller or less capable producers in 
terms of seeking out the paths of least resistance to direct markets.  
 
Flower industry certifications have also focused on the environmental dimensions of 
production particularly chemical usage and environmental management (Riisgaard 
2009). Environmental regulations on the sample farms were enforced by a myriad of 
organisations with overlapping environmental mandates. These include371 the National 
Environmental Management Authority (NEMA), the Water Resources Authority (WRA) 
and KEPHIS as well as other industry and civil society environmental groups outlined 
in section 8.2. NEMA requires farms to have a water sampling point where officials 
test farm water disposed from the greenhouses for chemicals every three months 
while WRA issues a levy that is included in the electricity cost rates (GIZ 2015). In 
terms of the costs of compliance, Naivasha flower farms pay about $400 for an annual 
license enabling them to recycle and compost waste, and $1000 for managing the 
effluent discharge. Two farms in the sample explained that to set up the required 
wetlands water purification systems cost them approximately KES 1 million ($10,000).  
 
International consolidators and flower trading houses such as the Dutch Flower Group 
which supply major supermarkets will only source from suppliers who have the 
necessary certifications for gaining access to European markets. In effect, 
certifications serve to create a new social contract that enhances trust and safeguards 
the farm’s reputation. The quote below from ASDA’s global flower sourcing manager 
shows the absolute importance of compliance to certifications for access to 
supermarkets, and how this requirement means they only work with very large capable 
farms.  
“All of our suppliers have to be Global GAP certified. It's very hard to work with 
small growers. Apart from that, to supply any Walmart372 store the producer has 
to be Walmart supply chain security certified. This is done by an independent 
                                                 
371 Flower farms also engage the services of a private firm called the Environmental and Combustion 
Consultants (ECC) which manages and disposes of hazardous waste from flower farms. 
372 ASDA is Walmart’s UK subsidiary. 
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third party auditing firm which is very strict on supply chain security issues. We 
have to take [the producers] through all this. So, when we started we started 
with the big ones -  with 5 big suppliers in Kenya.” – Global Flower Sourcing 
manager, IPL/ASDA  
  
Large producers therefore obtain the hallowed “preferred supplier” status with 
supermarkets which illustrates the “cascade effect” (Nolan et al. 2008). It further shows 
the need for smaller producers to creatively explore alternative export markets if they 
are to survive and thrive in the long term.  
 
8.3. Analysing the web of Voluntary Private Initiatives in Kenya’s flower 
industry 
Sample of codes employed in the wider Kenyan cut flower industry 
 
Table 8.2. 
Source: Adapted from Dolan & Opondo (2005:90) and updated (author’s own analysis) 
 
Table 8.1. showed the codes governing the sample of seven flower farms in my 
sample, while table 8.2. above shows from documentary analysis the codes or private 
voluntary initiatives373 that are at play in the wider Kenyan flower industry.  
 
Northern codes originated from the global North, typically European importing 
countries. They are typically business-to-business (b2b) codes such as GlobalGAP 
                                                 
373 Private initiatives here refer to those that are not public including certifications, codes of conduct 
and multi-stakeholder initiatives that collectively dominate the web of governance for the flower 
industry. (Henson and Humphrey, 2008; Tallontire 2007; Nelson & Tallontire, 2014) 
  210 
and MPS which signal quality of the production process on social and environmental 
criteria to the institutional buyers of cut flowers in European export markets. They are 
often invisible to end consumers. MPS which until 2007 was the only certification that 
was displayed to buyers at the Dutch auctions, was developed by Dutch growers who 
also own the auctions.  Setting the ‘rules of the game’ was arguably a way of exercising 
the power of Dutch growers over the industry. MPS374 has four categories of 
certification which deal with environmental and social criteria, demands from the retail 
sector and product quality.  The Flower Label Program (FLP) is a German business to 
business (b2b) code set up as a joint initiative of human rights organizations, labour 
unions, churches, flower producers and flower retailers. 
 
Southern codes are those originating from countries where cut flower production 
occurs in the global south. They developed from an awareness of the entrenchment 
of Northern commercial interests over those of producers in the global south, and 
therefore came in to promote the ethics of African horticultural operations (Barrientos, 
2001).  In Kenya, the KFC, a membership organisation has taken the lead in 
establishing an accredited quality certification scheme that enforces sustainable 
production practices on flower farms. KFC’s producer members375 subscribe to the 
Flowers and Ornamentals Sustainability Standard (F.O.S.S.)376 and are audited 
annually against it (GlobalGAP)377 in order to qualify for the silver certification which is 
mandatory for members and the gold378 which is voluntary. Secondly, KFC working 
with the Kenya Bureau of Standards (KBS) also helped to develop the national379 code 
                                                 
374 MPS-ABC: covers environment; crop protection, energy, fertilizers, waste and water. MPS-SQ deal 
with certification for social criteria (such as safety, health and working conditions). MPS-GAP covers 
certification for compliance with demands from the retail sector while MPS-Q covers all kinds of 
quality criteria  
375 65 of 117 producer members registered under the KFC according to the KFC database accessed 
at: http://kenyaflowercouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/KFC-Certificaton-Register-December-
2017.pdf.  
376 F.O.S.S covers governance, good agricultural practices, human resource management, workers’ 
welfare, employee health, environmental protection and post-harvest management (KFC website) 
377 GlobalGAP website accessed at https://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/media-
events/news/articles/Kenya-Flower-Council-Standard-Re-benchmarked-as-Equivalent-Scheme/ 
378 There are only four gold certified Producer Members, all of which are large scale farms including 
Oserian Development Company, Finlay Flowers, Flamingo Horticulture, and Tambuzi Limited. As of 
December 2017, 55% of KFC producer members had achieved silver certification. (Ifedapo & 
Esposito, 2018: 341).  
379 There was a previous national horticulture code developed in 2004 but according to the KFC CEO, 
“nobody around the table wanted new standards and nobody was using the old code because it was 
only national, unknown by the market and not internationally accredited such as MPS, Fair Trade.” –
Interview with KFC CEO, 12 Jan, 2016.  
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of practice for all flower exporters in 2015 - the KS1758380 Part 1 for Flowers and 
Ornamentals Standard. As a government standard, it is expected to raise the 
confidence of Kenyan flowers in export markets and create a “brand Kenya” product 
(KFC website)381. In a self-regulated industry, the assertion of KFC standards on the 
global stage382 can be seen as part of a power-play that challenges the dominance of 
buyer-led, northern-origin standards.  
 
Kenyan domicile standards such as the KFC standards are anchored in consideration 
of local production conditions and work towards a greater inclusivity of the range of 
producers than northern standards do. In a neo-colonial stance, local domicile 
standards were previously looked down upon as compromising on quality standards, 
so to fix this perception Kenyan standard setters engaged in a benchmarking process. 
This is an example of the ‘nestedness’ (Aggarwal 2005) of local domicile regulations 
in international ones.  Benchmarking also keeps KFC members up to date with global 
buyers’ standards, while reducing the cost to flower growers by offering a ‘one off’ 
audit (Riisgaard 2008:21). While benchmarking and accreditation383 to internationally 
recognised standard such as Global G.A.P. may in some regard have helped to 
reconcile power plays between northern and southern codes of conduct, they are 
contested because they place the KFC in direct competition with the global standard 
for Kenyan members.  
 
Conversely, is interesting to note that the localisation of northern standards in the 
Kenyan context has also been fraught with power struggles. For example, KenyaGAP 
(Kenya Protocol for Good Agricultural Practice), a version of Global GAP attuned by 
FPEAK to local production standards and therefore more accessible specifically to 
                                                 
380 KS1758 encompassed actors along the value chain such as breeders, consolidators and freighters, 
rather than only producers. Meeting KS1758 standard has become a mandatory requirement to qualify 
for an export licence.   
381 Kenya Flower Council website accessed at http://www.kenyaflowercouncil.org/blog/?p=6285 
382 Colombia, the world’s biggest exporter of cut flowers in the global South also developed its own 
certification known as FlorVerde in 1998, under Asocoflores,  its powerful producers’ lobby group 
(Riisgaard 2011:441). 
383 In 2005, KFC certification received recognition of equivalent status with Global G.A.P ornamentals 
standards and later gained accreditation from the globally recognised South African National 
Accreditation System (SANAS) in 2008. In 2015, the KFC standards were incorporated into the 
Floriculture Sustainability Initiative (FSI) basket of standards. As part of FOSS, the KFC standards are 
also now part of the International Trade Centre Standard Map. (Ifedapo & Esposito, 2018: 341) 
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smallholders, failed to register enough export companies (Carey 2008; Ouma 
2010:22). The struggle to develop globally recognised country domicile codes of 
conduct shows the entrenchment of industry self-regulation and of the assertion of the 
power of producing countries in the global trade.  
 
Supermarket codes in the UK evolved after the 1990 Food Safety Act (Dolan & 
Humphrey 2000) to provide benchmarks for the quality of production processes of 
source farms. The UK is a critically important export market for Kenya and imported 
approximately €64m worth of cut flowers in 2017 (Floridata, 2017)384. Though UK 
supermarkets had been using third party certifications (discussed in the section below) 
such as Fairtrade, they have recently been developing their own internal sustainability 
certification systems385. These make the sustainable sourcing initiatives of the 
supermarket much more visible to its consumers, in the hopes of building greater 
brand loyalty and confidence. Having their own brands pits supermarkets’ labels in 
competition against those of third party certifications, showing that certification is 
becoming a business unto itself, while transparency, integrity and independence of 
certification takes a back seat to the brand value. Supermarket codes are internally 
designed, implemented and audited using checklists (Opondo 2006). They are 
particularly stringent and demanding which sets into motion a “cascade effect” (Nolan 
et al. 2008) of consolidation among supermarkets’ sourcing partners. This has 
exclusionary effects on smallholders due to challenges with coordination costs and 
quality standardisation.  
 
The shift by capable producers towards direct markets, especially supermarkets, 
entrenches the buyer-driven power in the governance of the flower trade, where the 
strategy for inter-firm coordination is control386. Whereas the strategy for capable 
producers seeking to supply supermarkets is to simply comply with the requirements 
                                                 
384 Floridata website accessed at https://www.hortweek.com/floridata-figures-show-top-uk-plants-
import-export-nations/ornamentals/article/1448180 
385 These are for example M&S Plan A or Sainsbury’s ‘Fairly Traded’. However, other supermarkets 
such as the Co-op have affirmed their commitment to partnering with established third party certification 
by sourcing 100% of their cut flowers from Africa under Fairtrade (The Co-op website) Accessed at 
http://www.co-operativefood.co.uk/food-matters/fairtrade-ethical-trading/fairtrade-product-
stories/fairtrade-roses/ 
386 As discussed in chapter three, control is often related to the captive and hierarchical form of 
governance (Gereffi et al. 2005b) where lead firms are working with suppliers with low capabilities. 
  213 
for certification, this research identified a strategy of circumvention by producers on 
the margins through two case studies discussed in section 8.5. below.  
 
Independent codes include certifications that are administered and audited by third 
parties. Unlike business-to-business codes, these certifications are consumer-facing. 
The independence of their auditing systems, and the ethically oriented identity of the 
labels builds consumers’ confidence in the sustainability of supermarkets’ trading 
practices. Until 2006, Fairtrade flowers  in Switzerland were certified by Max 
Havelaar387 cooperating with FLP and MPS (Riisgaard, 2011:441). The unique appeal 
of Fairtrade lies in the Fairtrade Minimum Price which translates into the guarantee of 
a minimum wage for workers and a demonstrated effort of the farm to work towards a 
living wage under Fairtrade’s Hired Labour Standards. Secondly, Fairtrade Premiums 
derived from 10 percent of the sales price are channelled directly to workers through 
Fairtrade Premium committees in farms388. The flower portfolio is Fairtrade’s newest 
commodity sector, the standards for which were set in 2011 following a request from 
a major Swiss supermarket. Kenya is already Fairtrade’s biggest flower producer with 
approximately389 40 farms certified, which is 70% of Fairtrade’s global flower portfolio. 
All of these farms are large or mid-scale farms which have the required capabilities to 
meet the social and environmental criteria. The viability of independent codes depends 
on sustaining demand among buyers. For example, in failing to meet this demand, 
Fair Flower Fair Plants (FFP) ceased to operate in 2017390.   
 
                                                 
387 Fairtrade ideals connecting consumers and disadvantaged workers are embodied in a set of non-
profit organisations. These include Fairtrade International (FLO) which establishes rules specific to 
various commodities, FLO CERT which carries out independent audits and checks compliance on farms 
and third, national labelling organisations (such as Max Havelaar) which promote Fairtrade in country 
(Raynolds, 2012:501). 
388 Fairtrade committees typically allocate funds to for example, payment of a percentage of school fees 
for workers’ children, hiring additional teachers in school, paying for short term skills development 
courses such as driving, tailoring, hairdressing and computer skills. They also meet workers’ ‘home 
improvement’ needs by providing interest-free loans for essential household items such as iron sheets, 
sewing machines, water tanks, cement, solar panels and cookers. In 2014, 56 % of the Fairtrade 
Premium was spent on services for workers on the farms and their families and 24 % on initiatives to 
support the wider community Fairtrade Africa (2015) accessed at https://www.fairtradeafrica.net/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/FLOWER-IMPACT-BROCHURE.pdf  
389 This figure is approximate because farms can either be registered as single estate or multi-estate 
which is where one owner has multiple flower farms.  
390 The FFP website explained that, “for the florists there was no sufficiently wide range of Fair Flowers 
Fair Plants products and too large a number of growers did not participate because of low demand.” 
Accessed at http://www.fairflowersfairplants.com/en/home-2/ 
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Among smallholders, two case studies showed that certifications as institutions are 
deeply contested, relational entities. In the NBMSTR multi-stakeholder case study391 
there was a renegotiation of the requirements of the Rainforest Alliance certification 
standard by ‘ethical agents’. This allowed Wilmar’s smallholders to supply smaller 
quantities and single variety bunches in line with their production capabilities. This 
bargain shows a re-evaluation of the GPN notion of ‘value-creation’ in direct markets 
(specifically supermarkets), which traditionally place value on large, standardised 
volumes and multi-varietal bouquets. In this scenario, the episodic bargaining power 
of smallholders was dramatically enhanced when backed by influential American 
philanthropic capital (the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) and technical support 
from powerful northern intermediaries (the IIED). These north-south dynamics also 
points to the geo-politics involved in the exercise of institutional power. The episodic 
bargaining process qualifies as such here because the institutional concessions only 
held for that moment with the support of the partners, and proved unsustainable when 
the funding for the pilot was withdrawn. Another point to note is that the societal 
embeddedness of the ethical agents392 emerges as critical for bargaining 
intermediaries.  
 
The second example of concessions made by third party certifications so as to include 
smallholder produce is the introduction of Fairtrade’s “bouquet rules”393 in order to 
increase the variety of Fairtrade flowers and increase sales. Whereas the Rainforest 
Alliance certification example showed the malleability of certifications under 
institutional power, this Fairtrade example shows how these institutions can be 
remoulded under market pressure. Even though many certifications are often enforced 
by non-market institutions (e.g., by NGOs) they are in the end market instruments that 
derive their viability from meeting market demand.  
 
                                                 
391 The case study was detailed in chapter seven. The New Models for Sustainable Trading 
Relationships (NBMSTR) funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and supported by the 
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), the Sustainable Food Lab and 
commercial experts. 
392 Buxton & Vorley (2012:1) describe the ethical agents as “having both industry knowledge and 
expertise in export market chains and networks, as well as knowledge about the needs of low-income 
households in developing countries”. 
393 This example was previously described in detail in chapter seven. 
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Multi-stakeholder initiatives are the  fifth category of codes governing the flower 
industry and bring in a variety of actors including consumers,  buyers, flower farms, 
trade unions, NGOs, civil society organisations and workers’ committees (Barrientos 
et al. 2003; Opondo 2006; Riisgaard 2009; Riisgaard & Hammer 2011; Nelson & 
Tallontire 2014). They developed from concerns about the unilaterally developed 
company or supermarket codes which had limited stakeholder consultation and 
checkbox audit systems (Nelson & Tallontire 2014:487) and which were therefore 
accountable primarily to company interests. Examples include the International Code 
of Conduct for Cut Flowers (ICC), the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) Base Code in the 
UK, the now defunct Horticultural Ethical Business Initiative (HEBI) in Kenya and the 
new Floriculture Sustainability Initiative (FSI). Broadly, MSIs are seen as base codes 
and have no certification body but are designed to act as a reference point for various 
certification schemes. The ICC stands out as an inclusive code394 in its origination 
because it uniquely involves trade unions395 and NGOs in the formulation of the base 
code. It provided the social underpinnings for reputable certifications in the flower 
industry such as MPS-SQ, FFP, FLP, FLO and HEBI (Riisgaard 2011) and sets the 
gold standard for the social requirements of flower industry certification.  
 
The Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) includes “companies, trade union organisations and 
NGOs that seeks to identify and promote good practice in the implementation of codes 
of labour practice396 in workplaces supplying the UK” (Opondo 2006). Famously, the 
ETI member Women Working Worldwide (WWW) ran a campaign which highlighted 
labour injustices in Kenyan flower farms and challenges with social auditing. This 
contributed to the development of the Kenyan multi-stakeholder platform, HEBI in 
2003 (Opondo 2006; Riddselius 2011). It adopted the ETI Base Code to the local 
                                                 
394 It was developed by a coalition of European NGOs and the International Union of Food and 
Agricultural Workers (IUF) in 1998. This was a pioneering initiative due to the central involvement of 
the IUF and which provided a base code on labour rights and environmental protections (Riisgaard 
2011). 
395 Uniquely, the ICC calls for the involvement of trade unions and NGOs in social auditing of flower 
farms, a promising but highly contentious way of producing substantive and transformative farm checks. 
This is a difficult requirement to execute uniformly and each certification has a different way of going 
translating the requirement and implementing it (Riisgaard 2011:446).   
396 ETI’s base code deals with labour practices, based on International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
conventions and though it is not an auditable standard, the ETI has established a set of best practices 
that members should adhere to. 
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context and began conducting training on participatory social auditing397. HEBI was a 
landmark initiative and very promising in its unique efforts to incorporate a wide range 
of industry actors398 and to implement participatory social auditing399, which was 
endorsed both by the KFC and FPEAK although they continued to use international 
audit procedures. It is unclear whether and to what extent HEBI is still functioning. This 
retreat from participatory social auditing which is aimed at empowering workers’ rights 
and back to a more quantitative, checklist form hollows out attempts to alter power 
dynamics in labour relations. The obsolescence of HEBI brings to light power struggles 
among key local actors, such as workers unions400 and with northern actors.   
 
The third and newest example of an MSI is the Floriculture Sustainability Initiative, 
which is a basket of fourteen voluntary certification standards and schemes developed 
by 25 sector stakeholders with the goal of moving towards a mainstreamed 
sustainable floriculture space. The various certifications are independently 
benchmarked for social and environmental criteria to globally recognised standards 
GLOBAL GAP for environmental criteria and the Global Social Compliance Program 
(GSCP) B for social criteria.  
 
Riisgaard & Gibbon (2014:18) noted that as a result of buyer pressure which has led 
Kenyan producers to adopt this myriad of certifications, “Since 2005 the sector has 
become one of the most comprehensively subject to private regulation globally.” But 
does the layered and widespread adoption of all these certifications contribute to 
                                                 
397 Nelson & Tallontire (2014:488) “The approach includes training of workers before audits to enhance 
their understanding of the process and then including workers in the audits, as well as drawing on 
evidence from civil society bodies, and draws on methods from participatory research as opposed to 
more ‘‘tick-box’’ approaches.” 
398 Tallontire et. al (2011:8) “This included Kenyan civil society organizations and trade 
associations/employers, observers (including donors and some UK-registered NGOs), and 
government representatives. The aim was to include unions but have they did not accept the 
invitation.” The Kenya Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union (KPAWU) perceived HEBI as 
northern driven, and inimical to the Union position. 
399 HEBI’s efforts at participatory social auditing were undermined in part by the demands of UK retailers 
that require that “suppliers submit their audit data to SEDEX, which dictates an audit format that is 
quantitative and far from participatory in nature” (Riisgaard, 2011:447; Riisgaard, 2010; Tallontire, 2009) 
and further creates a “command and control” approach at the international level where southern 
stakeholders have little say (Nelson & Tallontire 2014:489). 
400 Riisgaard (2009a:332) Thus, “where adoption has occurred, there has been little labour union 
participation, no significant increase in unionisation, and actually worse relations between national 
unions and national NGOs promoting labour rights”. 
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greater sustainability in the industry? The following section discusses this question 
based on the literature on the governance of the cut flower industry. 
 
 
Standards and sustainability in the cut flower industry 
There are three main apparent manifestations of the effects of certifications on driving 
sustainability in the industry, though the overall general effects remain inconclusive in 
the literature. These are parallelism, the trade-off between principles and scale, and 
the effect of standards on enabling rights versus outcome rights for workers. 
 
The main reason that farms continue to subscribe to certifications is to enhance their 
market access, rather than to advance the sustainability of their production practices. 
Farms therefore subscribe to multiple certifications to increase their access to an array 
of export markets and since the certifications converge around roughly the same 
requirements, the additional cost of subscribing to another certification is marginal. 
One manifestation of this is “parallelism” (Riisgaard 2011) which is where a wide range 
of standard schemes operate in parallel in roughly the same issue area. The challenge 
with parallelism is that it leads to a ‘race to the bottom’ with convergence around the 
lowest common standards or upholding the status quo, rather than actually raising the 
bar in terms of processes of production.  
 
Secondly, there is the trade-off between principles of sustainable production and size 
or scale of production (number of farmers adopting the standard) identified by 
Ingenbleek & Meulenberg (2006:808). Standard schemes that value scale over 
principles will have lower or less stringent sustainability standards which will often not 
be communicated to consumers. Those that value principles over scale have more 
stringent requirements that differentiate their producers from the mainstream and this 
has great value when communicated to consumers401. The implication here is that 
consistent forms of empowerment among workers will only be achieved in marginal 
standard schemes, which also explains why it is so difficult to scale up certifications to 
high principle standards (Macdonald 2007).  
 
                                                 
401 This resonates with the findings by Henderson and Humphrey (2008) that differentiate between 
risk management standards which pertain to those who privilege size over principles, and 
differentiation standards which apply to those whose focus is on principles of sustainable production.   
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The third effect draws a distinction between standards that focus on process rights 
and those that focus on outcome standards (Barrientos & Smith, 2007:716). Process 
rights or enabling rights refer to principles of freedom of association and freedom from 
discrimination which are the basis for core ILO conventions, and provide a route to 
negotiating for entitlements such as health and safety policies, living wages, better 
working hours, pensions which are outcome standards. The literature402 converges 
around a finding that most certification schemes have made advances in achieving 
outcome standards but do poorly in fortifying process rights, and further fail to reach 
the most marginalised workers such as casualised migrant women labourers. This has 
to do with whether the farms are audited using technical checklist mechanisms or 
through participatory social auditing that gives wide-ranging voice and power 
(Barrientos & Smith, 2007; Dolan & Opondo, 2005) The dominance of the technical, 
checklist, self-assessing means of auditing means that issues relating to process 
rights are overlooked and power asymmetries are maintained.  
 
Ultimately, concerns about the sustainability of the flower industry have become 
enmeshed in the nuts and bolts of private voluntary standards and certification which 
are themselves bound up in power struggles403 between northern commercial and 
consumer interests and southern producers and workers’ priorities. Increasingly, also 
the certification landscape has become corporatized as far as auditing and branding 
is concerned and therefore has its own agenda. The desired standardisation or 
mainstreaming of sustainability comes with a price tag that gives the conscionable 
consumer purchase into a system that, almost as though mirroring the commodity it is 
built around, has become increasingly aesthetic. The following section explores the 
role of Kenyan regulators in governing the cut flower industry amidst the proliferation 
of private voluntary codes of conduct.  
 
 
                                                 
402  See for example Barrientos & Smith, 2007; Dolan & Opondo, 2005; Nelson et al., 2007.   
403 A sharp critique launched from cultural anthropology asserts that certifications as a form of private 
governance of the flower industry emerge as instruments of control exercising a mode of 
‘governmentality’ that reinforces the consolidation of power by Northern commercial interests (Dolan, 
2007; Kuiper & Gemählich, 2017). 
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8.4. The Kenyan regulatory system in relation to the cut flower industry 
The institutional landscape of Kenyan flower sector regulators 
The main role of advocating for adoption and compliance of standards in the Kenyan 
cut flower sector lies with the KFC, a private voluntary membership organisation 
whose mandate is to lobby for the interests of its members (large, medium and small 
scale) and foster the responsible and safe production of cut flowers in Kenya. It is also 
the industry lobby body, and the focal point ensuring compliance to standards and 
safeguarding the reputation of the industry so as to secure and expand export markets. 
KFC was set up by large scale farmers to enhance the interests and image of the 
industry. As explained in an interview with the outgoing CEO, Jane Ngige: 
 
 “The KFC was hived off FPEAK in 1996 by five exporters who realised that for 
the business to be successful, they had to focus on market access, which is the 
gate to this business.” 
 
The Fresh Produce Exporters Association of Kenya (FPEAK) was founded in 1975 as 
a membership based trade association that is seen as representing mid-tier and 
smallholder interests, and advocates for a favourable trade environment for its 
members and enhances their ability to meet international standards and therefore 
access export markets. It developed its own code of practice in 1996, and thereafter 
developed producer compliance guidelines specific to smallholders. As the leading 
private membership based organisations that also govern Kenyan floriculture, KFC 
and FPEAK, have recently reorganised themselves into an umbrella body forming the 
Kenya Horticultural Council (KHC), under the leadership of the former KFC CEO. The 
CEO of FPEAK clarified that the KHC is not a merger but a joint body that will be 
concerned with mutual challenges in the industry such as lobbying, traceability and 
marketing but both organisations will continue to exercise their separate mandates 
(ABC website)404.  
 
In the public sector, the main regulatory bodies interacting with export preparedness 
for the cut flower industry are the Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Services (KEPHIS), 
                                                 
404 Africa Business Communities website. Accessed at 
https://africabusinesscommunities.com/features/column-hosea-machuki-kenya-can-double-its-
horticulture-export-earnings/ 
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the Horticultural Crops Directorate (HCD), the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) and 
the less well acknowledged Pests Control Products Board (PCPB)405.  
 
Established in 1996 as the lead regulator in agriculture, KEPHIS is responsible for 
issuing phyto-sanitary certificates and ensuring that cut flower producers meet the 
stringent maximum residue levels (MRLs) required for export access to the EU, which 
began mandatory pesticide inspections406. The KEPHIS seed and plant variety 
protection office is also responsible for managing plant breeders’ rights in Kenya, 
which are crucial for the commercialisation of flower varieties grown in Kenya.  
 
The HCD established in 1967 is mandated to facilitate the development, promotion, 
coordination407 and regulation of the horticultural sub-sector in Kenya. It is also 
responsible for issuing export certificates to cut flower exporters. The KRA is 
responsible for collecting corporate tax from cut flower exporters, and has in the last 
decade been embroiled in court cases against flower farms arraigned for transfer 
pricing, which will be discussed in a later section in this chapter. 
 
There is also a range of government organisations with environmental mandates that 
conduct audits on farm production processes. These primarily include the National 
Environmental Management Agency (NEMA) and Water Resources Authority 
(WRA)408, which are under the Ministry of Environment and Forestry and the Ministry 
of Water and Irrigation409. NEMA is the principal agency in charge of environmental 
management and coordinates environmental conservation activities. WRA is 
mandated to regulate water use among competing users, control pollution, 
                                                 
405 The PCPB is mandated to by An Act of Parliament (1983) to “regulate the importation, exportation, 
manufacture, distribution and use of products used for the control of pests and of the organic function 
of plants and animals and for connected purposes.” Accessed at http://www.pcpb.or.ke/ 
406 This was a particular challenge in 2013-14 when Kenyan cut flower exports were increasingly 
intercepted at entry into EU markets for breaching the maximum residue levels of pesticides such as 
Dimethoate. As a sustainable alternative, the flower industry has increasingly adopted the use of bio-
controls a to deal with cut flower pests and diseases. Accessed at: 
http://agritrade.cta.int/Agriculture/Commodities/Horticulture/New-EU-maximum-residue-levels-hit-
Kenyan-vegetable-exports 
407 To facilitate market access and minimise post-harvest losses, HCD has also provided refrigerated 
trucks for hire by farmers, built marketing centres and collection depots (Bolo, 2012). 
408 WRA was known as the Water Resources Management Authority (WRMA) before April 2017, 
pursuant to the enactment of Section 11 of the Water Act, 2016. Accessed at https://www.wra.go.ke/ 
409 The portfolio of Ministries in Kenya is regularly reshuffled under different political dispensations. 
For example, in 2002 when NEMA was formed, it was under the Ministry of Environment, Water and 
Natural Resources but is currently Ministry of Environment and Forestry. 
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disseminate information on water resources and facilitate adaptation to climate 
change. 
 
In addition, there are civil society organisations in the Lake Naivasha area that provide 
a platform for collective riparian and environmental management410. These include 
The Lake Naivasha Growers Group which helps farms to manage the ecosystem 
around the lake and the shared natural resources. The Lake Naivasha Water 
Resource Users Association (LANAWRUA) deals with linking farm management and 
the local community on water catchment issues while Lake Naivasha Riparian 
Association (LNRA) is a community based organization that was established in 1927 
by landowners411 around the lake to ensure sound environmental management of the 
lake’s resources. Despite the various agencies commissioned to handle 
environmental compliance, there remain loopholes412 in the parameters considered.  
As an export-oriented industry, three key state institutions are mandated to enhance 
trade. These include the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Co-operatives (MITC), the 
Export Promotion Council (EPC) and the Kenya Investment Authority (KIA). The 
department of external trade under MITC facilitates Kenya’s external trade and as 
such is responsible for negotiating trade policy under WTO terms. In 2017, MITC413 
launched the National Trade Negotiations Council (NTNC) to handle trade 
negotiations, which include the Economic Partnership Agreement between the East 
African Community (EAC) and the European Union.  
 
The Export Promotion Council was established under the Ministry of Trade in 1992 to 
facilitate the growth of Kenya’s exports at the onset of the Structural Adjustment 
                                                 
410 The law on riparian zone protection is not in a piece of a single legislation, but rather is fragmented 
in numerous pieces of legislations like Environment Management and Coordination Act (EMCA) 1999, 
the Water Quality Regulations (WQR) (2006), Water Resources Management Rules (WRMR) (2007), 
the Agricultural Act (Cap318), Forest Act, 2005, the Land Act 2012, the Water Act, 2002 and the Wildlife 
(Conservation and Management) Act 2013. This presents a problem of overlapping mandates and lack 
of coordination in enforcement (Matunda 2015). 
411 LNRA has a diverse membership of actors with a stake in maintaining the ecological integrity of the 
wetlands. 
412 One farm director in Central Kenya explained that neither the government environmental regulations 
nor NEMA considers pollution of sub-soil water in its checks, implying that they do not check whether 
farms allow pollutants in the soil. This is why it is important for farms to grow their flowers in soil-less 
matter using hydroponic technology which enables growers to make use of otherwise infertile land and 
to recycle up to 40% of their water use. 
413 MITC also hosts Brand Kenya which is working on supporting the branding and marketing of Kenyan 
flowers in export markets. 
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Programs. It provides trade information through the Centre for Business Information 
and training for exporters. It also supports product development and facilitates the 
expansion and development of export markets. The KIA was set up under the 
Investment Promotion Act of 2004, thereby succeeding the Investment Promotion 
Centre created in 1985. KIA has an expanded mandate in regards to investment 
promotion and facilitation and policy advocacy and acts as a one-stop shop for 
investors.   
 
The network of local institutions, both public and private, forming the regulatory 
landscape of the flower industry is summarised in figure 8.2. below.  
 
Network of institutions regulating the Kenyan flower industry 
 
Figure 8.1. 
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
Beyond certification: Three instruments of governance in the Kenyan flower 
industry 
There are three instruments governing the Kenyan flower sector – the Horticulture 
Traceability System, taxation and trade policy under the Economic Partnership 
Agreement with the EU which are discussed below.  
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1.Traceability mechanisms  
In the wake of interceptions and rejections from 2011 of horticultural produce from the 
EU that breached MRLs (Agritrade)414, horticulture sector stakeholders415 launched the 
Horticulture Traceability System (HTS)416 in 2016. It traces back to the farm any 
produce that is non-compliant, and with the live feedback loop, prompts the 
implementation of immediate remedial measures (AFA417 website).  
 
The traceability system creates individual farm accountability for the quality and 
compliance of the produce they export, and avoids penalties for the industry as a 
whole. The relational nature of the firm advocated in GPN 2.0 theory is evident in the 
working of this system. HTS facilitates a more transparent firm-territory relationship 
(Dicken & Malmberg 2001) by breaking down the boundaries between local production 
operations and European export markets.  The resultant stronger relationship has 
increased confidence in Kenyan cut flower produce in export markets. It is also 
expected to boost the participation of smallholders in export markets though the extent 
of this is yet to be established. It is also possible that the traceability system could 
operate as a ‘technology of surveillance418’ that identifies, isolates and unwittingly 
enables a black-listing of smallholders in particular who have limited recourse to 




2. Taxation in the Kenyan flower industry 
Taxation in the Kenyan flower industry is a hotly contested regulatory issue around 
three main issues – the multiplicity of taxes at county and national levels, the 
implementation of Value Added Tax (V.A.T.) on locally traded flowers and in the 
                                                 
414 Accessed at http://agritrade.cta.int/Agriculture/Commodities/Horticulture/New-EU-maximum-
residue-levels-hit-Kenyan-vegetable-exports 
415 KFC, FPEAK, KEPHIS, PCPB, Kenya Vegetables and Fruits Exporters Association, KALRO with 
funding from USAID.  
416 The HTS is a cloud-based system which includes a mobile application to capture and upload 
information at the farm, a web reporting portal which stores data in a central location, as well as a 
labelling system enabled with quick reference codes. 
417 Agriculture and Food Authority. Accessed at: https://www.agricultureauthority.go.ke/kenya-
government-launches-system-to-track-horticultural-products/ 
418 Dolan (2007) used the term to make an argument about the use of Fairtrade as a mode of 
governing the African as subject in global ethical trade initiatives. 
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delayed payment of rebates, and transfer pricing. The multiplication and duplication of 
taxes (or ‘double taxation’) at the county and national level were prominent grievances 
articulated by the flower farm managers in the research sample and the KFC. With the 
onset of devolution of administrative power to 48 newly established counties419 in 
2013, came the implementation of a new layer of taxation. Devolution highlights the 
nestedness (Aggarwal 2005) of state regulatory institutions between the national and 
county levels, which though meant to enhance the relationship between the industry 
and the state, in this case creates friction.  
“What is challenging us at the moment is devolution - in terms of double 
taxation. You find something is being asked for by the national government and 
then the county government also wants a share. For example, cess tax. Last 
year 2014/2015 we spent a good amount of time fighting cess tax from the 
Nakuru County government where they wanted to charge something for every 
shilling we sell. I think the ridiculous figure they had come up with was 2% of 
our sales turnover. I mean that's KRA now. Then if we had branded the truck 
[transporting to the flowers to the airport], then we would pay so much. By the 
time I am in Limuru, Kiambu county is also asking me for the licence and when 
you go to Nairobi, the county also wants money. This is why we are fighting 
with these guys. It has come through devolution.” – Flower Farm-M Director.  
 
As the quote shows, the number of business licences that farms need to operate has 
increased with the decentralisation of government. According to the KFC there are 
now about 40 different levies that exporting commercial farms have to deal with. Over-
taxation has become a thorn in the flesh of the flower sector and the KFC argues that 
to evade the burdensome taxation regime, some industry actors are setting up new 
operations in Ethiopia where the cost of production is lower, although none has fully 
relocated (The Star Newspaper, 2016)420. In an exercise of non-decisional bargaining 
power (Bachrach & Bachrach 1962) discussed in chapter two, smallholders who are 
few and relatively invisible when in the eyes of the tax authorities, are able to 
circumvent the system and avoid paying cess tax.  
                                                 
419 Previously Kenya’s had a provincial administrative system with nine provinces and therefore 
considerably less bureaucratic charges to operate trade across provinces.  
420 The Star Newspaper. April 22, 2016.  Accessed at https://www.the-
star.co.ke/news/2016/04/22/kenya-flower-industry-resilient-despite-high-taxes_c1335371 
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A second taxation challenge that affects primarily local consolidators is the 16% V.A.T. 
charged to locally traded cut flowers from 2013421 which makes local consolidators’ 
flower exports less competitive in export markets. For mid-scale producers, the main 
challenge is with delays experienced in processing VAT refunds due to many years of 
backlog at the KRA, a situation which has been described as the “Achilles heel” of the 
government in supporting the flower sector, as in the quote below.  
“Producers pay VAT on all their inputs and can then claim back. These VAT 
claims for the industry are amounting to Ksh 50 Billion (approximately $500 
million) but last year (2015) they were looking at Ksh 100 Billion. It is one of the 
Achilles heels of the government in terms of supporting the industry.” – Jane 
Ngige, KFC CEO. 
 
The Kenyan treasury explained that these delays are caused either by exporters 
double-filling claims on both the online portal (i-tax) and the paper forms. Secondly, if 
an exporter is indebted to KRA, refunds will not be paid until the outstanding debt is 
cleared (Flowerweb)422. The Export Processing Zones (EPZs) are also out of reach for 
the industry since as explained in the quote below, producers are in a double-bind 
since on the one hand they are exporting a primary product but on the other hand, 
they engage in value addition by packaging bouquets for export. 
“Exporters are seen on one hand as primary producers and so cannot benefit 
from the EPZs which are valid only to exporters who prove value addition. One 
the other hand, they are seen as manufacturers since they add value by 
packaging and so have to pay the Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) levies 
which are paid by manufacturers.” -  Jane Ngige, KFC CEO. 
 
The third issue under taxation is that of transfer pricing, which has received significant 
press coverage in the last decade. Transfer pricing423 is used to inflate profits in 
                                                 
421 The Value-Added Tax Act was passed in 2013 adding 16% tax on locally traded cut flowers. Prior 
to this cut flowers were zero rated goods. The KFC unsuccessfully lobbied for zero rating on local 
sales of cut flowers in the same way that coffee and tea exports are treated. (Kenya Flower Council 
blog) Accessed at: http://www.kenyaflowercouncil.org/blog/?p=4798 
422 Flowerweb website. Accessed at http://www.flowerweb.com/en/article/172733/Kenya-Flower-
Council-meets-Revenue-Body 
423 The ‘transfer price’ is the price at which transactions are carried out between companies in the same 
group. 
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jurisdictions with low tax and to decrease profits in countries where the tax is high so 
as to reduce the firm’s overall tax burden424. Transfer pricing legislation based on 
OECD guidelines425 was introduced in Kenya in 2006 to enhance tax enforcement 
capacity. Since then large scale, high profile Kenyan flower farms such as the now 
bankrupt Sher Karuturi flower farm and Van den Berg Roses426 have been sued by the 
KRA for dodging taxes by conspiring with overseas partners. KRA launched audits 
when it was noted that many flower farms were consistently recording tax losses or 
minimal tax profits. In April 2013, the court established that Sher Karuturi, then the 
world’s biggest producer of roses, used transfer pricing to avoid paying the 
government $11 million in corporate income tax. Overall, Kenya could be losing up to 
$5 million a year through transfer pricing from its flower exports (Guardian newspaper 
report , April 1, 2011)427. This case marked the first time that an African government 
had brought a large multinational company to court for transfer pricing through a fully 
public process.” (ITC, 2014)428. The impact of transfer pricing is significant and 
predatory for the economy and is also evidence of the high-stakes struggle for 
accountability between developing countries and multi-national companies which 
engage in regulatory arbitrage.  
 
Power struggles in the flower industry occur not only at the sub-national level between 
the state and producers, and at the local-global interface as states do their best to hold 
multi-national companies accountable, but also at the regional level in the negotiation 
                                                 
424 This is done, for example, by overstating the price of a rose stem produced within a low tax 
jurisdiction ‘K’ and sold to a sister firm in high tax jurisdiction ‘D’. In this way, the firm in ‘D’ could report 
high costs and lower profits, while that in K, the low tax jurisdiction, would report a profit and record a 
lower tax burden overall. In this regard, The Standard Newspaper (April, 2014) reported that Sher 
Karuturi which was found guilty of tax evasion. The firm paid only KSh 4.80 for a rose stem, while it 
sells the same flowers through its Dubai-based subsidiary at as much as Sh100. Accessed at: 
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000108060/taxpayers-could-lose-sh600m-in-kra-
tax-deal-with-karuturi 
425 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations from the 
OECD Model Tax Convention.  
426 Nation newspaper, July 26, 2016.  In 2016, KRA sued Van den Berg Roses for tax evasion through 
transfer pricing in the amount Ksh 1.1 Billion (approximately $11 million). KRA accused VDB of 
withholding transaction details required to calculate the end customer buying price on a transaction by 
transaction basis, while VDB contended that KRA calculated the tax due using a general formula 
(comparable unit price (CUP) method) rather than one based on actual sales (resale price mechanism 
(RPM). Accessed at: https://www.nation.co.ke/business/KRA-accuses-flower-dealer-of-playing-dirty-
with-parent-firm/996-3316130-qop2pz/index.html 
427 Guardian Newspaper, April 1 2011. Kenya Flower Industry’s taxing question. Accessed at 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/apr/01/kenya-flower-industry-tax-investigation 
428 International Trade Centre website. Accessed at http://www.intracen.org/itc/blog/market-insider/Tax-
authorities-investigate-flower-farms-in-Kenya/ 
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for access to European export markets.  This discussion of the multi-scalar reality of 
governance in the flower GPN (Coe & Yeung 2015) gives equal importance to sub-
national and regional dynamics. The following section on regional contestations in 
trade policy explores trade relations between Kenya and the EU, as the blueprint on 
which other private governance mechanisms such as the afore-discussed 
certifications, traceability and taxation become viable.  
 
3. The Economic Partnership Agreement and regional contestation 
This section is developed primarily from an analysis of documentary sources on trade 
policy, as well as interviews with the KFC and two mid-scale flower farm managers 
(Farms M and W). The Cotonou Partnership Agreement of 2000, (henceforth referred 
to as the Economic Partnership Agreement, ‘EPA’) redefined the trade relationship 
between African, Caribbean and Pacific (‘ACP’) countries and the EU. It succeeded 
the Lomé Convention429  which enabled preferential trade terms and so was argued to 
be in contravention of WTO rules. The EPA rendered trade reciprocal and 
differentiated according to the abilities of ACP countries. Negotiations would therefore 
be organised with trading blocs such as the East African Community (EAC)430, and in 
conformity to WTO rules (Kenya Human Rights Commission 2014). The EPA also has 
safeguarding provisions which allow each side to reintroduce duties if imports from the 
other side threaten to disturb its economy (European parliament)431.  
 
Intra-regional negotiation challenges began in 2007, when the EAC directed its 
members to harmonise their positions on the EPA and give a market offer to the 
European Union (Kenya Human Rights Commission 2014). While some area 
negotiations were concluded, the deliberations failed to conclude the full EPA 
negotiations leading to the implementation of a Framework EPA in the interim. In 2014, 
the EAC was on the verge of moving to “the ‘Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP)’, where its exports to the EU were to attract import duties of between 5% and 
                                                 
429 The Lomé Convention was signed in 1975 between the EU and ACP countries as a non-reciprocal, 
preferential trade agreement. It exempted agricultural goods and minerals from tariffs and duties 
thereby providing special access to the EU market and the EU also pledged development assistance. 
It was renegotiated every 5 years and finally expired on Feb 29th, 2000 after 25 years with the onset of 
a global trade liberalisation agenda.  
430 The East African Community is comprised of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda. 
South Sudan which joined the EAC in September 2016 is not part of the agreement.  
431 Accessed at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-balanced-and-progressive-
trade-policy-to-harness-globalisation/file-epa-with-east-africa 
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22% while the other EAC partner states would continue trading under the ‘Everything 
But Arms’ (EBA)432 initiative thus making Kenya more disadvantaged than the rest of 
EAC Partner States.”(Kenya Human Rights Commission 2014). Further, given that 
Kenya’s cut flower industry supplies 38% of the cut flowers in Europe (KFC website), 
it was likely to be hardest hit economically of all the countries in the region if the bloc 
did not sign and ratify the EPA by the October 1st 2014 deadline. Failure to ratify meant 
that exporters would face a tax bill equivalent to KSh 100 million ($1 million) per week, 
and amounting to a potential loss of 150,000 jobs (Trade Law Centre, 2014)433. 
 
The major objection to the EPA is the requirement for gradual opening of up to 80% 
of EAC markets to EU imports. Tanzania argued that the EPA’s requirement to open 
Tanzania’s markets to EU imports, most of which are manufactured goods, antithetical 
to the development of infant manufacturing industries434. The second argument 
against signing the EPA was that it would undermine regional trade.  Almost 50% of 
the total EAC exports within Africa is made up of manufactured exports 
(AllAfrica.com)435. Under the EPA, manufactured goods from the EU would enter the 
EAC duty free and local manufactures would not be competitive against them. Burundi 
refused to sign the agreement because the EU had imposed sanctions for President 
Pierre Nkurunziza’s unconstitutional clinging to power, while Uganda chose to stand 
in solidarity with Burundi and Tanzania’s opposition.  
 
The central position of the Kenyan flower industry in the negotiations meant that the 
KFC was heavily engaged in lobbying for the signing and ratification of the EPA to 
ensure favourable market access. In August 2016, a trade delegation comprised of 
the KFC, Union Fleurs (The international flower trade association) and Kenya’s 
Minister for Trade travelled to Brussels to make the case that failure to have a special 
agreement between the EU and Kenya would have disastrous consequences not only 
                                                 
432 This difference in trading status is because Kenya is classified as a developing country while the 
other EAC members are least developed countries eligible to trade under the EBA. 
433 Accessed at https://www.tralac.org/news/article/6442-kenya-eu-sign-epa-agreement.html 
434 Allafrica. Com (28th July, 2016). In 2016, only 6% of EAC exports were manufactured goods, while 
91% of the trade is comprised of agricultural goods and primary commodities. Further, Tanzania argued 
that while 348 of its commodities are in the EPA’s “sensitive list” and enjoy a protected status, the 
industries producing Tanzania’s remaining 648 tariff lines would have to compete with EU imports. 
Accessed at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201607280743.html 
435 Accessed at https://allafrica.com/stories/201607280743.html 
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for Kenya’s flower trade and economy, but for the global flower trade (Florinews)436. 
The uncertainties in trade posed by Brexit made the situation even more urgent. Kenya 
and Rwanda went ahead and signed the EPA but only Kenya has ratified it. This 
means that the EPA still cannot come into full effect,  though Kenya can still benefit 
from  the EU Market Access Regulation (MAR)437 (European Parliament)438.  
 
The EPA negotiations are a prime example of the exercise of episodic bargaining 
power (Clegg, 2002). In this scenario, the flower industry’s institutional power is 
derived from a combination of its economic heft given that it contributes 1.45% to 
Kenya’s GDP, its political and industrial capital in Kenya and foreign elite interests.  
Further, its collective power is displayed under the banner of the powerful and 
articulate lobbying voice of the KFC. The industry’s power was then altogether 
employed in bargaining this minefield of trade policy negotiations and competing 
developmental interests with great dexterity.  
 
The negotiations pitted Kenya, which is the only country in the region with ‘developing 
country’ status against the long-term industrial policy agendas of the rest which are 
categorised as ‘least developed countries’, thereby straining the firm-territory 
relationship at the regional level. The flower industry’s flexed muscle in these EPA 
negotiations has also shown it to be yet again439 a powerful liberalising force in trade 
policy. It highlights the immense power of mid and large scale flower farms most of 
which are owned by the political, industrial and foreign elite (as explained in chapters 
1 and 6 of this thesis) over those of smallholders, who protested against the EPAs in 
Kenya for being excluded from negotiations (Grain 2017). The section that follows 
elaborates on various bargaining strategies employed by small and mid-scale 
producers in this global competitive landscape. 
                                                 
436 Accessed at http://www.florinews.com/index.php/past-featured-articles/40-past-featured-
articles/260-how-the-kenyan-flower-industry-was-saved-from-a-disaster 
437 Florinews online Report. EU Market Access Regulation (MAR) grants Kenya duty-free access to 
the EU market on a long-term basis and without any specific deadline for expiry, but it remains a 
unilateral instrument in the hands of the EU. Accessed at: http://www.florinews.com/index.php/past-
featured-articles/40-past-featured-articles/260-how-the-kenyan-flower-industry-was-saved-from-a-
disaster 
438 Accessed at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-balanced-and-progressive-
trade-policy-to-harness-globalisation/file-epa-with-east-africa 
439 Previously, the flower industry was instrumental in leading Kenya to sign up to the International 
Union for the Protection of New Plant Varieties (UPOV) which limits access to protected varieties 
through plant breeders’ rights (discussed in chapter 6). 
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8.5. Extra-firm bargaining strategies by Kenyan cut flower producers 
Extra-firm bargaining strategies include the contestations which take place between 
cut flower producers and the plethora of institutions governing the cut flower market at 
a local, regional and global level. To gain access to export markets beyond the auction 
to the more lucrative and more strictly policed supermarkets, Kenyan cut flower 
producers employ a variety of strategies to navigate the trade landscape. The three 
strategies include compliance, contestation, and circumvention which are summarised 
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Extra-firm strategies for market access for Kenyan cut flower producers 
 
 Table 8.3. 
 Source: Author’s analysis 
 
The rising dominance of supermarkets as preferred markets by capable cut flower 
producers entrenches the buyer-driven governance of the trade. Producers supplying 
supermarkets must be consistently compliant to the stringent supermarket 
certifications which stipulate exact volumes and varieties in line with seasons, and 
demand consistency of supply year-round from its suppliers440. The mode of 
governance  exhibited in this relation between large capable producers and 
supermarkets is ‘modular’ (Gereffi et al. 2005b), whereby suppliers are capable 
enough to meet the demands of complex transactions and decipher highly codified 
information. 
 
                                                 
440 As outlined in chapter 6, supermarkets therefore increasingly source from a small, select group of 
very technologically sophisticated, large scale and vertically integrated farms that are capable of 
complying to the certification requirements, a scenario which exemplifies “the cascade effect” (Nolan 
et al. 2008). 
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Contestation through lobbying is the main bargaining strategy employed for more 
favourable regulation in the public sector. This is seen in various examples highlighting 
episodic and non-decisional forms of bargaining. This chapter has explained how, the 
collective power of the industry organised under the banner of KFC, the mid and large 
scale cut flower industry is lobbying the Kenyan government to streamline the 
duplication of taxes at the county and national levels. The KFC is also lobbying for the 
timely repayment of VAT to cut flower producers. This chapter has also illustrated high 
profile contestation between various firms and state around the issue of tax evasion 
through transfer pricing, as some multi-national flower firms seek to lower their tax 
burdens, and the state seeks corporate tax accountability to enhance its own 
revenues.  
 
Secondly, the political might of the flower industry has been witnessed in trade policy 
negotiations, as the KFC lobbied for the signing and ratification of the EPA by the East 
African Community. At a global level, a multi-scalar alliance showcasing the 
institutional strength of the Kenyan flower industry represented by KFC, the state 
(represented by the Minister for Trade) and the global flower sector (represented by 
Union Fleurs), lobbied the EU in Brussels for European market access for the Kenyan 
industry given the failure of the EAC bloc to agree on the terms of the EPA. These 
forms of contestation between the industry and regulation in the public sector have 
serious effects on the nature of the firm-territory relationship.  The weak overall 
collective action of the considerably few small-scale flower farmers has meant their 
exclusion from the processes of public lobbying over trade policy, although that might 
change with the formation of the Kenya Horticultural Council that brings together KFC 
and FPEAK. In a classic case of non-decisional bargaining, smallholders who make 
up a marginal tax base, and those who sell locally under informal trade at the Nairobi 
flower market capitalise on their relative invisibility to avoid dealing with the tax-man.  
 
The third way to manoeuvre the meshwork of industry certifications is to use ‘strategies 
of circumvention’ by selecting to operate in emerging markets in the flower trade such 
as the UAE and Japan, that are known to be less stringent. Alternatively, rather than 
target non-traditional markets, producers can target specialised retailers such as 
florists and garden centres in Europe that are less keen on certification and are more 
concerned with obtaining a diversity of varieties of high quality. This strategy is 
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employed by the less capable or marginal supplier such as smallholders, or mid-scale 
flower farms that are struggling to transition to supermarkets in Europe. This chapter 
highlighted one notable example of a strategy of circumvention involving smallholders 
where through informal networks, the sourcing manager of a supermarket identified 
smallholders to supply their non-certified though high quality summer flowers to a mid-
scale farm that then consolidated them into ready-made bouquets that are certified for 
sale. The success of these strategies of circumvention relies heavily on the degree of 
societal embeddedness, and building trust between the producer and the buyer.  
 
8.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the landscape of regulation in the form of private voluntary 
standards as certifications and codes of conduct, as well as state sanctioned 
regulation in the form of taxation, traceability mechanisms and trade policy. The public 
and private modes of governance intersect with each other and are inextricable in 
operation, and this chapter has argued that the public domain sets the blue print on 
which private modes of governance operate.  
 
The suitability of GPN over GVC analytical frameworks for the Kenyan flower industry 
becomes evident. The engagement with GVC theory here is only to highlight the 
existence of modular governance in the compliant relationship between large capable 
producers and supermarkets, and captive governance (Gereffi et al. 2005) in regards 
to the limited supply capabilities of small-scale farms to supermarkets, thereby 
necessitating their various strategies of circumvention. The GPN framework emerges 
clearly first in the location of the contestations between the industry and the web of 
governance as extra-firm strategies where firms bargain for market power, proprietary 
rights and social and political legitimacy (Coe & Yeung, 2015).  
 
The complexity of the ‘web of governance’ also lends itself to GPN’s network 
metaphor, thereby avoiding deterministic or unilateral interpretations of the exercise 
of power among industry actors. The three locations of power materialise, specifically 
institutional power as embodied in the range of regulatory actors, and collective power 
as exhibited in the KFC’s organisational and representational force. Producers’ 
bargaining power using the examples of episodic and non-decisional modes of 
bargaining is seen as a practice intersecting those locations. Further, these 
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contestations highlight the GPN notion of multi-scalarity – occurring sub-nationally as 
far as taxation is concerned, regionally as in the case of trade policy and globally all 
across the production network as compliance to supermarket codes. The successes 
of actors’ extra-firm  strategies are  tied to the “societal embeddedness” (Hess 2004) 
of the firm, which is related to the GPN notion of the firm-territory nexus expounds on 
how contestations shape the relationship of the firm to the territory be that at the county 
level, nationally or regionally.  
 
Three extra-firm bargaining strategies of compliance, contestation and circumvention 
(summarised in figure 8.3.) are introduced as testament to the agency of producers in 
buyer-driven markets. The strategies are dependent first on producer capability and 
scale so that those who are capable, comply and therefore access the lucrative direct 
markets, while those who are less capable find more creative ways of circumventing 
the meshwork of certifications that polices entry by seeking emergent markets or 
specialised retail centres. Contestation through lobbying is the main way in which the 
industry as collectively organised under KFC can bargain with public-sector regulators. 
There is evidence of the Kenyan flower industry flexing its collective and institutional 
power as expressed in its economic and political identity to sway trade policy (the 
EPA) in its favour, in the process arguably subverting the long-term industrial policy 
interests of other countries in the East African community.  
 
The geopolitics of extra-firm bargaining is seen through benchmarking processes 
carried out by regulators in the global south which is testament to the ‘nestedness’ of 
these institutions of governance. Change in certifications as institutions of governance 
also emerges under pressure from ethical and market concerns. The institutional 
power of philanthropic capital (as in the Gates Foundation) and influential northern 
intermediaries can lead changes in certification to accommodate smallholder 
production, and thereby facilitate market access. The sustainability of relationships of 
dependency of this nature is however questionable.  
 
Governed by an increasingly complex meshwork of private voluntary certification, 
supermarkets roll out a ‘cascade effect’ (Nolan et al. 2008) which entrenches the 
dominance of larger more capable producers as preferred suppliers and weeds out 
the smaller less capable suppliers. Even so, producers continue to build 
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infrastructures of inclusion through a diversity of bargaining strategies which rely on 
collective action, cultivation of deeper societal embeddedness, and a functional 
understanding of the heterogeneity of export markets. This chapter’s narrative overall 
challenges the notion that certifications and codes of conduct are immutable 
gatekeepers of market access and views them as contested institutions of governance 
which are in the process of constantly being made and remade.   
  236 
 
9. In Conclusion: The flower industry as a late bloomer 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the underpinnings of the thesis narrative and 
brings together the overall empirical and analytical findings of this thesis in relation to 
the research questions. It then discusses the novelty and implications of the research 
and finally suggests areas for future research.  
 
 
9.1. Empirical and analytical findings 
In a bifurcated global trade landscape dominated by giants of industry and 
characterised by low demand growth, buyer-driven governance, and a proliferation of 
private codes of conduct, this thesis asks: “What strategies do Kenyan cut flower 
producer networks use in seeking greater bargaining power amidst shifts in 
export markets?” 
 
For greater clarity, the main research question was split into three sub-questions. The 
first research was aimed at exploring the suitability of the GPN lens in application to 
the Kenyan cut flower industry and thereby developing an analytical framework: 
Thesis sub-question 1: To what extent does the Global Production Networks 
framework explain how cut flower producers adapt to shifts in end markets? 
a) To what extent does GPN theory explain the interests and position of the 
variety of actors in the Kenyan cut flower production network in line with the 
shifts in end markets? 
b) To what extent does GPN theory help us to understand the strategies of 
actors as they bargain for market access? 
c) What are the strengths and limitations of GPN theory in explaining the 
development implications for the localities where the Kenyan cut flower 
network is embedded? 
 
In answer to sub-question 1 (a), chapter three categorises the diversity of actors into 
firms, intermediaries and extra-firm actors as defined by GPN theory. This supports 
the segmenting of firms outlined in the production network summarised in image 5.1. 
including breeders, producers, freight-forwarders, import handlers and the markets. A 
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case is made for the consolidator-exporters as the key intermediaries for producers to 
direct markets, while extra-firm actors include the community of regulatory institutions 
described in chapter eight. Dembinski’s (2009) notion of ‘focal firms’ is used to 
characterise and highlight the central role of the consolidator-exporter, which utilises 
its embedded knowledge, technology and networks to link the production to the 
marketing ends.  
 
Sub-question 1 (b) expounds on strategies emerging from mapping GPN 2.0 network 
configurations to the Kenyan cut flower producer networks. The intra-firm, inter-firm 
and extra-firm categories in GPN 2.0 prove useful for analysing the strategies 
particularly of mid-scale flower production networks. According to Coe & Yeung (2015) 
these GPN categories enable us to think of actors in the production network as 
relational entities whose relative power is always under contestation, in addition to 
their role in minimising transactions costs.  
 
In answer to sub-question 1 (c), this thesis finds that GPN 2.0 provides a useful 
threefold focus on the value capture trajectories, strategic coupling and the sub-
national scale. The notion of value capture provides an embedded political economy 
understanding because it depends on the capabilities of the firm and considerations 
of the asymmetry of power between actors such as between supermarkets and farms. 
The concept also encompasses the difficulties of replacing a firm with specific 
knowledge such as a consolidator-exporter, specificities within the industry such as 
demand fluctuations with seasonality, and local conditions in the territory where the 
firm is anchored such as with negotiating for duty free access to European export 
markets. 
 
The notion of strategic coupling is also useful in that it explains the linking of the 
advantages of regions to the needs of GPN through a dynamic bargaining process. 
The contestations involved in strategic coupling are explained for example in the 
national and sub-national processes of lobbying by the Kenyan flower industry for 
streamlining of taxation, and regionally through the Economic Partnership agreement 
negotiations within the East African Community, as elaborated in chapter eight of this 
thesis.  
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The second thesis sub-question probes the practices and experiences of cut flower 
producer networks in Kenya in adapting to shifts in export markets, as well as to local 
production challenges.  
Thesis sub question 2: What are the experiences of Kenyan cut flower producer 
networks in seeking greater bargaining power in European export markets? 
a. How do cut flower producer networks manoeuvre local production 
challenges to gain greater bargaining power in export markets? 
b. What is the role of intermediary firms in positioning cut flower producers 
in the changing export markets? 
c. What are the institutional pressures / constraints that cut flower producer 
networks face in seeking greater bargaining power in new export 
markets? 
Chapters six, seven and eight detail the empirical observations and analyses from 
mid-scale, small-scale production networks and the web of governance institutions 
through which they negotiate export market access.  
 
In answer to question 2 (a), the first finding is concerned with intra-firm strategies on 
selection of varieties and labour management. While mid-scale farms supplying the 
Dutch auctions tend towards diversification of their varieties, those supplying direct 
markets especially supermarkets adopt what this thesis calls a ‘Triple S’ strategy of 
selecting varieties – specialization, standardisation and scaling. This is summarized 
in table 6.2. Smaller farms within the mid-scale segment that cannot meet supermarket 
demands perhaps due to constraints of scale and production capabilities were 
observed to ‘go niche’. They opt to secure markets for the supply of ‘occasion’ varieties 
such as delphinium and bouvardia which are demanded in limited quantities for special 
occasions. Smaller farms are also better able to provide the required attention to detail 
necessary to grow unusual varieties.  
 
The second key finding on intra-firm strategy has to do with labour hiring strategies. 
Field work elucidated two internal tensions in farm hiring strategies which are linked 
to the two desired outputs – higher worker productivity and higher worker retention. 
The first tension links levels of education with worker retention. Farms say they require 
at least secondary school educated workers but they prefer to hire the under-educated 
because they are more easily retained over a longer period of time. The second 
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tension links levels of education with worker productivity. Farms actively hire workers 
with lower education (despite their desire for more productive workers) thereby 
overlooking the notion that educated workers are more likely to train better, add 
greater value, and make more informed decisions at work. These findings are 
complemented by a third observation on labour hiring strategies, which was the 
preference for tacit or hands-on knowledge over technical knowledge. Overall, there 
is a history of employment in this sector that is influenced by hiring strategies that 
default to pre-capitalist forms of contracting which privilege familial referencing, tacit 
knowledge and gendered norms.  
 
The research found that smallholders plant two or more flower varieties as part of a 
diversification strategy. They obtain plant material from their peers, from contractual 
collectives or from government research institutes. The source matters because 
farmers cannot commercially grow summer flowers for export to the auction unless 
they have paid royalties, which are collected at the auction. For smallholders, the main 
challenge is not only accessing suitable varieties but also balancing the planting and 
crop cycles with the seasonal cycles of demand at the auction. In terms of labour, 
smallholders use family labour, which is sufficient given that flowers are grown typically 
on a quarter acre of land.  
 
Inter-firm strategies on the relationship between flower farms and other actors in their 
production networks are intertwined with the central role of consolidator-exporters, 
which is referred to in thesis sub-question 2 (b). Consolidator-exporters are focal firms 
in smoothing out supply the between producers in the global south and buyers located 
in the lucrative direct markets the global north. They add value by converting flowers 
from a product to an aesthetic commodity through consolidation in the form of 
bouquets. Using their sophisticated logistical and cold chain technologies, they 
provide just-in-time delivery which is of paramount importance in maintaining the 
integrity of highly perishable aesthetically valued commodities. Indeed, they are 
becoming an entirely new locus of power as strategic partners to supermarkets, which 
are becoming more dominant in shaping demand and governance. Chapter six 
analyses three case studies of inter-firm relationships centering the consolidators-
exporters. These included a multi-national consolidator, a joint-venture consolidator 
formed through collective action of four farms, and an independent consolidation 
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enterprise. These case studies showed that these relations are diverse, strategic and 
attuned to overall consolidation in the flower industry as a directive from direct 
markets.  
 
The key finding in terms of intra-firm strategies for smallholders, was that those outside 
formal contractually bound (outgrower) groups are organized around what this 
research identifies as ‘collectives of convenience’. They are characterised as such due 
to their opportunistic, fluid and short-lived nature. Collectives of convenience should 
be seen as essential manifestations of farmers’ agency and important short-term life-
lines for market access but they do not qualify as ‘focal firms’. This is because they 
seldom successfully link production and marketing because they lack the social 
embeddedness necessary, and only opportunistically harness economies of scale 
required for market access.   
 
Overall, the thesis finds that inter-firm strategies point to processes of consolidation 
shaping direct markets in the global flower trade. As supermarkets become 
increasingly dominant in shaping demand for cut flowers, they prefer to form strategic 
partnerships with fewer, larger and more capable suppliers as ‘preferred suppliers’, 
who in turn prefer to work only with very large, sophisticated, capable producers to 
minimise coordination costs. This gives rise to what Nolan et. al (2009) describe as 
the ‘cascade effect’ in play. Smaller players have to rely on strategies of circumvention 
to supply niche markets and capture some value. 
 
Question 2 (c) establishes in chapter eight that the institutional constraints that cut 
flower producers are in the form of a proliferation of voluntary private initiatives that 
are either business-to business codes of conduct or mediated by third party 
certifications and often visible to consumers such as Fairtrade. These private 
initiatives are concerned primarily with communicating the quality of processes of 
production using environmental and social parameters. Secondly, cut flower producer 
networks also have to negotiate their way through the Kenyan regulatory system which 
is comprised of a myriad of taxation measures, traceability initiatives and regionally 
articulated trade policy around which there is intense contestation.  
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In answer to question 2 (c) there are three identified extra-firm strategies of bargaining 
- compliance, circumvention and contestation. These relations are summarised in 
table 8.3. and manifest bargaining power in two forms, episodic and non-decisional as 
outlined in chapter 2. Episodic bargaining power (Dahl 1961; Clegg 2002), refers to 
decision making situations shaped by rules, relations and resources which an actor 
uses strategically to get their way, while non-decisional bargaining power (Bachrach 
& Baratz (1962; 1963) is where one actor limits the scope of the political process 
available to the other actor, when issues are deliberately left out of the agenda by one 
of the actors. Capable mid-scale producers comply with the stringent supermarket 
certifications which stipulate exact, standardised volumes and varieties in line with 
seasons, and demand consistency of supply year-round from its suppliers. They do 
so in order to gain the coveted ‘preferred supplier’ status from supermarkets that 
ensures stability of market access.  
 
Producers such as smallholders who are typically less capable find creative ways of 
circumventing the meshwork of certifications that polices entry. For example, by 
seeking access to emergent markets such as Japan and the Middle East or 
specialised retail centres which much less emphasis on certifications for entry of cut 
flower exports markets. In the process of circumvention, the thesis identifies a case of 
non-decisional bargaining power where smallholders capitalise on their marginality in 
the political sphere to get around regulatory “barriers” such as payment of cess tax. 
 
 The third intra-firm strategy is in relation to state regulation and involves contestation 
often between the Kenya Flower Council, the flower industry’s powerful lobby group 
and state/regional actors. In a show of episodic bargaining power, the KFC harnesses 
the collective power of the mid and large scale flower industry which is anchored in 
elite ownership. With its considerable economic foothold in Kenya, the flower industry 
lobbies for preferential trade policy such as the Economic Partnership Agreement. 
These bargaining and manoeuvring strategies showcase the agency of producers in 
otherwise buyer-driven markets.   
   
The third thesis sub-question is premised on the acknowledgement of the flower 
industry as a knowledge intensive industry and asks: 
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Thesis sub-question 3: What is the nature of the interaction between cut flower 
producers’ activities and Kenya’s knowledge economy? 
a)   To what extent do producer networks introduce new technologies and 
methods of production? 
b)   How has the flower industry contributed to the systems of knowledge 
management in Kenya?  
c)   To what extent are there linkages between producer networks and Kenyan 
systems of knowledge production/ management? 
 
The analytical framework developed in chapter three of this thesis lays out the cut 
flower knowledge economy in terms of knowledge infrastructures, systems and 
relationships, visualised in figure 3.4.   
 
In answer to question 3 (a) which refers to knowledge infrastructures, the thesis 
establishes from field work that the cut flower industry has been at the forefront of 
introducing new technologies of production such as automated greenhouses, 
hydroponic systems and the use of IPM. There is a disjuncture from the local economy 
in localising the supply of simpler inputs and few systematic, institutional efforts to 
support the endogenisation of industry knowledge on the technology front. This 
situation is reinforced by the geo-politics and interests of transnational and local elite 
capital. The outcome is elements of ‘enclave formation’ (Melese & Helmsing, 2010) 
whereby the industry generates knowledge and use of new technologies, but 
circulates it only within its borders bound by the constraints and interests of capital. 
 
In answer to question 3 (b) which ties back to knowledge systems, the research finds 
that terms of systems of proprietary knowledge management, returns for breeders’ 
R&D efforts (described in chapter five) are secured through a tightly intermeshed 
system of Plant Variety Protections (PVP) under UPOV. While UPOV has helped to 
secure PVPs for multi-national foreign companies in the industry and thereby 
stimulated their investment in the industry, smallholder farmers have been increasingly 
marginalised from accessing export markets by its protocols of royalty collection and 
limitations on commercialising farm-saved and exchanged planting material. This 
imbalance shows the systematized dominance of European knowledge in the R&D for 
the sector, which contributes significantly to the reproduction of north-south 
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asymmetry of power in the cut flower production network. European technical 
managers still own and control the scientific knowledge behind these processes, and 
Kenyan technical managers whom they work with are only exposed to the mechanics 
of the same. This undermines possible value enhancement that could improve the 
global positioning of flower industries in the global south in the long-term.  
 
In regards to question 3 (c), related to knowledge relationships, connections in 
knowledge transfer are weak for example, between Kenyan flower farmers and the 
local research system. This disjuncture originates from the fact that public-sector 
research bodies are aligned to the food security agenda and flower sector research of 
commercial utility is deprioritized. The opportunities for collaboration are therefore 
sporadic and dependent on donor funding. The africanization of farm management 
over time since the 1990s has led to a transfer of knowledge between former European 
management and incoming African managers. However, the industry still relies on 
foreign consultants to oversee the upper reaches of technical issues. While 
managerial expertise abounds, the thesis argues that there is slow and limited 
endogenisation occurring at the uppermost levels of knowledge management. While 
research partnerships clearly exist, the challenge is a lack of systematic, strategic 
institutional collaboration.  
 
In sum, the core argument of my thesis is that in an industry characterised by low 
demand growth, buyer-driven governance, a proliferation of private codes of conduct, 
and dominated by giants of industry, Kenyan mid and small scale cut flower producers 
nevertheless maintain agency and bargaining power in seeking access to European 
markets. They do so through three main strategies which enable them to navigate the 
shifts in export markets. These include intra-firm strategies of managing supply that 
revolve around selection of flower varieties, labour and knowledge management; inter-
firm strategies for export market access focussed on a diversity of relationships with 
consolidator-exporter firms, and thirdly extra-firm strategies of bargaining with 
governance institutions, which include compliance, contestation through lobbying and 
circumvention. The argument was formed in response to the European industry 
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official441 (noted in the introduction) who expressed doubts as to how any farm smaller 
than sixty hectares might survive in this industry.  
 
This thesis has two overall empirical findings. The first is that to survive and thrive, mid 
and small scale producers must diversify. Diversification is the common factor in 
producers’ strategies for securing new lucrative export opportunities in a bifurcated 
market. The second finding linked closely to diversification is that knowledge of export 
market dynamics and deep social embeddedness in trade networks are the critical 
capabilities for the success of producers’ market access strategies.  
 
 
9.2. Contributions to knowledge 
My research has contributed to the advancement of knowledge first and foremost by 
shifting the orientation of knowledge production in this sector from the usual north-to-
south to an African-centred conversation, by focussing on the perspectives and 
experiences of producers from the global south, as analysed by a Kenyan researcher. 
The research pointed to the reproduction of the geopolitics of knowledge production 
in the enclaved concentration of R&D initiatives on cut flowers in Europe, and the 
limited transfer and endogenisation of knowledge at the R&D frontier that has occurred 
among Kenyan technical managers in over forty years of production experience.  
 
The research demystifies the production and marketing activities of mid-scale and 
smallholders by analytically segmenting them from large scale farms. Doing so 
enables us to hold a lens over their activities which are often overshadowed by the 
handful of dominant large-scale producers. It acknowledges the agency and creativity 
of Kenyan mid and small scale cut flower networks navigating shifting export markets, 
while manoeuvring through a complex governance web.  
 
The thesis also postulates new knowledge by identifying and characterising 
“collectives of convenience” among smallholders as a testament to their agency and 
the heterogeneity of modes of collective action. Relatedly, I characterise ‘consolidator-
                                                 
441 Anonymized. Receiver-manager of a large-scale flower farm in Naivasha.  
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exporters’ and make the case for their critical role as focal firms linking producers to 
the lucrative and previously uncharted direct markets.  
 
The thesis makes a number of novel theoretical contributions responding to the gap 
in literature engaging the GPN framework to analyse the dynamics of the Kenyan 
flower industry as a model high-value export horticulture sector in a developing 
country. It maps the GPN 1.0 categories of value, power and embeddedness to the 
Kenyan cut flower sector as summarised in appendix A. as a first step to macro 
analysis that illuminates political-economic realities of the industry. Secondly, it 
operationalises the GPN 2.0 lens by providing a schematic outlining the intra-, inter-, 
and extra-firm bargaining strategies of cut flower producers shown in table 3.1. Third, 
I critique GPN theory as doing little beyond the identification of the locations of power 
(corporate, institutional and collective) to explain the contestation and bargaining that 
occur given the asymmetry of power among actors. The thesis therefore argues that 
bargaining power is not so much a location as it is a practice intersecting corporate, 
institutional and collective power as shown in figure 3.3. 
 
By acknowledging the knowledge intensive nature of the cut flower industry, this thesis 
has uniquely introduced a discussion of the knowledge economy in relation to the 
flower industry, thereby expanding our understanding of the industry’s development 
impact.  
 
9.3. Implications of research 
This thesis sought to provide a deeper understanding of these producers’ 
perspectives, practices and power dynamics in the production network, rather than to 
provide policy prescriptions. With this caveat in mind, the main implication of my 
research for policy makers in the sector is to underscore that diversification is not a 
fall-back option but a conscious strategy in production and marketing for small and 
mid-scale producers.  
 
My research also underscores that any initiatives for market development in the sector 
must be premised on an understanding of the knowledge-intensity of the sector and 
the informality of trade networks therein. Despite the fast-paced façade of the day-to-
day operations of the sector, this industry is at its heart “a late bloomer”, in which 
  246 
actors spend lifetimes and invest generations in the slow cultivation of deep societal 
and network embeddedness that are absolutely critical to thriving in the trade. 
 
For smallholders seeking export market access, the main message of this thesis is 
then to cultivate deep network embeddedness by seeking out or forming stable 
contractual collectives to enhance opportunities for long-term, stable export market 
access, rather than to be part of multiple collectives of convenience. True to the nature 
of the late-blooming nature of the industry, the critical market knowledge is embedded 
in those informal networks and ties of trust which take time, strategy and consistency. 
There are no quick gains from participation in flower production, and as one farmer 
explained (in chapter seven), many “hearts have been broken” from this false 
expectation.  From this vantage point, it is possible to successfully partner with a 
capable consolidator-exporter who can provide knowledge on structure, dynamics and 
requirements of desirable export markets.  
 
Lastly, given the nature of demand that is increasingly being shaped by supermarket 
chains that seeks large, specified, certified volumes of cut flowers and packed-at-
source bouquets the survival of all producers other than the very large scale depends 
on collective action. For researchers and policy makers, this implies that only 
contractual collectives present real possibilities for strategic integration into global 
markets. Therefore, it is important to resolve weaknesses of group governance, 
cultivate institutional access to market knowledge, and build adaptive capabilities to 
enable groups to utilise and transform that knowledge into bargaining power.  
 
9.4. Areas for future research 
This thesis outlines a few areas where further research is required in the areas of cut 
flower production, policy, value-addition and local linkages and marketing and 
governance.  
 
In the realm of production in Kenya, these include: research on the reproduction of 
elite ownership structures in the Kenyan flower industry, and a longitudinal study of 
the factors affecting the productivity of general workers over time in flower farms. It 
would also be of interest to look into the impact of transnational capital in the form of 
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new trend of private equity investment442 in the Kenyan and Ethiopian flower industries 
(Silici & Locke, 2013), given the general expectation of fairly quick profits which are 
rare in the flower industry. Research on the participation of smallholders in the sector 
should begin with an updated baseline study (the last one being in 2010 by Fintrac). 
Since Kenyan smallholders are also involved as or linked to traders in the Nairobi 
Flower Market which is a mainstay of Nairobi’s daily economic activity, more research 
is required on quantifying the local flower trade, the dynamics of the local trade, florists 
and the link to the service economy that caters to corporate clients and special 
occasions such as weddings.  
 
At the top of the list for priorities in the sphere of policy is research on mobilising the 
opportunities arising out of devolution in Kenya to more creatively link the debate on 
the security of livelihoods of smallholders diversifying to cut flowers to the food security 
debate. Regarding the disjunctures identified in the knowledge economy, research is 
required on ways of building more robust knowledge flows between the Kenyan flower 
industry and Kenyan research bodies. Research is also required on building long-term 
institutional linkages between floriculture institutes in Europe and Kenyan agronomic 
research institutes. In terms of trade policy, there is a gap in knowledge on the nature 
of demand for Kenyan cut flowers in other African markets in particular Nigeria, which 
has a notable wedding planning service economy. Research on developments in trade 
policy between Kenya and Nigeria on the same would inform a growing south-south 
agenda in trade.  
 
There is also need for more research in the field of value-addition and local linkages 
to the economy for example: a feasibility study on the production of high quality 
cocopeat as a substrate for cut flower propagation. It is also necessary to explore the 
possibilities of manufacturing hydrosols and beauty products. Second, there is work 
to be done to develop mobile and farm-based refrigerated units adapted to the 
challenges of access to electricity (possibly linked to the renewable energy agenda) 
and poor road connectivity in rural areas, which would be suitable for and affordable 
to smallholders. There is also a booming and lucrative service industry linked to the 
                                                 
442 Examples of PE investments are highlighted in chapter six.  
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flower sector that is locally under-explored such as developing courses on cut flower 
arrangements for special occasions.  
 
Looking to marketing and governance, branding of Kenyan cut flowers is an emergent 
area of research interest443. While traceability mechanisms are strong, the visibility of 
Kenyan provenance in exported cut flowers is not. Research is required exploring the 
relationship between branding and the politics of provenance in the sector, and a 
quantification of possible value-added from branding. Other emergent areas for 
research linked to branding include the impact of digitisation of markets on the 
integration of developing country producers into global export markets. In terms of the 
politics of certification, research is required on the impact of the new trend of replacing 
third party certification (such as Fairtrade) with in-house supermarket certification on 
workers’ welfare. 
                                                 
443 This angle already has some local institutional backing. Brand Kenya partnered with the 
International Flower Trade Expo for a press-conference to highlight the sector’s strong global 
performance. Noting that flowers lose their country of origin tag on sale at the auction for example, the 
Brand Kenya board showcased the ‘Mark of Identity’ which seeks to distinguish Kenyan premium 
products locally and internationally. Accessed at: http://brandkenya.go.ke/brand-kenya/ach-9.php 
There are also opportunities to link the flower sector to tourism. Kenya already has a well-oiled 
marketing machine to promote tourism that could benefit the flower sector.   
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A (1).  VALUE IN GPN FRAMEWORK 
 
GLOBAL PRODUCTION NETWORK FRAMEWORK - MAPPING ONTO KENYAN CUT FLOWER EMPIRICAL STUDY 






Value creation is concerned with the use of 
technology to generate value, the various ways of 
converting labour power into labour, and the 




“(a) Technological rents derived from 
asymmetric access to technology 
 
-  Access to breeders' rights for special limited 
access to high value varieties 
- Access to high value technologies such as 
automated greenhouses, water systems, 
hydroponic technologies 
 
Value enhancement is derived from inter-firm 
processes of knowledge and technology transfer 
and industrial upgrading  
 
Examples:  
(a) Technology transfer 
- The extent of technology transfer is significant 
though the degree to which knowledge has been 
endogenised is arguable 
 
- Knowledge from the flower industry is delinked 
from institutional interaction with research 
centres and is siloed within the industry   
 
Value capture is dependent on government policy 
and corporate governance which facilitate the 
repatriation of profits or more indigenous 
ownership Chapter nine outlines contestations 
between the flower industry and the state on value 




- Taxation policies: The flower industry takes issue 
with duplication and multiplicity of taxes in Kenya 
after the institution of the county governments in 
2013.  
  
- There are also differing formulas of calculating 
tax revenues leading to contestation between 
farms and Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) 
officials. 
  
- Enactment of the transfer pricing rules in 2006 
has empowered KRA to sue some large-scale 
flower farms for tax evasion.  
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(b) Organisational rents 
Labour 
- Gendered hiring policies and exclusive 
gentlemen's mentorship networks that mean on 
flower plantations,  men get promoted to 
managerial positions but women have 
performance ceilings 
- Hiring permanent rather than seasonal labour 
due to shifts to stable direct markets that require 
labour year-round 
- Labour incentive structures that reward higher 
and higher productivity per worker e.g., paying 
extra per stem packed over daily targets 
- rewarding tacit rather than technical know-how 
(degrees) with promotions 
  
Variety management practices 
- “Triple S” : Specialisation, Scaling and 
Standardisation 
- Going niche 
 
(b) Capacity building between firms 
Little capacity building support between buyers 
and mid-scale farms which are already highly 
capable suppliers 
 
- Critical linkages between focal firms 
(consolidator-exporter) and smallholders in 
contractual collectives for agronomic support, 
training, inputs, certification 
  
Contractual collectives that partner with 
philanthropic capital and ‘ethical agents’ may 
receive support to meet the requirements of 
supermarket certification (see the Wilmar Agro. 
Ltd. - IIED case study in chapter eight)   
  
(c ) Relational rents 
- Development of marketing and value addition 
cluster among mid-scale farms. Case study: The 
Flower Hub 
- Development of mid-scale farms as hubs where 
smallholder fillers are brought and incorporated 




(c) Workers’ skills development over time in 
flower plantations 
 
- Mid-scale flower farms struggle with stagnant or 
declining worker productivity. There is an 
inherent tension between hiring under-educated 
workers and expecting an increase in 
productivity over time. Farms investment in 3-6 
months of worker training when they are first 
hired.  
  
- Fairtrade farms can institute skills training 
through stipulations of Fairtrade Premium 
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committees e.g., workers can receive training 
on tailoring, driving   
(d) Brand rents 
- Strategic market choice for producers: 
Entering the auction and building international 
image among big buyers for quality and 
consistency, and then transitioning into direct 
markets which are more stable 
 
- Product differentiation among 
consolidator/exporters: Suggestion of seasonal 
bouquets to supermarket that only they can 
supply from Kenyan producers, or production of 
niche varieties for occasional bouquets e.g., 
Bouvardia by the smaller mid-scale farms  
 
(d) Linkages to local firms  
- Supply of cocopeat - a production input in 
greenhouses by local firms is a possibility but 
has not been successfully piloted 
 
- Local innovation of water recycling systems 
using banana and arrowroots plantations along 
water ways to absorb chemical outflow 
 
- Development of a local packaging industry 
specific to the flower industry   
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APPENDIX A (2).  POWER IN GPN FRAMEWORK 
 
PRODUCTION NETWORK FRAMEWORK - MAPPING ONTO KENYAN CUT FLOWER EMPIRICAL STUDY 






Corporate power refers to the lead firm’s capacity 
to influence decisions and resource allocations, 
decisively and consistently in its own interests, 
through the control over key resources, like 
information, knowledge, skills and brands within a 
GPN (MacKinnon, 2012) 
 
Lead firms have power to some extent to shape 
decisions and influence resource allocations. 
However, small firms also have autonomy to 




- Mid and small scale flower farms have: 
Intra-firm strategies for production that revolves 
around (1) managing variety supply through 
diversification to the auction, ‘triple S’– 
specialisation, scaling and standardisation’ to 
direct markets, and going niche to differentiated 
direct markets (2) lowering costs of production 
through labour management 
 
- Inter-firm strategies for managing relationships 
with focal firms (consolidator-exporters). 
 
Institutional Power is embedded in those actors 




- National and local state power exercised 
through enforcing regulation e.g., KRA (Taxes), 
KEPHIS (Phyto-sanitary regulations), EPC, 
NEMA, WARMA (Environmental regulations) 
 
- International or inter-state agencies on 
enforcing trade policy e.g., EU for the negotiation 
of the Economic Partnership Agreement with the 
East African Community; Accession of Kenya to 
the 1991 act of the Union for the Protection of 
Plant Varieties (UPOV) convention which 
protects Plant Breeders’ Rights.  
 
- Private Voluntary Initiatives ascertaining the 
quality of processes of production including 
Business-to-Business codes (MPS, FFP); 
Kenyan certifications such as KFC silver and 
gold certifications Third party certification such 
as Fairtrade, Rain Forest Alliance; Supermarket 
codes such as Waitrose, Sainsbury's, Tesco 
 
Collective Power means the power of collective 




- Smallholders form ‘collectives of convenience’ as 
acts of resistance from perceived exploitation by 
outgrower firms (contractual collectives)  
  
- Trade Unions (KPAWU) which negotiate the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement every two years 
with the Flower Growers Group within the 
Agricultural Employer Association (AEA) 
 
- Industry associations such as the Kenya Flower 
Council, Fresh Produce Exporters Association of 
Kenya, lobby for the signing of the EPA, and for 
streamlining of industry tax structures 
 
- Royal FloraHolland, the Dutch flower Auction 
was set up as a growers’ cooperative structure, 
which managed to alter the governance of the 
trade from buyer-driven to producer-driven (Patel-
Campillo 2011)  
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- Extra-firm strategies of navigating through web 
of governance in the flower industry through 
compliance, contestation and circumvention   
 
- Bretton Woods Institutions e.g., IMF and World 
Bank that set up the push for liberalization in the 
sector 
 
- NGOs lobbying for improvement of working 
conditions such as Kenya Human Rights 
Commission, Women Working Worldwide, as 
well as those exposing financial exploitation 
within the industry e.g., Christian Aid, Oxfam   
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APPENDIX A (3).  EMBEDDEDNESS IN GPN FRAMEWORK 
 
PRODUCTION NETWORK FRAMEWORK - MAPPING ONTO KENYAN CUT FLOWER EMPIRICAL STUDY 






Territorial embeddedness captures how firms are 
anchored within a specific locality which affects 
prospects for development in that area 
 
Examples: 
- The embeddedness of firms in Lake Naivasha 
area for the ideal agro-ecological conditions and 
Mount Kenya region in search of higher altitude 
locations which enables them to diversify 
production to higher-value varieties  
  
Cut flower production in Kenya grew to take 
advantage of the liberal labour market policies 
which meant that wages were relatively lower 
than other comparative locations. The industry 
also attracts migrant labour and women who tend 
to be retained for longer due to lack of work 
options. 
 
Network embeddedness refers to the social 
connectivity within the GPN, the stability of the 
relationships and the importance of the network 
for its participants (Coe &Yeung 2015: 17) 
  
Examples: 
- Smallholder farmers in stable contractual 
collectives exit the group due to perceptions of 
financial exploitation to form more fluid 
‘collectives of convenience’ which are less 
stable, more opportunistic and based on trust 
between the farmers 
- Network embeddedness includes the process 
of building trust between agents, firms e.g., 
gentlemen's agreements; compliance with 
taxation, attending trade fairs in non-traditional 
markets; facilitating on-farm visits for potential 
buyers in new markets, record of compliance to 
industry codes and certifications   
 
Societal embeddedness developed by Hess 
(2004) refers to the 'genetic code' of the actor 
considering the importance of the cultural, 
institutional and historical origins of the actor in 
question e.g., this has an impact on work culture, 
attitudes to worker relations. Working conditions 
are carried by the firm from its home base to its 
new place of operation 
  
Examples: 
Might account for differences in work culture within 
foreign-owned firms e.g., between Indian owned 
vs. Kenyan or European owned firms though this 
was not explicitly explored in field work.  
  
Smallholder farmers often have little 
understanding of the aesthetic value of the cut 
flower as commodity being that they do not 




  255 






  256 




  257 





                                                 
444 Sample contract obtained from the Director of Wilmar Agro Ltd.  
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